EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 264071, August 13, 2024 ]
BEN D. LADILAD, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MARY GRACE BANDOY, RESPONDENTS.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
CAGUIOA, J.:
I concur in the ponencia. I write this Separate Concurring Opinion in the hopes that by tackling some of the issues raised during the deliberations of the case, I may be able to even slightly contribute to the jurisprudence relevant to this case.
During the case deliberations, it was suggested that while the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) delayed in resolving the preliminary investigation against Ben D. Ladilad (Ladilad) for violation of Section 261, paragraphs (g)1 and (h)2 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 95813 during the 2013 National and Local Elections, Ladilad already acquiesced to such delay for consciously allowing his motion for reconsideration to remain unresolved for eight years without objection. It was further raised that although Ladilad did file a motion for early resolution once, the same was made to expedite the resolution of the main case for preliminary investigation—not the motion for reconsideration, which is the specific stage in the case in which COMELEC incurred in delay.
I disagreed then—as I do now—and asked that the Court reconsider the suggestion being that it appeared to be contrary to settled jurisprudence of recent times.
In speedy disposition cases involving preliminary investigations, the period from when the complaint is filed to when the presence of probable cause is ultimately determined is counted for purposes of determining whether there was inordinate delay. This means that, if a motion for reconsideration is filed against the resolution in the main case, the period spent in resolving such motion for reconsideration is likewise considered, i.e., it is added to the period during which the main case remained unresolved. Thus, in Peñas v. COMELEC4 (Peñas), the Court, in assessing whether there was inordinate delay in the resolution of the complaint for the election offense of election overspending under Section 262 of the OEC, looked at or considered the pendency of the case from the filing of the Complaint on November 6, 2014, to the initial finding by the COMELEC en banc of probable cause on November 5, 2018, all the way to its denial of the motion for reconsideration on December 9, 2020. The Court ultimately held therein that the total period of more than six years delay in the preliminary investigation was inordinate, so that COMELEC did, in fact, committed a violation of Joseph Roble Peñas' right to speedy disposition of cases.
In the present case, following Peñas' computation, the total delay of COMELEC should be counted not just during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration. Rather, the period from the filing of the complaint on June 27, 2013, to the initial finding of probable cause by the COMELEC en banc on November 4, 2014, all the way to its resolution of the motion for reconsideration on September 27, 2022. Thus, a total of more than nine years should be the period considered in determining inordinate delay by COMELEC. After all, the entire period of delay was committed by just one body—the COMELEC—and the resolution of the main case itself was delayed although the period thereof is dwarfed by the protracted delay in the motion for reconsideration stage.
It makes sense, therefore, that an objection to such delay, made in any stage thereof as long as it has already arisen because the period under the relevant rules to resolve the case has lapsed, should still be considered in determining whether or not there was a waiver or acquiescence by the respondent. Here, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure (COMELEC Rules) requires the COMELEC en banc to resolve cases within 30 days from the time they are deemed submitted for resolution.5 When the COMELEC en banc first delayed in the resolution of the main case which ultimately took more than a year to resolve, Ladilad already filed a motion for early resolution.
That he failed to object again to the continued delay of COMELEC of eight more years in resolving the motion for reconsideration is of no moment. As held in Peñas, it is the duty of COMELEC to justify its delay the moment it fails to observe its own prescribed period to resolve cases.6 It is not respondent's responsibility to repeatedly remind COMELEC of such duty. Requiring litigants to regularly call the attention of the government to resolve pending cases, especially litigants who already did so previously, is unreasonable and encourages slackness on the part of government officials, who are expected to be aware of their own mandates.
Also, during the case deliberations, a distinction was submitted between Peñas and the present case in that, allegedly, the respondent in the former had no legitimate avenues to object to COMELEC's delay whereas Ladilad in this case had such opportunity and, in fact, did file a motion for early resolution in the main case.
To stress, Peñas, like Ladilad, also involved a preliminary investigation of an election offense case by COMELEC; thus, it treated therein the same COMELEC Rules as that which applies here. It stands to reason then that the lack of any legitimate avenue to object to delay during COMELEC's preliminary investigation in the Peñas case, is likewise true in the present preliminary investigation case for the election offense of illegal transfer by Ladilad.ℒαwρhi৷
Indeed, the "legitimate avenue" to invoke the right to speedy disposition of cases refers to interlocutory pleadings which the relevant rules sanction, such as a motion to dismiss. It cannot refer to just about any action such as a motion for early resolution which merely prays to expedite the resolution of the case and does not invoke a fundamental right such as the right to speedy disposition of cases which can ultimately lead to—as it does in the present Decision of the Court—the dismissal of the Complaint. Peñas referred to the case of Javier v. Sandiganbayan,7 where the Court noted that the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure prohibits motions to dismiss, except those grounded on lack of jurisdiction, leading it to conclude that there were no legitimate avenues in preliminary investigations before the Ombudsman to invoke the subject right.8 Peñas, noting that the COMELEC Rules likewise has such prohibition, arrived at the same conclusion that there was no proper channel to object to inordinate delay by COMELEC in preliminary investigation cases.9 Needless to say, the same is true for Ladilad, being covered by the same COMELEC Rules that applied in Peñas. In short, Ladilad also lacked legitimate avenue to question the delay committed by COMELEC in resolving the preliminary investigation of the complaint against him.
In light of the foregoing, I hereby concur in the ponencia.
Footnotes
1 SECTION 261. Prohibited Acts. – The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
. . . .
(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases. — During the period of forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-owned or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any new employee, whether provisional, temporary or casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought unless, it is satisfied that the position to be tilled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a manner that may influence the election.
As an exception to the foregoing provisions, a new employee may be appointed in case of urgent need: Provided, however, That notice of the appointment shall be given to the Commission within three days from the date of the appointment. Any appointment or hiring in violation of this provision shall be null and void.
(2) Any government official who promotes, or gives any increase of salary or remuneration or privilege to any government official or employee, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations.
2 SECTION 261. Prohibited Acts. – The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
. . . .
(h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service. – Any public official who makes or causes any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or employee in the civil service including public school teachers, within the election period except upon prior approval of the Commission.
3 In the Matter of Enforcing the Prohibitions Against Appointment or Hiring of New Employees, Creating or Filling of New Positions, Giving Any Salary Increase or Transferring or Detailing Any Officer or Employee in the Civil Service and Suspension of Elective Local Officials, in Connection with the May 13, 2013 Automated Synchronized National, Local and ARMM Regional Elections (2012).
4 UDK-16915, February 15, 2022 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, First Division].
5 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 18, sec. 7.
6 Peñas v. COMELEC, supra note 4, at 14. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
7 873 Phil. 951 (2020) [Per J. Caguioa, First Division].
8 Peñas v. COMELEC, supra note 4, at 16. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
9 Id. at 17. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
