Manila
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 264071, August 13, 2024 ]
BEN D. LADILAD, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MARY GRACE BANDOY, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
HERNANDO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order, Status Quo Ante Order, and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,1 assailing the Resolution2 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc, and the Resolution3 of the Office of the Regional Election Director-Cordillera Administrative Region (ORED-CAR), in E.O. Case No. 13-261.
Relevant Factual Antecedents
On June 27, 2013, Mary Grace Bandoy (Bandoy), a graft researcher, filed a Complaint4 against Ben Ladilad (Ladilad) and Luciana M. Villanueva (Villanueva) for violation of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), in particular, Section 261, paragraphs (g)5 and (h),6 in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 9581,7 before the COMELEC, for acts allegedly committed during the election period of the 2013 national, local, and Administrative Region of Muslim Mindanao elections.
Ladilad was the President of Benguet State University (BSU). Villanueva, on the other hand, was the Vice President for Research and Extension (OVPRE), also of BSU.
In such capacities, Ladilad and Villanueva were accused to have caused the illegal detail and transfer within BSU offices of Gretchen Gaye Ablaza (Ablaza) and Frances Noelle* Escalera (Escalera), both BSU employees. Ablaza was transferred from the Graduate School Office (GSO) to the OVPRE on March 25, 2013, through a letter dated March 8, 2013, penned by Villanueva, and approved by Ladilad:8
March 8, 2013
DR. BEN D. LADILAD
President
Benguet State University
La Trinidad, Benguet
SIR:
Upon the recommendation of the Human Resource Development Committee (HRDC), the application for study leave of Ms. Ammie S. Dayao, staff under the Office of the Vice President for Research and Extension, has been approved effective January 28, 2013 to March 31, 2013. However, in the absence of a stand-in for her post, she was not able to undertake all her planned activities for the period.
As per discussion with Mr. Wagner F. Grande, head of the Human Resource Management Office, I learned that Ms. Gretchen Gaye C. Ablaza, shall be completing her study leave by March 25, 2013. Prior to her leave, Ms. Ablaza was assigned at the Graduate School Office who was later replaced by Ms. Elvie P. Allatis. In view of this, may I request that Ms. Ablaza be assigned to the OVPRE when she shall return for work. She will be of great assistance to the R&E Sector especially in the field of social research considering her expertise in education management.
Thank you very much and looking forward for your favorable response to this request.
Very truly yours
(sgd.)
LUCIANA M. VILLANUEVA
Vice-President for Research and Extension
APPROVED:
(sgd.)
BEN D. LADILAD, Ph. D. CESO III
President9
Meanwhile, Escalera was transferred from the Internal Auditing Service (IAS) to the Human Resource Management Office (HRMO), considering that her initial detail in the HRMO covering the period of March 5, 2012 to March 5, 2013, was about to expire.10 The questioned detail took effect on March 6, 2013, through Office Order 47, Series of 2013 issued by Ladilad:11
05 March 2013
OFFICE ORDER 47
Series of 2013
| To: |
MS. FRANCES NOEL G. ESCALERA |
| Subject: |
DETAIL AT THE HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT OFFICE (HRMO) |
1. In the exigency of public service, you are hereby ordered to be detailed at the HRMO effective March 6, 2013;
2. As a detailed personnel, you are expected to assist in the implementation of governing laws, rules and policies relative to human resource administration, and other related concerns;
3. It is desired that you shall perform your duties and responsibilities with utmost dedication, commitment and sincerity;
4. This Office Order shall remain in full force until revoked by this office.
5. Please be guided accordingly.
BEN D. LADILAD
President12
Ladilad and Villanueva contended that the assignments of Ablaza and Escalera were exempted from the election ban. There was no transfer involved, since what the law prohibits is the actual and physical transfer of an employee from one unit or geographical location to another. Ablaza was granted a study leave from November 5, 2012 to March 24, 2013, during which one Elvie Altatis replaced her at the GSO.13 Ablaza was allegedly merely given a post to which she can report back to work after her study leave,14 and that her assignment to the OVPRE was an inevitable offshoot of a series of personnel movements that transpired before the election period.15
On the other hand, Escalera's detail to the HRMO by virtue of Office Order 47, Series of 2013 was merely done to hold in abeyance her return to her previous post in the IAS. They aimed to avert the consequences of prohibited transfers during the election ban, as Escalera's original detail in the HRMO per Office Order 030, Series of 2012,16 that ran for a period of one year from March 5, 2012, was set to expire on March 5, 2013.17 Escalera's work still pertained to IAS's functions despite being performed in HRMO, and thus, there was no transfer.18
Ruling of the Office of the Regional Election Director-Cordillera Administrative Region
The ORED-CAR recommended the filing of a case for violation of the OEC, Sec. 261(h), against Ladilad in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 9581,19 based on the finding that while Ablaza was not technically transferred, Escalera's detail still fell within the prohibition.20
In Ablaza's case, the ORED-CAR construed transfer as physically and concurrently "taking [out an] employee from one unit or department or geographical unit, and the putting of such employee into another unit or department of the government... In the instant case, Ablaza was already out of the [GSO] long before the effectivity of the election ban[,] although her deployment took place during the election period. Having been taken out from and being replaced in [the GSO was] but a logical and inevitable consequence of her study leave."21 As such, Ablaza's assignment to the OVPRE, as caused by Ladilad and Villanueva, did not need to be authorized by the COMELEC, and thus, not a transfer punishable under election laws.
As regards Escalera, on the other hand, the ORED-CAR deemed Escalera's detail to be a transfer within the purview of Sec. 261(h) in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 9581, as Ladilad's Office Order indicates on paper that she was being moved from her post in the IAS to the HRMO.22 Thus, it recommended the filing of a criminal information against Ladilad.
The dispositive portion of the ORED-CAR Resolution dated May 18, 2014, reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, on the ground of existence of probable cause, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS to the Law Department the filing of a Criminal Information against respondent Ben D. Ladilad for violation of paragraph (h) of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Comelec Resolution No. 9581.23 (Emphasis supplied)
The case was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc.
Ruling of the Commission on Elections En Banc
The COMELEC En Banc considered Ablaza and Escalera's personnel movements as transfers prohibited during the 2013 election period. Thus, it found probable cause against both Ladilad and Villanueva and indicted them for violation of the OEC, Sec. 261(h), in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 9581.
The dispositive portion of the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated November 4, 2014, reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission En Banc RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to ADOPT with MODIFICATION the Resolution dated May 26, 2014 of the Office of the Regional Election Director-Cordillera Administrative Region. ACCORDINGLY, the Law Department of this Commission is hereby DIRECTED to FILE a criminal charge against respondents Ben D. Ladilad and Luciana M. Villanueva for violation of Section 261, paragraph (h) of the Omnibus Election Code as implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 9581.
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis in the original)
Ladilad and Villanueva moved for reconsideration25 of the COMELEC Resolution dated November 4, 2014, which the COMELEC En Banc denied in its Resolution26 dated September 27, 2022.
Now before the Court is the Petition for Certiorari by Ladilad alone.
Issue
Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it found probable cause against Ladilad for violation of the OEC, Sec. 261(h), in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 9581?
Our Ruling
The petition is granted.(awÞhi(
Ladilad asserts that there was no transfer effected on Escalera and Ablaza,27 and alleges that the COMELEC incurred inordinate delay in resolving the case.28
On the latter issue, Ladilad claims that his right to the speedy disposition of the case was violated when it took the COMELEC almost eight years, or until September 27, 2022, to resolve his and Villanueva's Motion for Reconsideration29 of the Resolution dated November 4, 2014. Ladilad decries that he was disadvantaged by the uncertainties of the potential criminal case that may be filed against him; that he was forced to live under a cloud of anxiety and suspicion; that his reputation as a former BSU President was besmirched; and that the delay in the resolution of his Motion for Reconsideration impaired his defense in the event of a full-blown trial.30
Pursuant to the guidelines laid out in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan (Cagang)31 in the assessment of the existence of inordinate delays, particularly on how the right against such delays is invoked, We declare that the resolution of this case before the COMELEC was inordinately delayed.
We focus on the third and fifth guidelines as laid out in Cagang:
Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the right is invoked within the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, and the time periods that will be promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay.
If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove[,] first, whether the case is motivated by malice or clearly only politically motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the defense did not contribute to the delay.
Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove first, that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.
. . . .
Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.32 (Emphasis supplied)
We also clarified in Baya v. Sandiganhayan33 that inordinate delay in case disposal, for such to constitute a ground for dismissal, is not just a matter of a lapse of time. What constitutes "vexatious, capricious, and oppressive" delay is determined not by mere mathematical reckoning, but in an ad hoc, case-to-case basis.34 Baya laid out the four factors comprising the balancing act by which courts determine whether or not a person's right to a speedy disposition of cases is violated:
The four (4) factors—(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the respondent's assertion of the right, and (4) prejudice to the respondent—are to be considered together, not in isolation. The interplay of these factors determine whether the delay was inordinate.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Per COMELEC Rules of Procedure, any case or matter submitted to or heard by the COMELEC En Banc shall generally be decided within 30 days from the date it is deemed submitted for decision or resolution.36 Eight years passed before the COMELEC decided Ladilad and Villanueva's Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated November 4, 2014, that found them probably guilty of a violation of the OEC. Given eight years of inaction, the COMELEC now bore the burden of evidence of justifying the delay. However, it has never offered any explanation as to why it took eight years to resolve a motion for reconsideration. There was no mention that it followed its established procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigations and in the prosecution of the case. It did not aver in the slightest that the issues raised in the Motion for Reconsideration were so difficult and complex, or that the case records so voluminous, to reasonably require eight years of evaluation and resolution. The COMELEC also remained silent when Ladilad decried prejudice against him by reason of this eight-year delay. From these circumstances, the delay cannot be said to be reasonable.
In Peñas v. Commission on Elections,37 a formal complaint against Joseph Roble Peñas (Peñas) Was filed on November 6, 2014 for a violation of the OEC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7166, in particular, Sec. 100, in relation to Sec. 262, for election overspending. It took the COMELEC six years from the filing of the complaint to conclude the preliminary investigation and to resolve Peñas's case. Unfortunately, the COMELEC failed to justify its delay in concluding the preliminary investigation. Consequently, the Court declared that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion for its unjustified delay in resolving Peñas's case.
In the present case, it took the COMELEC eight years to resolve Ladilad's and Villanueva's Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated November 4, 2014, which found probable cause to indict them for a violation of the OEC. Worse, no explanation was offered to justify the said delay, except the sole argument that Ladilad had already waived his right to a speedy disposition of cases for his failure to timely raise the same.38
In order to resolve this issue, a review of the timeline of events is in order.
Bandoy filed the Affidavit-Complaint against Ladilad and Villanueva before the COMELEC ORED-CAR on June 27, 2013.39 Ladilad and Villanueva submitted their Counter-Affidavit on September 13, 2013, and their Supplemental Affidavit on October 14, 2013.40 On May 18, 2014, the COMELEC ORED-CAR issued its Resolution recommending the filing of a criminal information against Ladilad, and dismissing the case against Villanueva.41 Ladilad and Villanueva elevated the case to the COMELEC En Banc. On September 4, 2014, Ladilad filed a Motion for Early Resolution of his case.42
On November 4, 2014, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution modifying the COMELEC ORED-CAR Resolution dated May 18, 2014, and directing the filing of a criminal charge against both Ladilad and Villanueva for a violation of the OEC, Sec. 261(h), in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 9581.43 Ladilad filed a Motion for Reconsideration on November 17, 2014,44 and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on November 19, 2014.45 However, it was only on September 27, 2022, or after almost eight years, that the COMELEC resolved the same.46
Given that Ladilad moved for the early resolution of his case on September 14, 2014, when the COMELEC failed to decide his appeal within 30 days as prescribed in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 18, Section 7,47 it is incorrect for the COMELEC to say that Ladilad had waived his right to a speedy disposition of cases. On the contrary, Ladilad did not sleep on his rights. Certainly, this could not be construed as acquiescence to the delay.48
Whether or not the Motion for Early Resolution was directed against his pending motion for reconsideration, the fact remains that he invoked his right to a speedy disposition of his case at one point during the proceedings before the COMELEC En Banc. Even if Ladilad did not follow through the resolution of his Motion for Reconsideration thereafter, it cannot be concluded solely from this fact that Ladilad was already deemed to have acquiesced to the COMELEC's delay, to all its consequences, and to the alleged prejudice to his person, reputation, and future defense, and had effectively waived his right to the speedy disposition of his Motion for Reconsideration. After all, aggrieved litigants need not always register their objections to a delay in the case proceedings to preserve their right to the speedy disposition of their cases. Parties are not duty-bound to follow up on their case that is pending before the courts and tribunals.49 It is the governing agency, the COMELEC in this instance, that is tasked to promptly resolve it.50
Certiorari petitions must be grounded on allegations and evidence of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion is that arbitrary, despotic, and whimsical exercise of discretion as to amount to a lack of jurisdiction.51 Here, the COMELEC adopted the ORED-CAR's recommendations and directed Ladilad and Villanueva's indictment on November 4, 2014, or after the lapse of one year and five months from the time the complaint was filed. In addition, it took the COMELEC eight years, via its Resolution dated September 27, 2022, to deny Ladilad and Villanueva's Motion for Reconsideration, which effectively merely affirmed its recommendation for indictment dated November 4, 2014. By all means, the COMELEC's leisurely manner of handling and disposing the preliminary investigation proceedings against Ladilad had been arbitrary, despotic, and whimsical, and worse, unjustified.
Withal, the Court holds that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it incurred inordinate delay in finding probable cause against Ladilad for a violation of the OEC, specifically, Sec. 261(h).
Considering the foregoing, there is no more imperative to discuss the substantive issues regarding the transfers of Ablaza and Escalera.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections En Banc dated November 4, 2014 and September 27, 2022, and the Resolution of the Office of the Regional Election Director-Cordillera Administrative Region in E.O. Case No. 13-261 dated May 18, 2014, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Leonen, SAJ., Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gesmundo, C.J. and Caguioa, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Singh*, J., on official leave but left her vote.
Footnotes
* On official leave.
1 Rollo, pp. 3-20.
2 Id. at 37-52; 74-79. The November 4, 2014 Resolution in E.O. Case No. 13-261 was decided by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., and Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle, Elias R. Yusoph, Christian Robert S. Lim, Al A. Parreño, Luie Tito F. Guia, and Arthur D. Lim of the Commission on Elections, Intramuros, Manila. The September 27, 2022 Resolution in E.O. Case No. 13-261 was decided by Chairman George Erwin M. Garcia, and Commissioners Socorro B. Inting, Marlon S. Casuejo, Aimee P. Ferolino, and Rey E. Bulay of the Commission on Elections, Intramuros, Manila.
3 Id. at 24-36. The May 18, 2004 Resolution was erroneously referred to as the "Resolution dated 26 May 2014 of the Office of the Regional Election Director-Cordillera Administrative Region" in the dispositive portion of the assailed COMELEC Resolution dated November 4, 2014.
4 Id. at 294-299.
5 Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. – The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
....
(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases. – During the period of forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-owned or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any new employee, whether provisional, temporary or casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought unless, it is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a manner that may influence the election.
As an exception to the foregoing provisions, a new employee may be appointed in case of urgent need: Provided, however, That notice of the appointment shall be given to the Commission within three days from the date of the appointment. Any appointment or hiring in violation of this provision shall be null and void.
(2) Any government official who promotes, or gives any increase of salary or remuneration or privilege to any government official or employee, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations.
6 Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. – The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
....
(h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service. – Any public official who makes or causes any transfer or detail whatever of any officer or employee in the civil service including public school teachers, within the election period except upon prior approval of the Commission.
7 In the Matter of Enforcing the Prohibitions against Appointment or Hiring of New Employees, Creating or Filling of New Positions, Giving Any Salary Increase or Transferring or Detailing Any Officer or Employee in the Civil Service and Suspension of Elective Local Officials, in Connection with the May 13, 2013 Automated Synchronized National, Local and ARMM Regional Elections (2012).
* Noel in some parts of the rollo.
8 Rollo, p. 367.
9 Id.
10 Rollo, p. 39, COMELEC Resolution dated November 4, 2014.
11 Id. at 301.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 75.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 160.
16 Id. at 348.
17 Id. at 340, Counter-Affidavit (Ladilad and Villanueva) before the ORED-CAR.
18 Id.
19 In the Matter of Enforcing the Prohibitions against Appointment or Hiring of New Employees, Creating or Filling of New Positions, Giving Any Salary Increase or Transferring or Detailing Any Officer or Employee in the Civil Service and Suspension of Elective Local Officials, in Connection with the May 13, 2013 Automated Synchronized National, Local and ARMM Regional Elections (2012).
20 Rollo, p. 33 (dorsal page).
21 Id. at 165, ORED-CAR Resolution dated May 18, 2014.
22 Id. at 166-167.
23 Id. at 33 (dorsal page).
24 Id. at 51.
25 Id. at 53-64.
26 Id. at 74-79.
27 Id. at 12-16.
28 Id. at 16-18.
29 Id. at 53-64, filed on November 17, 2014.
30 Id. at 18.
31 837 Phil. 815 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
32 Id. at 880-882.
33 876 Phil. 57 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
34 Id. at 94-95.
35 Id. at 101.
36 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, rule 18, sec. 7.
37 UDK-16915, February 15, 2022 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, First Division].
38 Rollo, pp. 103-104.
39 Id. at 40.
40 Id. at 42.
41 Id. at 24-36.
42 Id. at 239-242.
43 Id. at 51.
44 Id. at 53-64.
45 Id. at 71.
46 Id. at 74-79.
47 Section 7. Period to Decide by the Commission En Banc. – Any case or matter submitted to or heard by the Commission en banc shall be decided within thirty (30) days from the date it is deemed submitted for decision or resolution, except a motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution of a Division in Special Actions and Special Cases which shall be decided within fifteen (15) days from the date the case or matter is deemed submitted for decision, unless otherwise provided by law.
48 Javier v. Sandiganbayan, 873 Phil. 951, 967 (2020) [Per J. Caguioa, First Division].
49 See Peñas v. Commission on Elections, UDK-16915, February 15, 2022 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier, First Division].
50 Id.
51 Tirol v. Tayengco-Lopingco, G.R. No. 211017, March 15, 2022 [Per J. Inting, First Division].
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