EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34636 May 30, 1974
JOSE R. OLIVEROS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Coronel Law Office for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Hector C. Fule and Solicitor Jose F. Racela, Jr. for respondents.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
While on the whole in agreement with the able opinion of Justice Teehankee, even if the stress on certain principles may be too unqualified, I am of the view that the question before us could likewise be dealt with from the rather narrow standpoint of how the power of a court to adjudge a party in contempt should be exercised. While not absolutely necessary then, nothing would be lost if I add these few words by way of explaining my stand.
It is difficult to explain, much less justify, the action of the lower court in finding petitioner in contempt of court and sentencing him to four months of imprisonment with a fine of P300.00. It seems to me that as pointed out in the opinion of Justice Teehankee, there was a failure to abide by the demands of substantive due process. It would be to ignore this guarantee of justice and of fairness if under the circumstances disclosed, petitioner's action is to be stigmatized as contumacious. There is nothing offensive to reason in what was done by him. He could plausibly look upon the termination of his term as tolling the suspension order for, as was pointed out by Justice Teehankee, had he not run for re-election, it would have automatically expired. There appears to be more than a taint of arbitrariness then in adjudging him guilty of a wilful defiance of what is commanded by a court of justice. There was not, to my mind, the least sign of intransigence. At the most, there was an honest mistake. It would be then a departure from settled and venerable concepts, having their roots in the traditions and conscience of a people loath to countenance excessive display of authority, if the lower court were to be sustained.
More than that, however, the overriding concern of this brief opinion is the potentiality for arbitrariness that the contempt power lends itself to.ℒαwρhi৷ A man on the bench must be on guard to be wary not only of his predilections but likewise of his sensitiveness to what may be considered as slights to the dignity of a court. Nonetheless, the occasions do present themselves when, even with the utmost care exercised, one who is both prosecutor and judge may be at times misled by factors infused with the personal element. Even if it were not thus, the impression of the lay public may be precisely that. It is not so much for the sake of the judge alone then, but much more so for the faith that the people have in the administration of justice, that the propensity to see disobedience or disrespect in conduct that at worst may be an insufficient understanding of what a court order means should be curbed. There must be caution and hesitancy on the part of judges whenever the possible exercise of this awesome prerogative presents itself. "The power to punish for contempt," as was pointed out by Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban,1 "should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindicative principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail."2 The lower court, to my mind, failed to meet such a rigid but commendable test.
Hence my concurrence with the thorough opinion of Justice Teehankee, subject to the above observation.
Footnotes
1 39 Phil. 778 (1919).
2 Ibid, 798.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I concur.
I believe it is but fair and just that petitioner is exonerated of the charge of contempt levelled against him for having assumed, on January 1, 1972, or after his re-election in November, 1971, the office of Mayor of Antipolo, Rizal from which he was suspended by the trial court's order of September 26, 1971, it not being indubitable that he knowingly and maliciously violated said order of suspension.
The conviction for contempt rendered by respondent judge unto petitioner is unquestionably criminal in character and ought not to have been imposed without certainty as to its propriety and correctness. It was a little harsh on the part of the trial court to assume that petitioner would easily understand the exact juridical implications of his re-election vis-a-vis his suspension, having in view particularly the doctrine in Pascual vs. Provincial Board.1 When it is considered that even among the members of the Court there is a sharp difference of opinion regarding the matter, because the legal issues involved, apart from being of first impression, are not susceptible of facile determination, thus requiring some time for the Court to resolve, it can be readily seen how the trial court failed to be more considerate in dealing with petitioner's desire to serve the term to which the people elected him. The worst that can be said of petitioner is that he ignored the provisions of Section 13 of Republic Act 3019. In a sense, it cannot be very properly held against him that he violated the order of suspension of September 25, 1971 because said order makes no express reference to his re-election, and ordinarily and as Section 5 of the Decentralization Act, Rep. Act 5185, provides in pari materia, "the penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent". On the other hand, in principle and under existing laws, a preventive suspension is supposed to be for a fixed period, oftentimes not more than sixty days, which, in the case of petitioner's suspension, if it were subject to the ordinary rules, would have ended on November 24, 1971. (Fourth paragraph of the same Section 5 and the Civil Service Act and Rules.) Stated otherwise, the only possible error of petitioner in assuming office on January 1, 1972 relates to an open and unprecedented question of law on which varying views can be espoused with no little degree of plausibility. Indeed, the main opinion says on this point:
Here, a strong case for petitioner's belief in bona fide that the suspension order of September 25, 1971 was not applicable to the new term of office to which he was subsequently re-elected has been made out. Petitioner has reason to complain that the suspension order did not prohibit him from assuming the office to which he was re-elected — which re-election was concededly an eventuality not contemplated or covered by the said order — and hence he should not be held guilty of having willfully and deliberately disobeyed the suspension order when he performed the act (of assuming office, as mayor for a new term) which was not prohibited nor even contemplated in the order.
In such kind of situations, where serious conflict of legal can exist, this Court has held that upholding one view and acting thereon cannot be considered as malicious and in bad faith, for the simple reason that then, there is no conscious, willful and deliberate act, much less a knowing transgression of the law. Thus, in Kasilag vs. Rodriguez, 69 Phil 217, at pages 230-231, the Court held:
Borrowing the language of Article 433, the question to be answered is whether the petitioner should be deemed a possession in good faith because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated. It will be noted , that ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the rule. From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce nor presume that petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in section 116. This being the case, question is whether good faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws. Manresa, commenting on article 434 in connection with the preceding article, sustains the affirmative. He says:
According to this author, gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. These considerations again bring us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith.
We do not believe that in real life there are not many cases of good faith founded upon an error of law. When the acquisition appears in a public document, the capacity of the parties has already been passed upon by competent authority, and even established by appeals taken from final judgments and administrative remedies against the qualification of registrars, and the possibility of error is remote under such circumstances; but, unfortunately, private documents and even verbal agreements far exceed public documents in number, and while no one should be ignorant of the law, the truth is that even we who are called upon to know and apply it fall into error not infrequently. However, a clear, manifest, and truly unexcusable ignorance is one thing, to which undoubtedly refers article 2, and another and different thing is possible and excusable error arising from complex legal principles and from the interpretation of conflicting doctrines.
But even ignorance of the law may be based upon an error of fact, or better still, ignorance of a fact is possible as to the capacity to transmit and as to the intervention of certain persons, compliance with certain formalities and appreciation of certain acts, and an error of law is possible in the interpretation of doubtful doctrines.' (Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code, Volume IV, pp. 100, 101 and 102.)
The good faith of petitioner, however, is a good defense only to the charge of contempt. On that basis, We have no alternative but to exonerate him. The continuation of his suspension is something else.
The provision of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act involved is worded thus:
SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. (See RA 5185, section 5, approved September 12, 1967.) Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
To my mind, the words "(A)ny public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending" are used advisedly in order to emphasize that it is the mere pendency of the criminal prosecution that is the criterion for suspension of the officer concerned, regardless of whether the accused is in office or not at the time of the actual filing of the information or even on the date of the alleged commission of the offense. For instance, even a private person not in the employ of the government may commit graft or corruption both under Rep. Act 3019 and the Revised Penal Code provisions on bribery. Should he be actually prosecuted and while his case is pending, he is elected or appointed to an office, he has to be suspended mandatorily as soon as the court makes a finding that the information is valid. (Luciano vs. Governor, cited in the main opinion.) For another example, if an elective officer is charged with graft and corruption or bribery and he is suspended, and he happens to be still under suspension at the expiration of his term because his case has not been terminated, and his case continues pending for a long time, such that even after the term of the official succeeding him, it has not yet been terminated, if said accused should run after the gap and win, the mere pendency of his case disable him from assuming the office, not withstanding his new election.
It could be different, however, if the provision were simply to the effect that the officer charged shall be suspended should a criminal case be "filed" against him, for, then, there could be some ground to maintain, as the main opinion asserts, that the order of suspension would necessarily contemplate only the term current at the time the order is issued. It would be questionable or controversial if any succeeding term may be deemed as also contemplated, hence, the extension of the suspension to the next term would be legally doubtful.
The reason for basing the suspension on the continued pendency of the case regardless of the date when the offense is supposed to have been committed and of the term when the order of suspension is issued is obvious. The law would make it impossible for the accused to take advantage of his position in any attempt to thwart in one way or another the prosecution against him. Besides, to some extent, there having been conducted a preliminary investigation of the accusation and the judge has found that the information is valid, a prima facie of serious official misconduct may be said to exist against him, which, from the moral as well as the purely realistic points of view, taints him with a stigma of unworthiness, thereby detracting in no little measure from his usefulness as a public servant and marring, if he should be allowed to continue in office, the ideal moral image of the public service. It is the laudable objective of the law to keep the service constantly manned only by officials and employees with unblemished reputation, to better serve the public interest and thus preserve the faith of the people in their government.
In the light of these considerations, I am inclined to agree with Mr. Justice Esguerra that the petitioner's suspension must be considered as continuous as long as the criminal prosecution against him has not been finally terminated, and that his election to a new term did not remove the fact that the case against him is still pending, hence the people must be understood as having elected him anew with the knowledge that he can assume the office only after he is cleared; it is not the other way around, as contended by petitioner, that his re-election was virtual clemency if not exculpation ordained by his constituents, it being well settled, and I believe rightly, that election or re-election can at best cleanse the candidate only of administrative liability thereby relieving him of the corresponding sanction therefor.2 To require a new order of suspension, would make compliance with the intention of the law, just discussed, dependent on the actual issuance thereof by the judge, which requirement, apart from its being open to unforeseeable problems and complications entailing consequent delay, even for a few days, is not consistent with the strict morality that underlies the provision in question. The fact that this Court has held in Luciano, supra, that the suspension is mandatory does not foreclose such undesirable possibility.
My vote, therefore, is that the respondent judge did not err in holding that petitioner has no right to assume the office of Mayor of Antipolo to which he has been re-elected, until after he has been acquitted by final judgment in the pending criminal case against him, although said respondent erred in finding petitioner guilty of contempt, it being evident, as discussed above that said petitioner acted in good faith and without unlawful intent in disregarding the order of suspension of September 25, 1971.
Footnotes
1 Cited in the main opinion.
2 See the cases cited in the main opinion.
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