Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34636 May 30, 1974
JOSE R. OLIVEROS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Coronel Law Office for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Hector C. Fule and Solicitor Jose F. Racela, Jr. for respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
In setting respondent court's order of January 26, 1972 convicting petitioner of contempt of court and sentencing him to four months imprisonment and to pay a fine of P300.00 for having assumed office as mayor of Antipolo, Rizal since January 1, 1972 for the new term (1972- 1975) to which he had been re-elected on the ground that this was willful disobedience of respondent court's order of September 25, 1971 which suspended him from the same office of mayor of Antipolo, Rizal during his previous term (1968-1971), the Court holds that the challenged order of January 26, 1972 ruling that its suspension order of September 25, 1971 was "still subsisting" and applied to petitioner's new term of office to which he had been re-elected anew (beginning on January 1, 1972) cannot be retroactively applied against petitioner in the criminal contempt proceedings.
The suspension order of September 25, 1971 suspending petitioner mayor from office covered only his then current term of office (January 1, 1968 to December 31, 1971) and no other term. Petitioner's reelection to the same office of mayor of Antipolo for a new term (January 1, 1972 to December 31, 1975) despite his pending anti-graft criminal case (by virtue whereof the suspension order was issued against him) was concededly an eventuality and an uncertain and unknown future event not contemplated or covered by the suspension order. Hence, he should not be held guilty of having "willfully and deliberately disobeyed the suspension order" when his act of assumption of office as mayor for a new term after his reelection by the electorate of Antipolo was not prohibited nor even contemplated in the said suspension order.
On September 25, 1971 after due notice and hearing as ordered by this Court in an earlier case,1 respondent court issued its order upholding the validity of the information for violation of section 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act 3019 filed on March 31, 1971 against petitioner as accused2 and directing that "the accused Mayor Jose Rentoria Oliveros of Antipolo, Rizal, is hereby ordered SUSPENDED pursuant to section 13, of Republic Act No. 3019, from office within twenty-four hours from receipt of this Order." Petitioner duly complied with the suspension order and ceased to hold office thereafter.
In the general elections of November 8, 1971, however, petitioner ran for re-election and despite the pending criminal anti-graft charge against him and his suspension from office won re-election and was duly proclaimed mayor-elect of Antipolo, Rizal for a new term beginning January 1, 1972 and ending December 31, 1975. Pursuant to the mandate of the Election Code of 1971 (Republic Act 6388)3 petitioner took his oath of office and entered upon the performance of his duties as re-elected mayor of Antipolo on January 1, 1972.
On January 17, 1972, respondent People through the state prosecutor filed a contempt petition against petitioner, asserting that petitioner's act of "taking over once again the functions of the office of mayor in the face of a suspension order [of September 25, 1971] constitutes grave disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order" and that his assumption of office was "illegal and improper ... deliberately with grave abuse of authority and in open defiance of the order of this Honorable Court."4
Respondent court after hearing rejected Petitioner's answer and pleas that he acted only in obedience to the mandate of the people of Antipolo who re-elected him to a new term of mayor altogether different and distinct from his previous expired term during which he was ordered suspended and issued its challenged order of January 26, 1972 declaring that "the order of suspension dated September 25, 1971 is still subsisting and that accused is still under suspension" and finding petitioner guilty of contempt of court.
Reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. The Court thereupon issued its order of February 4, 1972 restraining enforcement and implementation of the challenged order of January 26, 1972 until further orders.
I
The first question presented for determination is whether a criminal offense for violation of Republic Act 3019 committed by an elective officer during one term may be the basis of his suspension in a subsequent term in the event of his re-election to office.
Petitioner concedes that "the power and authority of respondent judge to continue trying the criminal case against petitioner may not in any way be affected by the fact of petitioner's re-election," but contends that "said respondent's power to preventively suspend petitioner under section 13 of Republic Act 3019 became inefficacious upon petitioner's re-election"5 arguing that the power of the courts cannot be placed over that of sovereign and supreme people who ordained his return to office.
Petitioner's reliance on the loose language used in Pascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija6 that "each term is separate from other terms and that the re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor" is misplaced.
The Court has in subsequent cases made it clear that the Pascual ruling (which dealt with administrative liability) applies exclusively to administrative and not to criminal liability and sanctions.ℒαwρhi৷ Thus, in Ingco vs. Sanchez7 the Court ruled that the re-election of a public officer for a new term does not in any manner wipe out the criminal liability incurred by him in a previous term.
In Luciano vs. Provincial Governor8 the Court stressed that the cases of Pascual and Lizares are authority for the precept that "a re-elected public officer is no longer amenable to administrative sanctions for acts committed during his former tenure" but that as to criminal prosecutions, particularly, for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as in the case at bar, the same are not barred by re-election of the public officer, since, inter alia, one of the penalties attached to the offense is perpetual disqualification from public office and it "is patently offensive to the objectives and the letter of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act ... that an official may amass wealth thru graft and corrupt practices and thereafter use the same to purchase re-election and thion 13 which reads as follows: . — have been filed against him.
Makasiar, J., concurs.. . . .— against him." (Rep. Act 3019).
Castro, concurring and dissenting:ASTRO2, January 26, 1965, pp. 19-20.., pp. 26-29.., pp. 29-31.., p. 32.., pp. 103-105.. 12, February 9, 1965, p. 211.., pp. 213-214.., pp. 219-220.., p. 221.27 Id., pp. 240-241.30 Id., 29 Id., 28 Id., 34 Id., p. 328.
Fernando, J., concurring :
ESGUERRA, J., concurring and dissenting :BARREDO, J., concurring:
sundesirableremained or causes beyond his control."m can be deemed to apply only to his administrative and not to his criminal guilt. As succinctly stated in then Solicitor General (now Associate Justice) Felix Q. Antonio's memorandum for the State, "to hold that petitioner's re-election erased his criminal liability would in effect transfer the determination of the criminal culpability of an erring official from the court to which it was lodged by law into the changing and transient whim and caprice of the electorate. This cannot be so, for while his constituents may condone the misdeed of a corrupt official by returning him back to office, a criminal action initiated against the latter can only be heard and tried by a court of justice, his nefarious act having been committed against the very State whose laws he had sworn to faithfully obey and uphold. A contrary rule would erode the very system upon which our government is based, which is one of laws and not of men."9
Since the criminal prosecution against petitioner-accused is concededly not abated by the fact of his re-election, the pendency of such criminal case under a valid information under Republic Act 3019 may clearly be and supplies the legal basis for his suspension from office in a subsequent term in the event of his re-election by virtue of the provisions of section 13 of the Act.10
II
This brings us to the second and principal question of whether respondent court's suspension order of September 25, 1971 issued during his expired term as mayor (1968-1971) automatically applied to a new term to which petitioner mayor was re-elected (1972-1975) such as to warrant and justify respondent court's challenged order of January 26, 1972 finding him guilty of contempt of court for having "willfully disobeyed" the said suspension order by assuming on January 1, 1972 the office to which he had been re-elected as ordained by the Election Code under pain of forfeiture of his right thereto.
There could be no such automatic application or extension of the suspension order of September 25, 1971 to a new term to which petitioner was re-elected in the 1971 elections. At worst, petitioner cannot be held guilty of willful disobedience of the suspension order for having assumed the office to which he was reelected when such act contingent upon his reelection was not even prohibited, much less specified in the suspension order.
From its very terms, the suspension order covered and contemplated only petitioner's then current term of office to which he was elected (beginning January 1, 1968 and ending December 31, 1971) and no other term. As conceded in the dissenting opinion, "he could not have been ordered suspended for his new term because at the time the order was issued there was no absolute certainty that he would run for reelection and been re-elected."11
If petitioner had not run for reelection or if he had lost in his bid for reelection, the suspension order would have lapsed and become functus officio by virtue of the expiration of his term. He would no longer have any office from which he would remain suspended, or to which he could be reinstated in the event of acquittal. If petitioner had run for entirely new office, say the governorship of the province and was duly elected thereto, it could not be contended that the suspension order (from office as mayor) would automatically attach to this entirely new office as governor such that his assumption of the new office would constitute contempt of court and a willful violation of the suspension order.
The State's argument that the suspension order was not perforce limited to petitioner's term of office (1968-1971) and should be deemed to attach automatically to his new term (1972-1975) although not originally covered nor contemplated thereby is anchored on the provision of section 13 of Republic Act 3019 that the suspended officer shall be entitled to "reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension" in the event of acquittal from the charge. This provision reinforces petitioner's position, that it refers to the current term of the suspended officer (and not to a future unknown and uncertain new term unless supplemented by a new suspension order in the event of re-election) for if his term shall have expired at the time of acquittal, he would obviously be no longer entitled to reinstatement; otherwise, it would lead to the absurd result that a suspended officer, notwithstanding the fact that his term of office has long lapsed and he has been succeeded in office by others would also invoke the provisions literally and claim the right to reinstatement and salaries and benefits upon his acquittal.
Respondent court in its challenged order of January 26, 1972 holding petitioner criminally liable for contempt, correctly stated that the issues before it were whether "(petitioner's) suspension (from the office of mayor of Antipolo, Rizal, under the original order of September 5, 1971) necessarily ended also with the termination of his term of office on December 31, 1971; and whether or not the accused (petitioner) is still under suspension."12
It adversely resolved these issues against petitioner by declaring its "opinion" that its original suspension order of September 25, 1971" is still subsisting and that accused is still under suspension."13 and retroactively applied its opinion and held petitioner guilty of contempt of court for having been of the contrary opinion and for having honestly believed that the suspension order could not, as the Court hereby holds that it did not, apply automatically to the new term to which he had been re-elected as mayor which was not covered nor contemplated by the suspension order.
Under these circumstances, respondent court's challenged order was violative of substantive due process and deprived petitioner of the benefit of the doubt to which he is entitled in criminal contempt proceedings in holding that petitioner in having assumed office on January 1, 1972 for the new term as mayor to which he had been re-elected willfully and deliberately disobeyed the suspension order and thereby incurred liability for contempt of court.
First, the court's challenged order of January 26, 1972 ruling that its suspension order of September 25, 1971 was "still subsisting" and applied to petitioner's new term for the office to which he had been elected anew (beginning on January 1, 1972) could not be retroactively applied against petitioner in the criminal contempt proceedings without violating the ex post facto principle.
Secondly, the issue at bar, viz, as to whether the suspension order issued under Republic Act 3019 during one term automatically applies to a new term to which the suspended official may be re-elected, is one of first impression. Upon the filing of the petition at bar, the Court issued its order of February 4, 1972 restraining the enforcement of the challenged order of January 26, 1972, due to the newness and importance of the questions presented. There do exist reasonable and logical grounds against such an interpretation of automatic application of the suspension order to a new term, as herein discussed, which militate against holding petitioner guilty of criminal contempt. Thus, even if it were assumed arguendo that the suspension order could be automatically applied to the new term, the very existence of strong reasons to the contrary rules out a willful and contumacious disobedience of the order calling for punitive action against petitioner. If the suspension order were at all clear and unambiguous, respondent court would not have needed to declare that its suspension order did not end with the termination of petitioner's term of office on December 31, 1971 and was "still subsisting"; hence it could not properly hold petitioner guilty of contumacious misconduct for not understanding its extent and of willful disobedience of an order that was not clear and unambiguous in the first place and about whose import not even the members of this Court are in full agreement.
Thirdly, the Court has consistently held that "(T)he power to punish for contempt should be used sparingly, with caution, deliberation and with due regard to the provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the individual. Courts should be slow in jailing people for non-compliance with their orders. Only in cases of clear and contumacious refusal to obey, should said power be exercised"14 and the power should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle.15
Here, a strong case for petitioner's belief in bona fide that the suspension order of September 25, 1971 was not applicable to the new term of office to which he was subsequently re-elected has been made out. Petitioner has reason to complain that the suspension order did not prohibit him from assuming the office to which he was re-elected — which re-election was concededly an eventually not contemplated or covered by the said order — and hence he should not be held guilty of having willfully and deliberately disobeyed the suspension order when he performed the act (of assuming office as mayor for a new term) which was not prohibited nor even contemplated in the order.
Fourthly, since petitioner did run for re-election and was elected to a new term of office, (January 1, 1972 to December 31, 1975), the proper recourse of the State was not to petition the lower court to declare petitioner in contempt of the original suspension order of September 5, 1971 for having assumed the office and entered into the performance of his duties for the new term pursuant to his re-election, but to secure a supplemental order suspending anew petitioner from the office of mayor of Antipolo, Rizal, to which he had been re-elected for a new term beginning January 1, 1972, by virtue of the mandatory provisions of section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 requiring his suspension from office during the pendency of the criminal prosecution against him for violation of said Act. This in effect was what the lower court did when it ruled per its challenged order of January 26, 1972 that notwithstanding petitioner's re-election, "the suspension is also deemed to continue during the entire pendency of said case" — although it went beyond its jurisdictional authority and further imposed a 4-month jail sentence and P300.-fine upon petitioner for criminal contempt of court.
In fine, then, while the pending criminal prosecution for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 committed by an elective officer during one term may be the basis of his suspension in a subsequent term if he is re-elected to the same office, such suspension must be issued anew upon a supplemental order. As held in Luciano, supra, such suspension is mandatory but not self-operative under section 13 of the Act and must be ordered by the court where the criminal case is pending. Here, since the validity of the information was already previously determined and the criminal case is admittedly pending and has not resulted in acquittal, the court is called upon to issue anew a supplemental order of suspension once it has verified the supplemental event of the accused's re-election to office. There having been no such supplemental order of suspension issued in the case at bar, save for the challenged order of January 26, 1972 which cannot be retroactively held against petitioner, respondent court's sentence of contempt against petitioner was issued with grave abuse of discretion and must be set aside.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent court's order of January 26, 1972, declaring petitioner "guilty of contempt of court under Rule 71" and sentencing him "to four months imprisonment and to pay a fine of P300.00" is hereby annulled and set aside.
The petition is however dismissed insofar as it prays for annulment of the portion of the order "declaring him to be under suspension until the present and for the entire duration of the pendency of the case against him", such new suspension to take effect upon finality of this judgment.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Zaldivar, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma, and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, C.J., concurs in the result.
Fernando, J., concurs and in addition submits a brief separate opinion.
Antonio, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 Jose R. Oliveros vs. Hon. Onofre A. Villaluz, etc. et al., 40 SCRA 327 (July 30, 1971).
2 Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-753, of the Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal.
3 Section 9 provides the four-year term of elected provincial city and municipal officers and that "(T)he officials elected shall assume office on the first day of January next following . . . ." Section 24 provides inter alia that "(E)very elected official shall take his oath of office on the day his term of office commences, or within ten days after his proclamation if said proclamation takes place after such day. His failure to take his oath of office as herein provided shall be considered forfeiture of his right to the new office to which he has been elected unless said failure is for cause or causes beyond his control."
4 Annex B, petition, Rollo, pp. 20-21.
5 Petitioner's memorandum, p. 8; Rollo, p. 100.
6 106 Phil. 466, 471 (Oct. 31, 1959), reaffirmed and cited in Lizares vs. Hechanova, 17 SCRA 58 (May 17, 1966), where a southern state Supreme Court case was cited that "(T)he Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people." (Idem, at p. 472).
7 21 SCRA 1292 (December 18,1967).
8 28 SCRA 517, 527-528 (June 20,1969).
9 Respondent's memorandum dated March 14, 1972, at p. 11.
10 "SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him." (Rep. Act 3019).
11 At page 8, separate opinion of Justice Esguerra, emphasis added.
12 Annex D, petition; at page 1; notes in parentheses and emphasis added.
13 Idem, at page 2..
14 Tinagan vs. Perlas, 22 SCRA 394, 398-399 (January 30, 1968) and cases cited.
15 More so is petitioner entitled to the benefit of the doubt and to acquittal of the contempt charge, when it is considered that he has already been convicted for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 in the decision in the main criminal case rendered on November 11, 1972 by the lower court and sentenced therein to ten years imprisonment, removal from office and perpetual disqualification from public office. (Motion for early decision dated December 11, 1972, Rollo.) Petitioner has appealed the conviction.
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