G.R. No. L-26112, October 4, 1971,
♦ Decision,
Villamor, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion,
Barredo, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Teehankee, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion,
Concepcion, [CJ]
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26112 October 4, 1971
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, MIGUEL TOLENTINO, SR., ZOILA DE CHAVEZ, DEOGRACIAS MERCADO, MARIANO PANTOJA, GUILLERMO MERCADO, AGAPITO REYES, ISIDRO BESAS, LEONA LACHICA, ELENO MACALINDONG, DIONISIO MACALINDONG, DOROTEO SARA, JOAQUIN CAUNCERAN, VIRGILIO AGUILAR, FELIX DUMAN, PIO BACULI, ANTERO APOLINAR, FLAVIANO CURZADO, ROSENDO IBAÑEZ, ARCADIO GONZALES, FELIX BORJA and BLAS BASCO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JAIME DE LOS ANGELES, Judge, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, Branch III, Balayan, Batangas; AYALA Y CIA. AND/OR HACIENDA CALATAGAN and ALFONSO ZOBEL, respondents.
Separate Opinions
CONCEPCION, C.J., dissenting:
The Court is called upon to pass upon the Second Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Second Motion for Reconsideration filed by Ayala y Cia. and/or Hacienda Calatagan and Alfonso Zobel, hereinafter referred to collectively as the respondents of the decisions in the case at bar, promulgated on June 30, 1967, the dispositive part of which reads:
Wherefore, said orders dated January 18, February 2 and 8, and April 13, 1966, should be, as they are hereby, annulled, and respondent Judge is directed to order the issuance of writ of execution for the enforcement of the decision in question, with costs against respondents herein, except respondent Judge, Honorable Jaime de los Angeles.
The decision therein alluded to is that rendered by Judge Tengco in Civil Case No. 373 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, as modified by this Court in L-20950, on May 31, 1965. The issue in the present action is simply: What is the aforesaid decision, as thus modified? To answer this question, we must determine specifically: (1) what was the decision of the trial court in said Case No. 373; and (2) to what extent such decision has been modified by ours in L-20950.
The Decision of Judge Tengco
The dispositive part of said decision consists of five (5) paragraphs. Paragraph (a) nullifies respondents' TCT No. T-9550 "and other subdivision titles" issued in their favor" over the areas outside its private land covered by TCT No. 722, which, including the lots in T-9550 (Lots 360, 362, 363 and 182) are hereby reverted to public dominion." Paragraph (b) commands the Dizons "to vacate Lot 360 in favor of ... Tolentino." Paragraph (c) sentences "all the defendants to jointly and severally pay ... Tolentino compensatory damages in the sum of P3,000 a year per hectare of Lot 360, from March 11, 1954, until he is placed in ... possession of the said area." Paragraph (d) restrains "all the defendants from further acts of ownership and possession over" the four (4) lots aforementioned. Paragraph (e) orders "the defendants to jointly and severally pay the costs."
There is no dispute as regards the meaning of paragraphs (a), (b) and (e). The issue is focused on paragraph (c) although paragraph (d) has, likewise, been brought into the orbit of said issue inasmuch as respondents maintain: (1) that the phrase "all the defendants" should be understood to refer exclusively to the Dizons, and said phrase appears, also, in paragraph (d), and (2) that, assuming that said phrase includes respondents herein, they should be deemed, in consequence of our division in L-20950, exempted from the payment of the damages mentioned in paragraph (c) and placed beyond the pale of the injunction contained in paragraph (d).
1. Meaning of Paragraph (c)
At the outset, it should be noted that we are called upon, not to decide whether or not it would be just and fair to hold respondents liable for damages to Tolentino, but merely to interpret and apply the aforementioned decision, which has long become final and executory; that the cardinal purpose of all rules of interpretation and construction is to ascertain the intent of the writer or framer of the object of interpretation; that, when the language thereof is plain and unequivocal, there is no room, much less justification, for the application of said rules, the clear and obvious meaning being controlling;1 and that "what is controlling" in a decision "is what appears in the dispositive part" thereof,2 "irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements" in the body or text of the decision.3
a) Writer's Opinion
It is clear that respondents were meant to be and are included in the phrase "all the defendants" used in paragraph (c) of the dispositive part of Judge Tengco's decision, and subject to the liability therein provided, for:
(1) The language of said paragraph is plain, simple and clear. The defendants in the main case being, not only the Dizons but, also, Ayala y Cia. and Alfonso Zobel, it follows that "all the defendants" include Ayala and Zobel.
(2) The intent to embrace them within the purview of paragraph (c) is made more apparent by paragraph (b) of said dispositive part, which refers to the Dizons only.4 The phrase "all the defendants" in paragraph (c) immediately after the command in paragraph (b) addressed solely to the Dizons was evidently used in paragraph (c), by way of contrast to distinguish its coveragefrom that of paragraph (b) and leave no room for doubt that paragraph (c) applies, not only to the Dizons, but, also to respondents herein.
(3) This purpose is, further, underscored by the fact that, in their respective complaints, the Government and Tolentino merely prayed that the defendants" be sentenced to pay damages to them, and that the trial court understood said phrase to encompass every one of the defendants, because of which it sentenced "the defendants," in paragraph (e),5 to pay the costs. In other words, the trial court prefixed to the phrase "the defendants" the adjective "all" which was not really necessary or indispensable in order precisely to stress in paragraph (c) owing to its proximity to paragraph (b) the difference between the defendants mentioned in paragraph (b) and those alluded to in paragraph (c). In short, the word "all" was purposedly and deliberately inserted in paragraph (c) to forestall any doubt about the inclusion of respondents in the liability therein adjudicated.
(4) This intent is made even more manifest by paragraph (d), "restraining and edjoining all the defendants from further acts" of ownership and possession over Lots 360, 362, 363 and 182 of Psd-40891."6 The phrase "all the defendants" in this paragraph cannot possibly refer to the Dizons only, who held no more than Lot 360 and were not performing acts of ownership or possession ever Lots 362, 363 and 182. The injunction, in paragraph (d) insofar as these three (3) lots are concerned, was addressed, therefore, to respondents Ayala and Zobel Besides it is neither logical nor reasonable to assume that the same phrase "all the defendants" meant one thing in paragraph (c), and quite another, thing in paragraph (d).
(5) Respondents, in fact understood said paragraph (c) as including them (Ayala and Zobel). ln their motion of January 8, 1966, to quash the writ of execution issued against them by the trial court, respondents alleged, inter alia, that, "while it is true that under paragraph (c) of the dispositive part of the decision of said "Court "all the defendants (are ordered) to jointly and severally pay intervenor Miguel Tolentino compensatory damages," it is ... equally true that, under the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No L-20950,it was held that "defendants Dizons cannot also be held liable for damages allegedly suffered by other parties on account of their possession of the property" because of their good faith" and that, "since defendants Dizons were held not liable for the alleged damages, it follows that the joint and several character of the obligation imposed by this Honorable Court" (the trial court) "was extinguished because the other defendants herein" namely, respondents herein "will no longer be able to claim from the defendants Dizon the share which corresponds to the latter. Respondents had thus conceded that, under paragraph (c) of the dispositive part of Judge Tengco's decision, they shared with the Dizons the joint and solidary liability to pay damages to Tolentino, although they (respondents) maintained that the decision of the Supreme Court relieving the Dizons from said obligation, had the effect of extinguishing their (respondents') aforementioned obligation under paragraph (c). Surely, our decision could not have extinguished such obligation if the same did not exist under the trial court's decision.
b) The Majority View
The reasons adduced in support thereof may be summed up as follows: (1) that "the judgment" of Judge Tengco is ambiguous; (2) that the opinion set forth in the body of his decision as distinguished from its dispositive part contains nothing to indicate the intent to hold respondents jointly and severally liable, with the Dizons, for damages to Tolentino; and (3) that Tolentino is not entitled to damages at all, as a matter of justice and equity. To my mind, these reasons are untenable, inasmuch as:
(1) The dispositive part of Judge Tengco's decision, and, particularly, paragraph (c) thereof, are clear, explicit and precise. Indeed, no attempt has been made to pinpoint any word, phrase or passage in said dispositive part and paragraph (c) that is or may be considered equivocal.
(2) The failure of the body of Judge Tengco's decision as distinguished from its dispositive part to discuss explicitly respondents' liability for damages, does not render the meaning of said paragraph (c) ambiguous. It does not affect the precision of the language or the singleness of the meaning of said paragraph (c). The phrase "all the defendants" therein includes everyone of them, and cannot mean some of them or "the Dizons only," or all of them "except Ayala and Zobel."
(3) The failure of Judge Tengco to state categorically, in the body of his decision, that respondents are liable for damages, does not warrant the conclusion that he intended to exclude them from the operation of paragraph (c) of the dispositive part of the decision. With or without such discussion or justification, the words "all the defendants" in said paragraph mean everyone of the defendants, and Judge Tengco is presumed to have intended this simple, natural and normal meaning thereof, until the contrary is clearly established. This presumption is buttressed by the fact that, as heretofore indicated, the term "all" was deliberately prefixed by Judge Tengco to the phrase "the defendants," in said paragraph (c). The question, therefore, is not "whether said decision shows that Judge Tengco had the aforementioned intent" but, "whether it clearly appears from said decision that he had no such intent."
(4) Even if the body of the decision were not clear on whether or not the intent of its writer was correctly set forth in the dispositive part of said decision, this would not justify a departure from the clear and natural meaning of such dispositive part, because the same constitutes the judgement of the court, not the opinion set forth in the text of the decision which, at best, set forth the facts and/or the reasons upon which said judgment is based. If those facts and/or reasons did not justify the judgment, the same would, perhaps, be groundless or erroneous; yet, the judgment would still be what plainly appears in the dispositive part of the decision, which, once final and executory should be executed and enforced as it is, "irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements in the body of the decision" itself.7 What is more, in the event of an open conflict between said dispositive part, on the one hand, and the body of the decision, on the other, the former prevails, for, "the judgment must be distinguished from the opinion ... . If any statement in the opinion preceding the decree seemingly excluded a portion ... it must be overlooked, because the judgment or the decree prevails over the opinion."8
Our adherence to this well-settled principle was emphasized, not long ago, in a unanimous decision in Board of Liquidators vs. Ricma.9 The complaint therein having been on motion of the defendants, dismissed, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion for the admission of an amended complaint. Acting upon these two (2) motions, the trial court issued an order which, after stating the reasons why both were unetanable, denied the "motion to dismiss, as well as the motion for the admission of the amended complaint." On subsequent motion of the defendants, the dispositive part of said order was amended so as to state that it was the "motion for reconsideration," not the "motion to dismiss," that was denied thereby. Later, the issue arose as to whether the period to appeal should be computed from notice of the first order or from that of the amendatory order. Passing upon this issue, we adopted the second alternative, upon the ground that the first order "clearly and definitely stated that what was being denied" was the "motion to dismiss," and "the dispositive part of said order made no reference at all to the motion for reconsideration ..." and that:
... the fact that the motion before the court was appellee's motion for reconsideration, and not the defendant's motion to dismiss, and the further fact that what was discussed in the body of the order was said motion for reconsideration and not the motion to dismiss are of no moment, since the rule is that when the dispositive part of a final order or decision is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without the need of interpretation or construction, the same is considered as the judgment of the court, to the exclusion of anything said in the body thereof. (Contreras vs. Felix, 78 Phil. 570; Edwards vs. Arce, 8 Phil. 688). ... . 10
If the dispositive part of a decision prevails over the body thereof, when the latter affirmatively shows what the Judge did not mean what he said in the dispositive part, and that he had obviously committed therein a mistake, with more reason should the dispositive part be controlling where the body of the decision is merely silent thereon.
(5) Later, in this opinion, we Will show that the natural meaning of paragraph (c) of the dispositive part of Judge Tengco's decision is fully and amply justified by the established facts.
(6) Judge Tengco meant what he said in the dispositive part of his decision. lndeed, the same merely granted the reliefs sought in the complaints of both the Government11 and Tolentino. It even followed the sequence of the remedies therein prayed for, and, almost literally, the language used in said complaints. 12 Thus, the Government and Tolentino prayed therein: (1) that the certificates of title in question be annulled; (2) that they be placed in possession of the lands in dispute; (3) that "the defendant's" be ordered to pay damages "jointly and severally"; (4) that "the defendants" be restrained from usurping said lands or performing further acts of ownership thereon; and (5) that the Government and Tolentino be given such other relief as may be proper. The dispositive part of Judge Tengco's decision granted Tolentino each and everyone of these reliefs in the order prayed for, thus indicating that the different paragraph of said dispositive part have the same meaning conveyed by their respective counterparts, in the prayer of the aforementioned complaints. The latter were, in turn, directed principally against respondents herein, from whom liability for damages was mainly sought to be exacted, they being the leading defendants in the case.
This is borne out by the fact that Judge Tengco's decision states, in the body thereof, that "judgement could only be rendered in favor or against the Republic of the Philippines and Intervenor Miguel Tolentino and/or against or in favor of Ayala y Cia., Alfonso Zobel and defendants Dizons" and that "the judgment in this case should be limited therefore between the Republic of the Philippines and Intervenor Miguel Tolentino on one side and Ayala y Cia., Alfonso Zobel and the Dizons ... on the other." 13
(7) The absence of any discussion, in the body of Judge Tengco's decision, of the joint and several liability of respondents herein, under paragraph (c) of the dispositive part, becomes readily understandable when we consider two (2) circumstances, namely: (a) Judge Tengco adopted the theory of the Government and Tolentino in their respective complaints to the effect that respondents and the Dizons are jointly and severally liable to them (Government and Tolentino) for damages, on account of the usurpation of Lot 360 by respondents and the occupation thereof by the Dizons, in consequence of the sale made in their favor by the respondents, after they (respondents) had illegally increased, by about 2,500 hectares, the area of Hacienda Calatagan by causing the same to be "resurveyed" in 1949; and (b) respondents had not questioned in their pleadings the logic of the conclusion thus drawn from these premisess by the Government and Tolentino.
In other words, Judge Tengco did not explicitly justify his aforementioned conclusion because respondents had limited themselves to assailing the factual bases thereof, and the court had found that the facts were substantially as alleged in said complaints. Whether such facts sufficed to justify the joint and several liability of respondents, pursuant to paragraph (c), is beside the point.14 The important thing is that Judge Tengco evidently believed that they did suffice. In fact, several members of this Court entertain such belief. After all, the intent of the party whose writing is sought to be construed constitutes the only objective of every rule of interpretation.
(8) It is argued that despite the clear language to the contrary in the dispositive part of Judge Tengco's decision the same could not have meant to include Ayala (and Zobel) in the award for damages, because neither said decision nor that of this Court declares or suggests that Ayala's possession, prior to the sale to the Dizons, was tainted with bad faith, because Judge Tengco had not in discussing the matter of damages made any reference to the previous possession of Ayala; and because said Judge had confined his discussion concerning damages to the issue of good or bad faith in the possession of the Dizons alone. The first two (2) reasons are factually inaccurate, whereas the last does not warrant the conclusion drawn therefrom.
(a) The decision of Judge Tengco did not explicitly declare respondents guilty of bad faith; but, the Judge was inclined to doubt respondents' good faith. After the rendition of his said decision, the Government and the intervenors had filed a motion for an alias writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, and a joint motion for reconsideration, foIlowed by an amended joint motion for reconsideration, of the decision insofar as it did not award damages to the Govermnent and the intervenors, other than Tolentino as well as for a new trial. Acting upon these motions, Judge Tengco ruled, on October 5, 1962, that "although believing that the defendants" referring to respondents herein "could have been in bad faith when the subdivision of the lands were made and corresponding titles were issued, as stared in those findings" made in his decision, it was best to maintain the status quo "in order to avoid serious incidents," in view of the substantial amount paid to respondents herein by the Dizons and the additional amounts spent by the latter to improve the fishponds in question and to operate the same. In other words, were it not for these circumstances, the alias writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, sought by the Government and Tolentino, would have been issued, for Judge Tengco believed that there could have been bad faith on the part of respondents in effecting the subdivision survey of Hacienda Calatagan and securing title to the subdivision. Inasmuch as the decision had not, as yet, become final, and Judge Tengco made the foregoing statement in resolving, inter alia, motions for reconsideration of his decision, the aforementioned pronouncement may be considered as part and parcel thereof (of the decision).
(b) Said decision declares that, by causing the Hacienda Calatagan to be resurveyed and by thereby securing subdivision titles to the area thus reserved, respondents herein had managed to get subdivision titles over an area of about 1,100 hectares in excess of that covered by the Hacienda's TCT No. 722, including more than 400 hectares of the navigable territorial waters, which are not subject to private ownership. In other words, respondents were guilty of a tort or quasi-delict, and, hence, liable, by operation of law, 15 for the damages caused thereby, in view of the "fault" or "culpa" entailed in the invasion of the public domain thus committed, regardless of whether or not they had acted in good faith or in bad faith. This point will be further elucidated in subsequent pages.
(c) The facts that, in considering Tolentino's claim for damages, shortly before concluding his decision, Judge Tengco merely referred to the possession of the Dizons, and made no mention of respondents herein, was due to the circumstance that the amount of damages awarded to Tolentino had been based upon the fruits or income received by the Dizons. In other words, the damages collectible by Tolentino were measured by the amount of the profits made by the Dizons in the operation of the fishpond constituting Lot 360. Respondents were not mentioned in said portion of Judge Tengco's decision because their participation in the events material to the case 16 had already been taken up, rather extensively in the preceding pages of said decision.
(d) There is absolutely nothing therein to indicate that Judge Tengco intended to exclude respondents from any liability for damages. Moreover, such doubt, if any, as may result from the aforementioned failure to mention respondents herein in the discussion of damages, is dispelled by the clear, positive and precisely language of paragraph (c) of the dispositive part of Judge Tengco's decision sentencing "all the defendants" jointly and severally to pay the aforementioned damages. Recently we had occasion to rule:
... . It should be remembered that while the body of a decision, order or resolution might create some ambiguity regarding which way the court's reasoning preponderates, it is the dispositive portion thereof that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, andimposes the corresponding duties or obligations.17
(9) The theory advanced in favor of respondents herein to the effect that, as a matter of justice and equity, Tolentino is not entitled to damages at all, much less from said respondents, because they were it is claimed completely out of the picture when he came in for the first time, is interwoven with the effect of our decision in L-20950 upon that of Judge Tengco. Hence, the latter question will be discussed jointly with the applicable principles of justice and equity.
Effect of Our Decision in L-20950 Upon That of Judge Tengco
In our decision in L-20950, we declared that, after going "over the evidence presented" therein, we had "found no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court"; that "there being no showing" that the "Dizons are not purchasers in good faith and for value, they have a right to retention of the property until they are reimbursed of the necessary expenses made on the land"; that "as such possessors in good faith," the Dizons "cannot also be heId liable for damages allegedly suffered by other parties on account of their possession of the property"; that, accordingly, the trial court had correctly revoked the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction it had previously issued and suspended meanwhile the delivery of Lot 360 to Tolentino and that, "thus modified, Judge Tengco's decision was "affirmed."
It is clear, to my mind, that te said decision had been thereby modified in two (2) respects only, to wit: (a) that we acknowledged the right of the Dizons to retain Lot 360, until reimbursed of the necessary expenses made thereon; and (b) that, until so reimbursed, the Dizons were not liable to pay damages to Tolentino. In all other respects, Judge Tengco's decision was affirmed. Since as demonstrated earlier in this opinion, and impliedly admitted by respondents in their motion of January 8, 1966, to quash the writ of execution issued by the trial court, on December 27, 1965 paragraph (c) of the dispositive part of Judge Tengco's decision "ordering all the defendants to jointly and severally pay ... Miguel Tolentino compensatory damages" includes respondents herein, it is clear that the effect of our decision in L-20950 upon that of Judge Tengco was merely to so modify said paragraph (c) as to order "all the defendants except the Dizons" to jointly and severally pay damages to Tolentino, and to uphold the right of the Dizons to retain the possession of Lot 360, until the necessary expenses shall have been refunded to them.
Tolentino's Right to Recover
Damages from Respondents
It is argued that, in consequence of our decision in L-20950, Tolentino had, also, lost the right to recover any damages whatsoever, because such right springs from his tight of possession, which, in turn, is suspended by the right of retention of the Dizons, pending reimbursement of their necessary expenses, so that, until then, Tolentino has no right of possession and, hence, is "not entitled to damages at all."
The flaw in this process of reasoning becomes apparent when we consider that independently of the aforesaid right of reimbursement and retention of the Dizons Tolentino is unquestionably entitled to recover damages from his lessor, the Government, having to its failure to deliver the possession of the area leased to him. This goes to show that Tolentino's claim for damages against other parties is not suspended or affected by the right of retention of the Dizons.
And the reason is simple. The right of reimbursement and retention of the Dizons is not a negation but a recognition of Tolentino's right of possession, for the former would not exist if the latter did not. What is more, the former exists because of the latter. In fact, there would be no reason for the right of reimbursement and retention of the Dizons if nobody were entitled to dispossess them and they were not bound to yield their possession.
Tolentino is entitled to the possession of Lot 360, because, being part of the public domain, it has been leased to him by the Government. Vis-a-vis the Dizons but, insofar only as they are concerned said right of possession of Tolentino is subject to the qualification that the Dizons cannot be ousted unless and until their necessary expenses shall have been reimbursed. That is why, despite said right of the Dizons, and without reimbursing those expenses, Tolentino may demand from the Government, as his lessor, the payment of indemnity for damages, on account of its failure to deliver to him the possession of the thing leased. In other words insofar as the Government is concerned, Tolentino's right of possession is not subject to the qualification, limitation or condition resulting from the right of reimbursement and retention of the Dizons. This right belongs to the latter and to no others because of a circumstance peculiar to them (the Dizons) their good faith resulting from justifiable reliance upon the subdivision Torrens Titles illegally secured by respondents.
This justification is, however, absent insofar as respondents are concerned, they being the very parties responsible for said illegality, which was committed by not adhering to the technical description in their TCT No. 722, and, in effect, disregarding the same and the area therein set forth. With respect to respondents herein, Tolentino's right of possession is not subject, therefore, to the limitation imposed by the right of reimbursement and retention of the Dizons. Neither may this right of the latter inure to the benefit of respondents, for they do not derive their rights or obligations from the Dizons. On the contrary, as buyers of Lot 360, the Dizons are the ones who succeeded to whatever right or interest respondents had in said lot, and, hence, acquired no right or interest whatsoever therein, because respondents had none. The right of reimbursement and retention of the Dizons exists, not because of the aforementioned sale by respondents who had, nothing to sell but, despite this fact and by operation of law, which protects the rights of possessors in good faith, regardless of their lack of a valid title.
In short, Tolentino's right of possession is qualified insofar only as the Dizons are concerned, but not vis-a-vis either the Government or respondents herein. As regards both, it is not subject to any limitation. Hence, Tolentino may demand from respondents the corresponding indemnity for damages on account of his failure to enjoy said right of possession because of their acts.
Respondents' Liability to
Tolentino for Dizons'
Possession
Respondents maintain that they cannot be held liable for damages to Tolentino, inasmuch as his inability to take possession of Lot 360 took place when they (respondents) were completely out of the picture. I am unable to accept this premise, much less the inference drawn therefrom.
1. Tolentino's interest in the disputed area was derived from one Gabino Lachica, who like the other intervenors in the main case had filed, with the Bureau of Fisheries, his application for lease in 1949. Respondents then caused Lachica and other similar applicants to be ejected from the disputed area. Evidently to defeat the claims of said applicants, respondents, moreover, caused a resurvey and a composite subdivision plan, supposedly of the Hacienda Calatagan, to be made, which plan included illegally said disputed area, together with other areas, aggregating 1,091 hectares, located outside the boundaries of the Hacienda, as set forth in its TCT No. 722. And, based on said resurvey and composite plan, the Hacienda, or respondents herein, unlawfully secured transfer certificates of title to the subdivision lots outside its perimeter. In 1952, the Bureau of Fisheries demanded upon the theory that the disputed area forms part of the public domain that it be vacated by those who held it upon the authority of respondents herein. Moreover, that same year of 1952, Tolentino as assignee of Lachica's interest, under the lease application filed by him in 1949 filed his own lease application, followed by another in 1954. Meanwhile, those required by the Bureau of Fisheries to vacate the disputed area, including the Dizons, had objected to the lease applications aforementioned, alleging that said area is part of the Hacienda Calatagan, covered by said TCT No. 722. Upon due investigation, conducted in 1954, this contention was found to be false, in view of which, that same year, the Director of Fisheries officially declared that the disputed area is part of the public domain. This action was sustained by Us in Dizon v. Rodriguez and Republic v. Court of Appeals, 18 as well as in Republic v. Ayala. 19
Thus, despite the fact that, as early as 1949, Lachica and others had claimed the right to hold the area aforementioned, pursuant to lease applications filed by them with the Bureau of fisheries, and questioned respondents' authority to possess that area, and that, as Lachica's assignee, Tolentino, as well as others, had, in 1952, filed similar lease applications with said Bureau, which then bade respondents' lessees to vacate said area, and in, 1954 rejected their claim that the same is part of respondents' property, on February 3, 1954, respondents sold Lot 360 to the Dizons. In other words, this illegal sale was made by respondents almost two years after Tolentino had personally and officially entered into the picture, and about five (5) years after his predecessor-in-interest Lachica, had done so.
2. Insofar as the impediment to Tolentino's consumption of possession of Lot 360 is concerned, respondents were not completely out of the picture, even after the sale by them to the Dizons. Indeed, the latter's possession was a necessary legal and factual consequence of that sale. What is more, as the successor-in-interest of respondent herein, the Dizons were their alter ego. The Dizons had stepped into respondents' shoes. Accordingly, the former represented the te latter, in the sense of exercising such right of possession as respondents illegally claimed to have, and which they must have known they did not have, because: (a) Lot 360 was outside the area covered by their TCT No. 722 and, together with other "subdivision" lots, supposedly of Hacienda Calatagan, far exceeded the area thereof; (b) they had been advised by the Bureau of Fisheries to vacate it; (c) the Department of Agriculture had declared it part of the inalienable public domain; and (d) its being part of the shore and territorial waters manifestly revealed that status to the whole world.
Vis-a-vis Tolentino, respondents stood in the same condition they would have been had the Dizons merely leased Lot 360 from them, for, in that case, Tolentino would have, likewise, been prevented by the Dizons from taking possession of said lot. It would then be more evident that the Dizons held the lot on behalf of respondents, in the sense that the former would be exercising, although temporarily, an alleged possessory right of the latter. Thus, the possession by the Dizons, under such hypothetical lease, would inure to the benefit of respondents herein, for purposes of acquisitive prescription of ownership, if the lot were alienable which it was and is not.
3. It is true that no contractual relation exists between respondents and Tolentino. But, contract is one only of the legal sources of obligation. One other source thereof is quasi-delict. 20 Hence,, Art. 2176 of our Civil Code explicitly provides that that "whoever by act or omision causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict ... ." In the case at bar, by illegally causing lot 360, inter alia, to be included in its subdivision title - although not really covered by its TCT No. 722, and actually forming part of the public domain and by conveying said Lot 360 to the Dizons knowing that it was claimed by the Government and its lessee, petitioner Tolentino, apart from the fact that, being part of the "foreshore, beach or ... navigable waters," it is manifestly "not ... capable of registration and its "inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into" property of "private ownership or confer title on the registrant"21 respondents herein had performed acts constituting "fault" or "culpa," in consequence of which Tolentino, as government lessee of said lot, had sustained damages, which respondents are bound to indemnify under said Art. 2176.
In an attempt to show that this rationalization is legally untenable, it has been argued that by such process a pedestrianinjured in an automobile accident may sue the manufacturer of said car. Instead of accomplishing its purpose the argument reveals its basic flaw. Indeed, in the absence of fault or negligence in the manufacure of the car, its manufacturer cannot possibly be held liable for the damages resulting from said injury. However, if the accident took place on account of a defect in the manufacture of the car, the injured party would certainly be entitled to recover said damages from the manufacturer, pursuant to the aforementioned Art. 2176. Such is, also, the established rule under the common law,22 which, moreover, holds the manufacturer liable even if the defective part had been supplied by others. 23
Consistently with the philosophy underlying the Common Law and said Art. 2176 of our Civil Code, Art. 2187 thereof declares that:
Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers.
Similarly, if a building or structure collapses totally or partially, owing to a defect in its plans and specifications, or in the ground, or in the construction, or to the use of materials of inferior quality, the engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications, or supervised the construction, or the contractor who built it, may be sued directly by the third persons who suffered damages in consequence of the said event, purchase persuant to Art. 2192 of said Code.
In the case at bar, the action to exact liability from respondents herein had been based upon a stronger legal and moral ground. Indeed, in the illustrations given above, there was merely a possibility or probability of somebody being harmed accidentally. In the case of Lot 360, its sale to the Dizons necessarily resulted in the assumption of its possession by the latter, and, hence, in the certainty of a denial of such pessession to the Government and its lessee, Tolentino. In other words, respondents knew positively that, by selling the lot they were acting in derogation of the rights or claims of the Government and Tolentino, of which they had previous notice.
Independently of the foregoing, the fact is that respondents had performed several unlawful acts such as, inter alia, illegally securing title to 1,091 hectares of the public domain including the territorial waters of the State; illegally causing said portion of the public domain to be subdivided, and certificates of title to be issued for the subdivision lots; and illegally selling and/or leasing a number of said lots and other parts of that segment of the public domain, including Lot 360, to third persons.
In other words, they performed an unlawful invasion of the public domain, which is a tort,24 commonly known as trespass,25 for which mistake, honest belief or professional neglect is no defense.26 The Common Law furnishes abundant authority to the effect that bad faith is not necessary for liability arising from tort to attach. In fact, good faith on the part of the tortfeasor does not exempt him from liability for his act. The rule is postulated in the Restatement27 in the following language:
In order to be liable for a trespass on land ... it is necessary only that the actor intentionally be upon any part of the land in question. It is not necessary that he intend to invade the possessor's interest in the exclusive possession of his land and, therefore, that he know his entry to be an intrusion. If the actor is and intends to be upon the particular piece of land in question, it is immaterial that he honestly and reasonably believes that he has the consent of the lawful possessor to enter, or, indeed, that he himself is its possessor. Unless the actor's mistake was induced by the conduct of the possessor, it is immaterial that the mistake is one such as a reasonable man knowing all the circumstances which the actor knows or could have discovered by the most careful of investigations would have made. One who enters any piece of land takes the risk of the existence of such facts as would give him a right or privilege to enter. So too, the actor cannot escape liability by showing that his mistaken belief in the validity of his title is due to the advise of the most eminent of counsel. Indeed, even though a statute expressly confers title upon him, he takes the risk that the statute may thereafter be declared unconstitutinal.
Other statements of the rule are set forth at the margin.28 To illustrate, Restatement gives the following examples:
A employs a surveyor of recognized ability to make a survey of his land. The survey shows that a particular strip of land is within his boundaries. In consequence, A clears this land of timber and prepares it for cultivation. In fact, the survey is mistaken and the strip in question is part of the tract owned by his neighbor, B. A is subject to liability to B.
A. who is entitled to possession of Blackacre, reasonably mistaking for Whiteacre, enters Whiteacre. A is subject to liability for tresspass.
A mines coal from B's land having mistaken the location of the boundary line. A is subject to liability to B although the mistake is a reasonable one. 29
Other Factors Relevant to
the Equities of the Case.
As above indicated, Tolentino filed, with the Bureau of Fisheries, a Fishpond Application on May 21, 1952, and another one on September 11, 1954, covering portions of the disputed area. These applications were objected to by the Dizons, one, Sy-Juco and others claiming that said portions were private property, forming part of Hacienda Calatagan, covered by TCT No. 722. After due investigation, with notice, to all parties concerned, a Committee created therefor by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, found that the disputed area was not within said Hacienda. Thereupon, the Dizons and their co-protestants filed, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, an action for prohibition to enjoining said official and the Director of Fisheries from acting upon said fishpond applications, until the ownership over the disputed area shall have been judicially settled. Having been allowed to intervene in the case, Miguel Tolentino and his daughter Clemencia Tolentino, filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted by Hon. Froilan Bayona, as Judge of said court. 30 Forthwith, Dizon, et al. filed, with the Supreme Court, a petition for certiorari and mandamus to annul the action taken by Judge Bayona and to compel him to reinstate the case in the lower court. On April 28, 1956, the Supreme Court denied said petition upon the ground that the Dizon should first prove to the Director of Fisheries that the disputed area is part of Hacienda Calatagan, covered by TCT No. 722, adding, however, that "even if they should succeed" in proving such claim, if said area is "really part of the sea, beach, or foreshore, the same cannot be registered under the Registration Act ... in the name of anyone, for they are not registrable, are non-alienable and belong to the public domain to be administered and managed by the State for the benefit of the people."31
Soon thereafter, or on August 14 and 16, 1956, the Dizons and Sy-Juco, et al., instituted Civil Cases Nos. 135 and 136 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, against the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the Acting Director of Fisheries, and Miguel Tolentino, to set aside the decision of the Director of Fisheries dismissing the protests of the Dizons and Sy-Juco et al., to Tolentino's fishpond applications, with respect to areas similarly situated as the one later involved in Civil Case No. 373 of the same court and L-20950 of this Court, and to quiet the title to the areas first mentioned. On January 30, 1958, Hon. Conrado M. Vasquez, as Judge of First Instance of Batangas, rendered judgment dismissing the complaints, and, inter alia, annulling the Torrens Titles of the Dizons and Sy-juco, et al., and ordering them to vacate the litigation areas. On appeal, this decision was, on October 31, 1961, affirmed, in CA-G.R. No. 24186-87-R of the Court of Appeals, which further sentenced the plaintiffs therein to pay damages to Tolentino, beginning from October 1, 1954. By resolution of August 20, 1962, this decision of the Court of Appeals was amended by eliminating the award for damages and declaring that the plaintiffs (Dizons and Sy-Juco) were entitled to reimbursement from the Republic of the Philippines for useful expenses, with right of retention, and to sue Jacobo Zobel under his vendor's warranty against eviction, he having been sufficiently notified of said actions to quiet title. On April 30, 1965, said decision of the Court of Appeals was "affirmed in all respects," in L-20300-01 and L-20355-56 of the Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, or on September 28, 1959, the Republic of the Philippines had instituted said Civil Case No. 373 of the Court of First instance of Batangas, against Ayala y Cia and/or Hacienda Calatagan, Jacobo Zobel" and the Dizons, to annul the transfer certificate of title issued to Hacienda Calatagan in consequence of the resurvey and composite plan thereof made, by order of respondents, in 1949, as well as the subdivision titles thereafter issued for areas not covered by TCT No. 722, to oust said defendants from the disputed areas, to recover damages from said defendants, and to restrain them from exercising further acts of dominion over the aforementioned areas, and for such other relief as may be meet and proper. Presently, Tolentino filed a complaint in intervention, and, thereafter, other applicants-awardees of fishpond permits joined the Republic and Tolentino in seeking the reliefs prayed for by both. On June 2, 1962, Hon. Damaso S. Tengco, as Judge of First Instance of Batangas, rendered the decision involved in the present case, which was affirmed by Us in L-20950, on May 31, 1965, subject to the modification already adverted to.
The points relevant to the equities of the case are: (1) that on April 28, 1956, this Court had declared32 that, if the disputed area is part of the beach or foreshore as respondents knew it was said area could not be registered under the Torrens System; (2) that this pronouncement was reiterated in the decision of Judge Vasquez, dated January 30, 1958, which further declared that said area is not and was not part of the Hacienda Calatagan and that the subdivision titles thereto, of the Dizons and Sy-Juco, et al., are null and void; and (3) that said pronouncement and declaration were affirmed by the Court of Appeals, on October 31, 1961, reiterated by Judge Tengco on June 2, 1962, and affirmed by the Supreme Court, on April 30, and May 31, 1965.
Thus, despite a final decree of the Supreme Court, as early as April 28, 1956, declaring clearly that respondents and the Dizons cannot possibly have a valid Torrens Title to the disputed area, despite the decision of Judge Vasquez, lessthan two (2) years later, declaring, in addition thereto, that said area is not and was not part of Hacienda Calatagan and that the Torrens titles covering said area are null and void, despite the reiteration of these declarations by Judge Tengco, and the affirmance thereof by the Court of Appeals and by two other decisions of the Supreme Court, and, despite, therefore, these six (6) decision two (2) of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, one (1) of the Court of Appeals, and three (3) of the Supreme Court which rendered liability for damages caused to Tolentino inescapable, respondents did nothing for the fifteen (15) years and a half that had elapsed, since the rendition of our decision in Dizon v. Bayona to undo or minimize the wrong they had done, and are still doing to Tolentino, as an awardee of fishpond permits granted by the Government.
It is next contended that, under Tolentino's theory, he would collect P90,000.00 a year from respondents until he recovers the possession of Lot 360, which he cannot have unless the Dizons are reimbursed of the necessary expenses made thereon by them, so that, by not making such reimbursement, he would be receiving indefinitely the aforementioned sum, at the expense of respondents herein. It is, however, within respondents' power to see to it that possession is forthwith given to Tolentino, and they could have done so, at any time had they been so minded, by reimbursing the necessary expenses due to the Dizons. Thus, respondents have themselves to blame for their inaction in this respect, despite the clear message of our decision in Dizon v. Bayona,33 since April 28, 1956, to which they have turned deaf ears.
If, using a Torrens Title he has counterfeited in his name, one sells the land of another to a third person, who acquires it in good faith and for value, and, as its possessor in good faith, has a right of reimbursement and retention, can there be any doubt about the legal and equitable right of the true owner and/or the successor-in-interest to his right of possession over the land, to recover the resulting damages from the author of the falsification, as the proximate cause of said damages? Would it be just and fair to exempt him from Iiability, upon the theory that the damages were sustained after the falsification and sale made by him, when he was "completely out of the picture," and that he may avail which he cannot34 of the rights of said buyer and possessor in good faith?
It has been argued that, since the damages suffered by Tolentino consist of the fruits received by the Dizons, which the former cannot recover from the latter, because of their right of reimbursement and retention,, there is no reason why respondents should be held liable for such damages, considering that said fruits Were not received by them. The flaw in this process of reasoning has already been shown in the preceding pages of this opinion.35 It may not be amiss to add, however, that, in consequence of the sale of Lot 360 to the Dizons, the price paid by the latter took the place of the land, insofar as respondents are concerned, and that the interest, profits and other benefits derived by respondents from the possession and use of said price partook of the nature or assumed the role of the fruits of said lot, which did not belong to them. Although the Dizons are entitled to recover said price from respondents, the latter are not bound to pay interest thereon to the former, because they (the Dizons) have actually received the fruits or income derived from the operation of the fishpond in Lot 360, which are the counterpart of the benefits derived by respondents from the possession and use of the price aforementioned. Inasmuch as, not being owners of Lot 360, respondents are not entitled to keep said benefits, the same should, pursuant to the elementary principles of justice and equity, be turned over to the party who would have received them as possessor and operator of the fishpond, had it not been for the illegal and tortious acts of said respondents. Apart from being implemented in Article 2176 of our Civil Code,36 those principles are incorporated, inter alia, in Articles 20 and 21 of the same Code, which provide:
ART. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages.
Effect of Dizon v. Rodriquez
It is urged that the reference made in our decision in L-20950, to Dizon v. Rodriguez37 in which it was held that the Dizons had acted in good faith because they had relied on the subdivision title of respondents herein and were entitled to continue relying thereon until a judgment annulling said title shall have become final necessarily implied that respondents herein are, likewise, entitled to such reliance, and, hence, to the exemption accorded to the Dizons, because justice and equity demand that the doctrine laid down in Dizon v. Rodriguez be applied equally to those similarly situated.
Respondents herein are not, however, so situated. The Dizon's were entitled to rely on the aforementioned subdivision titles of respondents herein and had no obligation to inquire about the circumstances under which said titles had been issued. Upon the other hand, respondents herein were not only aware of these circumstances. They were the ones who ordered the resurvey and the subdivision that led to the issuance of said titles. They knew that the area thereof exceeded, by over 1,000 hectares, the area covered by their TCT No. 722. As the Court of Appeals had repeatedly held in its decision in Dizon v. Rodriguez which "we affirrmed in all respects" the subdivision plan of the Hacienda Calatagan "was prepared in disregard of the technical description contained in TCT No. 722."
Indeed, nothing was said in our decision, either in L-20950, or in L-20300-01 and L-20355-56, which may be construed as extending to respondents herein the exemption therein declared in favor of the Dizons, or other lessees or assignees of said respondents, from the obligation to pay damages until such time as the Dizons, lessees or assignees, shall have been reimbursed the necessary expenses incurred by them. On the contrary, the express mention of the Dizons, as regards said exemption, immediately followed by the declaration, in the dispositive part of decision in L-20950, to the effect that, "thus modified, the decision of the lower court ... is hereby affirmed," necessarily implied that no other modification was intended and that respondents herein were excluded from the benefits of said exemption, since the same was not given to them in the decision of Judge Tengco.
Acquisition of Something Controversial
The propriety, in equity, of awarding damages to Tolentino has been put in doubt, upon. the theory that he had "wittingly acquired something that is controversial," referring, presumeably, to the fact that his interest in Lot 360 had been acquired by assignment of the rights therein of Gabino Lachica as the original applicant of a fishpond permit from the Government which were contested by respondents herein.
The status of said Lot 360 as a portion of the public domain and not a part of Hacienda Calatagan is not, however, controversial. Being a portion of the territorial navigable waters in Santiago Bay, it is obvious to the whole world that said lot is not and cannot be a private property, much less belong to the Hacienda Calatagan, whose TCT No. 722 explicitly stated that Santiago Bay constituted one of its southern limits. In other words, the Bay was not and is not part of the Hacienda.
What is more, jurisdiction over said portion of the Bay was asserted by the Bureau of Fisheries as early as August 2, 1952, and reiterated in 1954. Before the close of that year, such action was sustained by Judge Bayona, who, in turn was, in April 1956, upheld by the Supreme Court, which declared positively that areas that "are really part of the sea, beach or foreshore ... cannot be registered ... in the name of any one, for they are not registrable, are non-alienable and belong to the public domain ... ." There could have been, therefore, no possible doubt that Lot 360 and the other lots found in the Santiago Bay form part of the public domain. It should be noted, also, that owing mainly to the initiative and resolution of Tolentino, the State recovered more than 1,091 hectares of the public domain and the transfer certificates of title thereto of respondents herein and their assigns were annulled.
The question, therefore, is whether it is just and fair to deny Tolentino the right to recover damages from the party who caused them, despite the manifest public nature of Lot 360; despite the fact that it is beyond the boundaries set forth in respondents' TCT No. 722; despite the notices sent and demands made by the Bureau of Fisheries in 1952 and 1954, despite the decision of Judge Bayona in December, 1954 and that of the Supreme Court in 1956;38 despite the decision of Judge Vasquez in 1958 and that of the Court of Appeals in 1961,39 affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1965. 40
Granting, for the sake of argument, that Tolentino had acquired something controversial whether Lot 360 was or was not a part of Hacienda Calatagan thereby assuming the risk of losing and sustaining damages, the fact is, however, that he was not only right, but, also, that he thereby rendered a service to the nation, by establishing its title to over 1,000 hectares of the public domain appropriated by respondents herein. Beside, respondents had, also, performed something much more "controversial" to put it mildly and assumed a greater risk by causing a resurvey and a composite plan to be made of the Hacienda Calatagan, disregarding the boundaries set forth in its TCT No. 722, and by claiming title and performing acts of ownership over more than 1,091 hectares which are beyond said boundaries and lost in their bid therefor. Since both had assumed their respective risks, is it fair and equitable, in effect, to penalize the winner, by denying any relief for the damages sustained by him in defense of what is right, and to reward the losers, by allowing them to keep the income and other benefits derived by them by wrongfully defying the rulings of the proper administrative and judicial authorities, declaring their (the losers') claim to be devoid of merit?
Authority to Depart from the Tenor of a Final Decision
I would have preferred to conclude the present opinion at this point were it not for the transcendental implications of the pronouncements made in the majority opinion upholding the authority to amend decisions long final and executory.
The case of Locsin vs. Paredes41 and the quotations from Corpus Juris, Corpus Juris Secundum and the American Jurisprudence relied upon, as well as the other Philippine cases cited in support of respondents' contention, are not in point.
Said qoutations refer to "doubtful or ambiguous judgement" or decrees 42 "susceptible of two constructions." They are inapplicable to the case at bar, the "judgment" or "decree" involved therein which is the dispositive part of Judge Tengco's decision being neither "doubtful" nor "ambiguous" or "susceptible of two constructions." Besides as we have shown in the preceding pages the dispositive part of Judge Tengco's decision and that of ours in L-20950, as well as the text and the spirit of both decisions, are in harmony with our law on quasi- delicts or torts, and with the demands of justice and equity. Again, the quotation made in the majority opinion from the American Jurisprudence43 to the effect that, "if a finding is inconsistent with the judgment proper or decretal part of the decree, the latter must control" refutes the position taken by the majority, and supports our view.
Locsin vs. Paredes
The case was one for the recovery of P16,417.25 "representing the proceeds of a joint and several promissory note." Although the defendants therein. "admitted the existence of said debt in accordance with the promissory note," the judgment sentencing them to pay said amount did not declare them "jointly and severally" liable therefor. After the decision had become final, the lower court on motion of the judgment creditor based upon the theory that the failure of the dispositive part of the decision to order that the debt paid "severally" was due to an omission committed "inadvertently" ammended said part of the decision by specifying the "several" nature of the payment therein decreed. A petition for certiorari filed by the judgment debtors to annul this amendment was denied by the Supreme Court, upon the ground that the lower court had not exceeded its jurisdiction in acting as it did, because "it clearly appears from the allegations of the complaint, the promissory note reproduced therein and made a part thereof, the prayer and the conclusions of fact and of law contained in the decision of the respondent judge, that the obligation contracted by the petitioners is joint and several and that the parties as well as the trial judge so understood it."
In other words, the obligation involved there was concededly joint and several in nature. It was so stated plainly in the corresponding promissory note. It was so alleged in the complaint. Defendants "never denied" it. In fact, they "admitted" its existence "in accordance with the promissory note." They "defended themselves merely by alleging that the action was premature." The "conclusions of fact and of law contained in the decision" showed "clearly" that respondent judge, like both parties, had "understood" defendants' obligation to be "joint and several" in character. Hence, the Suprme Court concluded that his failure to so state it in the dispositive part of the decision was due "clearly" to an "omission" committed "inadvertently."
None of these circumstances exist in the case at bar. Here we are concerned, not with an "omission," but with an "addition" or insertion, which, unlike the former, cannot be and is not due to "inadvertence," but must have been and was intentional and deliberate. The Republic and Tolentino had prayed for a judgement against "the defendants," and the trial judge rendered judgements against "all the defendants," thus stressing the fact that the sentence encompassed everyone of them without exception. What is more, this judgment is in accordance with the theory of the Republic and Tolentino in their respective complaints, as well as in their pleadings, briefs and memoranda. Thus the Locsin case does not bear out respondents' pretense and merely makes its infirmity more obvious. To the same effect are
Other Philippine cases cited
in the majority opinion
The cases therein cited are Velez vs. Martinez,44 De Ralla vs. Director of Lands,45 Villones vs. Nable,46 and Morelos vs Go Chin Ling.47 In these four (4) cases, the dispositive part of the decision unlike that of the case at bar was ambiguous or susceptible of several interpretations.
In the Velez case, the question was whether the defendant, sentenced, in the dispositive part of a decision, to pay a certain sum to the plaintiffs was bound to do so in his personal capacity or as administrator of the estate of a deceased person. Said dispositive part did not state in what capacity the defendant had been so sentenced.
The De Ralla case involved a decision of the Court of Appeals in a land registration case, the dispositive part of which decision declared that petitioner had established a fee simple title, not over the "entire" property applied for and covered by the deed of purchase Exhibit D, but over a "portion" only thereof, which could not be adjudicated as yet to the applicant, because the "true boundaries" of said portion were not indicated in the plan submitted to court, which, accordingly, remanded the case to the trial court for resurvey, which should not include the areas covered by certain homestead and free patent applications. Said dispositive part further provided that "after the amended plan shall have been duly approved and the lower court is satisfied as to its identity" referring to the portion belonging to the applicant "it shall be adjudicated" to him. This dispositive part was assailed as incongruous, in that it denied the regulation of even the portion to which the applicant had established her title and that, by directing the exclusion of the areas covered by homestead and free patent applications, "the applicant would be deprived of a part of the property which has been declared to be registrable in her favor." It was held that the alleged incongruity in the dispositive part should be resolved by considering "the decision below ... as a whole ... ." No similar contradiction or incongruity exists in the dispositive part of the decision of Judge Tengco involved in the case at bar.
The dispositive part of the judgment on the pleadings rendered in the Villones case sentenced the defendant therein to accept a given sum of money payment of which had been tendered by the plaintiffs which, together with another specified sum, already paid by the latter, represented" the full purchase price of the land sold" by the defendant to the plaintiffs, and to execute the corresponding deed of conveyance in their favor. In the proceedings for the execution of this decision, the issue arose as to the area of the land to be conveyed to the plaintiffs, said area not having been given in said dispositive part.
Similarly the dispositive part of the decision in the Morelos case rendered on March 11, 1952 ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff P1,023 a month from February 1950 "up to the present time." This decision was, on February 8, 1957, affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On July 31, 1957, the trial court issued a writ of execution directing the sheriff to cause the defendant to pay P1,023 "a month" from February 1950 to January 1957. The defendant objected thereto, alleging that the decision sought to be executed merely directed the payment of said sum "from February 1950 up to the present time," which he claimed was March 11, 1952, the date of promulgation of the lower court's decision. This pretense was overruled, it appearing from the body of the decision that the issue between the parties was the term of a lease in of Morelos which was held to be eight (8) years from January 31, 1949, or up to January 1957. Indeed, the phrase "the present time" used in the dispositive part of the trial court's decision could mean either the date of its rendition which was long before the expiration of the term of the lease or the date when the decision became final after the expiration of said term or the date when the lease expired, which was several months before the decision had become final. In other words, the dispositive part of the decision was unlike that of Judge Tengco's decision or of ours in L-20950 open to several interpretations.
Cases subsequent to Locsin v. Paredes
1. Contreras v. Felix 48
Speaking through Justice Tuason, this Court declared that "(o)nly clerical errors, or mistakes or omissions plainly due to inadvertence or negligence may be corrected or supplled after the judgment has been entered" and that "the final judgment as rendered in the judgment of the court irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements in the decision" itself, referring to the views expressed in the body of the decision, as distinguished from its dispositive part, which constitutes the judgment proper. The Court further quoted with approval, Freeman's postulate49 to the effect that:
The general power to correct clerical errors and omissions does not authorize the court of repair its own inaction, to make the record and judgment say what the court did not adjudge, although it had a clear right to do so. The court cannot under the guise of correcting its record put upon it an order or judgment it never made or rendered, or add something to either which was not originally included although it might and should have so ordered or adjudged in the first instance. It cannot thus repair its own lapses and omissions to do what it could legally and properly have done at the right time. A court's mistake in leaving out of its decision something which it ought to have put in, and something in issue of which it intended but failed to dispose, is a judicial error, not a mere clerical misprision, and cannot be corrected by adding to the entered judgment the omitted matter on the theory of making the entry conform to the actual judgement rendered.50
Particularly relevant to the question whether or not the Locsin case justifies the granting of the relief sought in the second motion for reconsideration of respondents herein is the fact that, like the Locsin case, that of Contreras involved the question whether the judgement debtors, under a given final and executory decision, are jointly and severally liable thereunder, despite the silence thereon of its dispositive part, which was allegedly "due to inadvertence on the part of the court." Commenting thereon, this Court added, in the Contreras case.
In truth, there is no proper and sufficient showing here that the alleged mistake was due to inadvertence on the part of the court. We have been through with the decision and have not detected in it any clear purpose or intention to make the defendants jointly and severally liable. In all probabality, the nature of defendants' liability (whether joint or joint and several) was not touched upon at all by the parties and was not given thought by them or by the court. The point was involved in obscurity. As the Judgment of the lower court plainly indicates, the case was very intricate, complicated by a multiplicity of claims and counterclaims arising from different juridical acts and sought from different parties who sustained diverse relationships to the plaintiffs and to each other with reference to the separate items. It is not to be wondered at if the finer point of solidarity among the defendants was swallowed up and lost in the maze of these claims and counterclaims over the validity of which the three-cornered contest was centered and bitterly waged. ... 51
With respect to the question whether respondents herein may be held liable to Tolentino for damages sustained by him after the former had conveyed Lot 360 to the Dizons, the foregoing observations are squarely in point. Indeed, such question was never posed either before Judge Tengco or before the Supreme Court in L-20950. Hence neither the former nor the latter could have intended the consequences now sought to be brought by respondents' second motion for reconsideration.
Needless to say, to the extent that the decision in the Locsin case is inconsistent with that of the Contreras case, the latter must necessarily prevail over the former. In fact, the position taken by the Supreme Court in the Contreras case was reiterated in, inter alia, Edwards vs. Arce,52 Siari Valley Estates, Inc. vs. Lucasan,53 Manalang vs. E. Tuason de Rickards,54 Magdalena Estate, Inc. vs. Caluag,55 Philippine Sugar Institute vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 56 Board of Liquidators vs. Ricma,57 and Dy Pac vs. Dy Pac.58
2. The Edwards case
This referred to a lot of 180 square meters belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Edwards, who delivered it, in 1931, to Mr. and Mrs. Arce for administration. Inasmuch as the Arces had failed to render accounts since 1946 and had leased the property to another, the Edwards filed an action to recover possession of the lot and for an accounting and liquidation of said administration.
It appears that prior thereto, the Arces had sued the Edwards to compel them to execute a deed of conveyance of said lot, in compliance with a promise to sell made by them to the Arces. In due course, a decision was rendered declaring that the Arces were entitled to demand fulfillment of said promise insofar only as a portion of 137 square meters of said lot is concerned, without the improvements thereon, and not with regard to the remaining area of said lot, containing 43 square meters, and that, since the complaint sought the conveyance of the whole lot, with a total area of 180 square meters, judgment was rendered absolving the Edwards from said complaint.
After this decision had become final, the Edwards commenced the second action for the recovery of possession of the lot and for an accounting. In their answer to the complaint therein, the Arces invoked the decision in the first case, acknowledging their right to demand fulfillment of the promise of the Edwards, to sell a portion of 137 square meters of said lot. The Arces prayed, accordingly, that the Edwards be sentenced to execute the deed of conveyance thereof and to pay damages for their failure to do so, despite the decision in the first case. The Court of First Instance rendered, in the second case, adecision sentencing the Edwards to execute said deed of sale in favor of the Arces and requiring the latter to render an accounting to the former, under the terms set forth in said decision, which was substantially affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the latter's decision and sentenced the Arces to return the possession of the entire lot in question to the Edwards, to pay the latter a given sum for their use and occupation of a portion of said lot, and to render an accounting of the rentals for the remaining area thereof. Explaining its reasons therefor, the Court used the language quoted at the footnote. 59
It cannot be denied that the Arces had a strong equity in their favor, based on the explicit recognition made, in the body of the decision in the first case, of their right to demand fulfillment of the probe of the Edwards to sell to them a portion of 137 square meters of the lot in dispute, and that, the dispositive part of said decision dismissing the complaint of the Arces, with respect to the whole lot of 180 square meters, is inconsistent with said recognition. Yet, such is the policy of strict adherence to the principle of res adjudicata adopted in said case, that this Court felt constrained therein to reverse the decision appealed from.
Respondents herein have in their favor no judicial declaration, contained in a final judgment , similar or even comparable to that made in favor of the Arces. In fact, the former do not have the equities that the latter had.
3. The Siari Valley case
This case involved a decision of the Supreme Court affirming that of the Court of First Instance, the dispositive part of which was quoted only partially in our decision. The question was raised as to whether or not the portion not so quoted in our confirmatory decision had, also, been affirmed. Holding that the answer must be in the affirmative, we added:
We explained in Contreras vs. Felix, 78 Phil., 570, 44 Off. Gaz., 4306 that `the final judgment as rendered is the judgment of the court, irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements in the decision' and that the judgment must be distinguished from the opinion. Our decree was one affirming the appealed judgment. If any statement in the opinion preceding the decree seemingly excluded a portion (which we deny), it must be overlooked, because the judgment or the decree prevails over the opinion. 60
4. Manalang v. Rickards
In several actions for ejectment of tenants instituted in the City Court of Manila, on April 27, 1954, the defendants filed motions to dismiss based upon Rep. Act No. 1162 (approved on June 18, 1954), pursuant to which, from the approval thereof and until the expropriation therein provided, "no ejectment proceedings shall be instituted or prosecuted against any tenant or occupant of any landed estates or haciendas" therein authorized to be expropriated. On July 14, 1954, the court denied the motions and suspended the proceedings for two (2) years from the approval of said Act or until further order of the court. However, on April 13, 1955, the municipal judge ordered the cases set for hearing. A reconsideration of this order having been denied, the tenants filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging that the order of July 14, 1954, had already disposed of the action and determined the rights of the parties. The CFI dismissed the petition upon the theory that said order was merely interlocutory. Although in the body of the order the municipal judge declared that, "from the approval of Rep. Act No. 1162 no ejectment proceeding should be instituted or prosecuted against any tenant," thereby indicating apparently, that the motion to dismiss should be granted, the dispositive part of the order clearly and unequivocally denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal appealed from, stating:
... It is argued ... by appellants that the body of the order recognized the prohibition laid down by Republic Act No. 1162 against the institution of ejectment proceedings after the effectivity of said Act. It is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the Court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of the decision or order is the investive or controlling factor that determines and settles the rights of the parties and the questions presented therein, notwithstanding the existence of statements or declarations in the body of said order that may be confusing. In the case at bar, considering that the dispositive part of the order merely suspended the proceedings without touching on the merits of the case or disposing of the issues involved therein, said order cannot be said to be final in character but clearly an interlocutory one which in this case cannot be the subject of an action for certiorari.61
5. Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag
Paragraph (b) of a decision rendered on June 11, 1957, ordered
... the defendant, within thirty (30) days from notice hereof, to give to the plaintiff the title to Lot 2-b-5 of Psd-33887 subject to a first mortgage in favor of the defendant to secure payment on the unpaid balance of the price of the land.
The defendant having filed a motion for reconsideration, on January 10, 1958, the court modified said paragraph to read:
(b) Declaring the plaintiff to be entitled to pay for the land on cash basis within a period of ninety (90) days from the time that the defendant shall deliver to him the title to Lot 2 b-5 of Psd-33887, subject to a first mortgage in favor of the defendant to secure payment of the unpaid balance of the price of the land which delivery of title must be accomplished within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
The defendant subsequently tried to appeal from said decision, but the trial court dismissed the appeal upon the ground that the record on appeal had been filed out of time, computed from the original decision of June 11, 1957. The Court of Appeals sustained the view taken by the lower court, which was, however, reversed by the Supreme Court, the amendment made on January 10, 1958, being substantial in nature, in that the original decision did not require the plaintiff to make a payment to the defendant, which the amended decision did. Commenting on plaintiff's argument to the effect that the body of the original decision already stated that plaintiff was under obligation to pay for the land on cash basis, we said:
It is of no moment that the above was contained in text of the original decision. The quoted finding of the lower court cannot supply deficiencies in the dispositive portion. It is a mere opinion of the court and the rule is settled that where thereis a conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing. (2 Moran 194, 1963 ed.)62
6. Phil. Sugar Institute v. CIR
In a decision rendered on August 2, 1954, the CIR sentenced the employer corporation to pay its policemen a given additional compensation "together with all the privileges and facilities hitherto enjoyed by them." These policemen having been laid off in the meantime, and, thereafter, refused reinstatement, their Union filed with the CIRa petition for reinstatement and for contempt. In duecourse, the CIR rendered judgment on December 9, 1957,ordering the reinstatement prayed for, with back wages,"without loss of seniority and other privileges they havehitherto enjoyed ... ." Still later, the Union filed a "petition for execution of judgment re privileges, facilities". It appears that these "facilities" included free khaki suiting, shoes, helmets and ponchos, which the employer did notfurnish them upon reinstatement, alleging that said itemswere given for official use during their official tour of duty,while rendering actual police work, which they had not renderedwhile laid off. Inasmuch, however, as the decision soughtto be executed had eliminated the "facilities" fromthe award made therein, the claim of the policemen wasoverruled because:
Well-settled is the rule that the portion of a decision thatbecomes the subject of executon is that ordained or decreed inthe dispositive part thereof (Neri Edwards, et al. vs. Arce, etal., 52 O.G. 2357; Govt. of the Phil. vs. Jose Ramon y Vasquez, et al., 73 Phil. 669; Contreras, et al., 78 Phil. 570; Jabon, et al. vs. Alo, et al., 91 Phil. 750; Robles, et al. vs. Timario, et al., L-13911, April 28, 1960; Segarra vs. Maranilla, L-14428, July 26, 1960).63
7. Board of Liquidators vs. Ricma64
As we had occasion to point out earlier,65 this caseinvolved a conflict between the disapositive part of an order,which decreed the denial of a "motion to dismiss," and thebody of the order, which set forth the reason why plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of a previous order granting defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint,should be denied. Althouigh it was obvious that the court had committed a mistake in referring, in the dispositive part, to defendant's "motion to dismiss," for what was before the court was not that motion, the same having alreadybeen granted, but the motion for reconsideration ofthe order granting said motion to dismiss, we held that the dispositive part should prevail, for it "clearly and definitely stated that what was being denied" was the "motion to dismiss," regardless "of anything said" in the body of the order in dispute.
8. Dy Pac Pakiao Workers Union v. Dy Pac & Co.
On January 30, 1961, Dy Pac & Co. was adjudged by the CIR guilty of unfair labor practice and ordered to pay back wages to certain workers from the date of their unjust dismissal by stopping the work in the old carro to which they were assigned to the date of finality of the CIR decision, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The Union having later moved that said backwages be computed, the matter was referred to the chief examiner of the CIR, who subsequently submitted his assessment of the backwages from January 30, 1957 (date of dismissal) to December 1, 1962 (date of finality of the decision). This report was, on November 9, 1966, approved by a CIR Judge, but modified by a resolution of the CIR en banc, on November 9, 1966, reducing the backwages to six months.
Assailed as an attempt to modify a decision already final and executory, the validity of this resolution was sought to be justified upon the ground that "to reinstate the workers concerned when there is no work to be done would be injustice to the company, because management would be forced to give salaries to the workers even if they have nothing to do." In said resolution, the CIR en banc concluded, therefore, that whatever backwages the workers were entitled to should not extend beyond the time when, had they been reinstated, they would have nevertheless ceased working due to the legitimate shutting up of the carro in which they were working.
The Supreme Court rejected this view upon the ground that "while the body of a decision, order or resolution might create some ambiguity regarding which way the Court's reasoning preponderates, it is the dispositive portion thereof that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of these rights, and imposes the corresponding duties and obligations."
Public Interest and
Public Policy
We have thus consistently adhered to the rule that thedispositive part of a decision is the judgment properlyspeaking; that the same prevails over the opinion set forthin the body of the decision; and that, in case of conflictbetween the former and the latter, the former is controling, "regardlessof any possible injustice in a particularcase." And the reason for this policy is obvious.
... The necessity of giving finality to judgments that are not void is self-evident. The interest of society impose it. The opposing view might make litigation "more unendurable than the wrongs it is intended to redress." It would create doubt, real, or imaginary, and controversy would constantly ariseas to what the judgment or order was. As this court hasannounced, "public policy and sound practice demand that, at therisk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by the law. The very object forwhich courts wewre instituted was to put an end to controversies. (Layda vs. Legazpi, 39 Phil., 83; Dy Cay vs. Crossfield & O'Brien, 38 Phil., 521.)
We have no cause to depart from this rule. It is a rulethat must be adhered to regardless of any possible injustice ina particular case. It is not a legal concept of the flexible kind, capable being individualized to meet the needs of varyingconditions. "We have to subordinate the equity of a particular situation to the overmastering need" of certainty andimmutability of judicial pronouncements. The loss to the litigants in particular and to society in general "would in the long runbe greater that the gain if judges were clothed with power to revise' their decisons at will. "Perhaps, with a higher conception" of the administration of justice and its needs, "the timewill come when even revision will be permitted if revision isin consonance with established standards' of court functions,'but the time is not yet.'"66
This is good law and no reason has been given to depart therefrom in this particular case. Now more than ever, it is necessary to define or state, with the greatest possible precision, the extent to which courts may go in the interpretation or enforcement of judgments and decrees that are already final and executory. Shall we keep on upholding the restrictive policy above set forth, or should we favor a liberal one, and allow greater flexibility in the exercise of the ministerial duty to execute said final judgments or decrees?
It may be trite to note that the latter policy tends to encourage litigations; that one of the pressing needs of the Philippines is the adoption of measures tending to minimize judicial controversies; that there are thousands of cases pending in our inferior courts; that any increase in the number of cases in such courts would necessarily connote a corresponding increase in the number of cases brought to appellate courts, that in view of the big number of cases now pending in our courts of justice, such cases must necessarily consume many years before they are finally disposed of; that a further increase in the number of court litigations would surely cause greater delays in the disposition of cases; and that such delays inure principally to the benefit of unscrupulous litigants, to the detriment of the people and of their faith, in the Rule of Law.
I suggest that the restrictive policy is the best, from the viewpoint, not only of society, but, also, of the individual litigants; that the community is mainly concerned with public order, the interests of which are better served by the prompt settlement of justiciable controversies; that so is the litigant, who needs, more than the collectivity, to know what his rights are, in the simplest terms possible and as soon as it may be feasible; that, at any rate, most of the issues raised in connection with the execution of final judgments or decrees involve fine and hair-splitting distinctions, which it is the bounden duty of the parties to avoid by seasonably filing motions for reconsideration aimed at securing the necessary clarification; and that said restrictive policy would compel the parties and their counsel to exercise great care in studying said judgments anddecrees before they become final and executory.
The error of law or injustice that would allegedly resultfrom holding respondents herein liable for damages, isnegated by what has been said in the foregoing pages. Itshould be noted, moreover, that there would have been nosuch damages, had respondents not performed illegal acts,namely, the appropriation of extensive portions of thepublic domain, including the territorial waters, and the salethereof to third persons. They are, accordingly, the ultimatecause of said damages.
One other factor should not be overlooked in disposing ofthe issues now before the Court.ℒαwρhi৷ For a number of years now,certain events or incidents here and there have ledto the belief or feeling that there must have been a goodnumber of certificates of title illegally issued, covering extensive areas of the public domain, including, sometimes,lands previously decreed in favor of parties whose titles arestill subsisting. Heretofore, such belief or feeling had beenseemingly based upon judicial controversies or administrative investigations involving relatively small parcels of land. Latest developments, however, indicate that the magnitude of the irregularities in connection with the illegal issuance of transfer certificates of title and the consequent usurpations of portions of the public domain may have reached considerable, if not alarming, proportions.
Apart from its adverse effect upon the stability ofjudicial decisions and the condition of court dockets in thePhilippines, the resolution of the issues now pending determinationbefore Us has a bearing on the duty of courts ofjustice to afford effective relief against irregularitiesjeopardizing, not only the efficacy of our Torrens System,but, also, the defense of our national patrimony, if not ofour natiuonal security. The question, insofar as thepresent case is concerned, is: Shall we exempt the authors ofsaid irregularities from responsibility for damages, upon proof that the lands thereby usurped have been conveyed topurchasers for value, who relied on certificates of title illegally secured by their predecessors in interest? Wouldnot the grant of such exemption encourage said irregularities and foster the simulation difficult to prove in court of sales of dummies or alter egos?
Favorable action on the motion for reconsideration of respondents herein, would, it is believed:
(1) Establish a precedent fraught with possibilities tending to impair the stability of judicial decisions and affording a means to prolong court proceedings or justify the institution of new ones, despite the finality of the judgment or decree rendered in the main case, by sanctioning a departure from the clear, plain and natural meaning of said judgment or decree;
(2) Contribute to the further increase of the steadily mounting number of cases pending before our courts of justice and thus generate greater delay in the determination of said cases, as well as offset the effect of legislative and administrative measures taken some upon the suggestion or initiative of the Supreme Court to promote the early disposal of such cases;
(3) Impair normal and legitimate means to implement the constitutional mandate for the protection and conservation of our natural resources and the patrimony of the nation; and
(4) Promote usurpations of the public domain, as well as the simulation of sales thereof by the original usurper, by exempting him from responsibility for damages which would not have been sustained were it not for the irregularities committed by him so long as he has conveyed the subject matter thereof to a purchaser for value, in good faith.
Referring to the subject of torts, Prosser adverts to the necessity of taking an active role in making "a conscious effort to direct the law along lines which will achieve a desirable social result," 67 because:
The "prophylactic" factor of preventing future harm has been quite important in the field of torts. The courts are concerned not only with compensation of the victim, but with admonition of the wrongdoer. When trhe decisions of the courts become known and defendants realize that they may be held liable, there is of course a strong incentive to prevent the occurenceof the harm. Not infrequently one reason fro imposing liability is the deliberate purposes of providing that incentive. ... . (Prosser, The Law of Torts, 3rd ed., p. 23.)
Prosser goes on to say: "when the interest of the publicis throwjn into the scaleand allowed to swing the balancefor or against the plaintiff, the result is a form of" what Pound, in his Theory of Social Interests68 has caharacterizedas "'social engineering' that deliberately uses the law as an instrument to promote that "greatest happiness of the greatest number which by common consent is the object of society. This process of "balancing the interests" is by no means peculair to the law of torts, but it has been carried to its greatest length, and has received its moist general conscious recognition in this field."69
WHEREFORE, I vote to deny frespondent's second motion for reconsideration and supplemental second motion for reconsideration.
Footnotes
1 Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, 24 Phil. 504; Bachrach v. Rural Transit, L-26764, July 25, 1967; People v. Mapa, L-22301, Aug. 30, 1967; City Mayor v. Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, L-20346, Oct. 31, 1967; Pacific Oxygen v. Central Bank, L-21881, March 1, 1968; Lim Kiah v. Kaynee Co., L-24802, Oct. 14, 1968.
2 Edwards v. Arce, 102 Phil. 390.
3 Contreras v. Felix, 78 Phil. 570, 574, 575, 577.
4 "(b) Ordering Defendants Antonino Dizon, Lucia Dizon, Adelaida Dizon Reyes, Consolacion Dizon Degollacion, Artemio Dizon, Ruben Dizon, Amorando Dizon and Zenaida Dizon, to vacate Lot 360 in favor of Intervenor Miguel Tolentino;"
5 "(e) Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay the costs."
6 "(d) Restraining and enjoining all the defendants from further acts of ownership and possession over Lots 360, 362, 363 and 182 of Psd.-40891; ..."
7 Contreras v. Felix, 78 Phil. 570, 574, 575, 577.
8 Siari Valley Estates v. Lucasan, 102 Phil. 390, 393.
9 L-24318, August 29, 1969.
10 Emphasis supplied.
11 Except the Government's claim for damages.
12 The prayer in the complaint of the Government was:
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed this Honorable Court to render judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, as follows:
Under the First Cause of Action:
To order the annulment of whatever title was issued in favor of the defendant Ayala y Cia. and/or Hacienda Calatagan for the excess of some 2,500 hectares of land subject matter hereof and the reversion of said area to the public domain;
Under the Second Cause of Action:
To order that plaintiff's lawful and bona fide permittees be placed in possession of the corresponding parcels of land respectively covered by Fishpond Permit No. F-4526-N and other Fishpond Permits;
Under the Third Cause of Action:
To order the defendants to pay damages jointly and severally to the plaintiff in the sum of at least P500,000.00;
Under the Fourth Cause of Action:
To restrain the defendants from exercising further acts of dominion and ownership over the land subject matter of this litigation lawfully belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, by issuing a writ of preliminary injunction against them during the pendency of this case, and a writ of final injunction to be included in the judgment as part of the relief. Common to All Causes of Action:
Plaintiff finally prays for such other relief as may be deemed just, proper and equitable in the premises. (Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13, in L-20950.)
The PRAYER in the complaint of Tolentino was:
"WHEREFORE, plaintiff-intervenor respectfully prays this Honorable Court to render judgment in favor of the plaintiff and the plaintiff-intervenor and against the defendants, as follows:
Under the First Cause of Action:
To order the annulment of whatever title was issued in favor of the defendants Alfonso Zobel, Ayala y Cia., or the Hacienda Calatagan and the defendants Dizons for the excess of some 2,500 hectares of the portions of the sea, beach or foreshore and navigable inlet, Lot 360 of Psd-40891, subject-matter hereof, and the reversion of said area to the public domain.
Under the Second Cause of Action:
To order that plaintiff's lawful and bona fide permittees, and more particularly the plaintiff-intervenor be placed in possession of the said navigable inlet covered by Fishpond Permit No. F-4236-N and Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 1144.
Under the Third Cause of Action:
To order the defendants to pay damages jointly and several to the plaintiff in the sum of at least P500,000.00; and to the plaintiff-intervenor the amounts alleged and mentioned in paragraph 16 of this complaint intervention.
Under the Fourth Cause of Action:
To order the defendants requiring them to refrain from usurping the said fishpond, Lot 360 of Psd-40891, lawfully belonging to the Republic of the Philippines; and to issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the aforesaid defendants restraining them, their agents and representatives from the usurpation of the same and committing acts of dispossession against the plaintiff and the plaintiff-intervenor. Common to All Causes of Action:
Plaintiff-intervenor finally prays for such other relief as may be deemed just, proper and equitable in the premises." (Record on Appeal, pp. 30-31, in L-20950.)
13 Record on Appeal in L-20950, pp. 252-253.
14 Although they were truly justified, both legally and morally.
15 Art, 2176 of our Civil Code.
16 The resurvey ordered in 1949, to meet the adverse claims of others; the illegal inclusion in the resurvey plan of 1,091 hectares beyond the boundaries of the area covered by respondents' TCT No. T-722, about half of which excess (or 403.2185 hectares) being part of the foreshore, beach or navigable waters, which are not susceptible of registration, and are per se a notice of such fact; their refusal to vacate the areas covered by said claims or failure to cause said areas to be vacated by their assignees or successors-in-interest, despite a demand made by the Bureau of Fisheries, as early as 1952; the sale by them of Lot 360 to the Dizons in 1954, or subsequently to said demand of the Bureau of Fisheries.
17 Dy Pac Pakiao Workers Union v. Dy Pac & Co., L- 27377, March 31, 1971. Emphasis supplied.
18 L-20300-01 and L-20355-56, April 30, 1965.
19 L-20950, May 31, 1965.
20 Art. 1157 of our Civil Code.
21 Republic v. Ayala, et al., L-20950, May 31, 1965.
22 Ford Motors v. Mathis, C. A. Tex., 322 F. 2d. 267; Walker v. General Motors Corp., D.C.L., 115 F. Supp. 267; Mitchell v. Millee, 214 A. 2d 694, 26 Conn. Supp. 142; see also, 30 C.J.S. 935.
23 Comstock v. Gen. Motors Corp., 99 N.W. 2d 627, 358 Mich 163, 78 A.L.R. 2d 499; Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, C.A. Tex. 322 F. 2d 267; Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 55 Cal. Rptr. 94, 246 C.A. 2d 639; Ford Motors Co. v. Lonon, 398 S. W. 2d 240, 217 Tenn. 400; Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P. 2d 168, 61 C. 2d 256; People ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bua, 226 N.E. 2d 6, 37 Ill. 2d 180; Suvada v. White Motor Co. 210 N.E. 2d 182, 32 Ill. 2d 612.
24 Arts. 280, 281 and 308, Revised Penal Code; Arts. 429 and 1644, Civil Code of the Philippines; Sections 499 and 1837, Revised Administrative Code; Rep. Act No. 926; Daywalt v. Corporation, 39 Phil. 587.
25 Brame v. Clark, 62 S.E. 418.
26 La Bruno v. Lawrence. 166 A. 2d 822, 825.
27 Restatement of the Law Torts, 2nd, Secs. 1-280, p. 296.
28 "The defendant is liable for an intentional entry although he has acted in good faith, under the mistaken belief, however reasonable, that he is committing no wrong. Thus, he is a trespasser although he believes that the land is his own, or that he has the consent of the owner, or the legal privilege of entry; or although he is a child too young to understand that what he is doing is wrong. The interest of the landowner is protected at the expense of those who make innocent mistakes ..." Prosser, The Law of Torts 3rd ed. 1964 Ed., p. 74.
"It is also to be borne in mind that the intent, with which an act is done, is not the test of liability of a party to an action for trespass. A person may be ever so innocent of an intention to cross the invisible boundary of his neighbor's land, or he may believe that he has a perfect right to cross it, and yet his innocence and good faith will not protect him. His conduct may be marked by the utmost civility, and even be actuated by a desire to benefit, or it may in fact benefit the owner. Still, if his entry was unauthorized, he is a trespassed and liable accordingly. Mere inadvertence or accident in crossing the line will not save him from trespass, nor will plaintiff's failure to prove that defendant's act caused substantial damage. The law implies damages from the trespass. Even though the harm be so trifling, that plaintiff's witnesses are unable to place any estimate upon the injuries inflicted, yet, it is said, if no recovery could be had, the trespasser, by repetition of the act and the lapse of time, might acquire an easement in plaintiff's land, inspite of anything that could be done to prevent it." Burdick's Law of Torts, 1926 Ed., Sec. 52, pp. 408-409.
"When one commits a trespass upon the person or property of another, whether intentional or unintentional, there are few defenses which will excuse andd relieve him from liability. For example, the intent with which an act is done is not a test of liability in trespass; therefore, a mistake of law or fact or absence of bad faith on the part of the defendant will not excuse a trespass. Advice of counsel, even though acted on in good faith, will not relieve a trespasser from liability. A trespasser cannot relieve himself from liability by showing that a third person directed, ordered or authorized him to do the illegal act complained of. As in the case of other torts, infancy is not a defense to liability in tresspass." 52 Am. Jur., p. 864.
"Where defendant had a right to do the act, ordinarily, his motive is immaterial. Generally, good faith, or the fact that defendant acted on advice of counsel is no defense, at least if full disclosure of the facts was not made. Hence, a bona fide claim of right either to real or personal property constitutes no defense to tresspass although the belief wasunintentionally induced by plaintiff." 87 C.J.S. 992, Trespass, Sec. 33.
"Fact that trespass results from an innocent mistake, and in that sense, is not deliberate or willful, does not relieve the trespasser of liability therefor or for any of the results thereof; and, therefore, even if defendant in action for trespass to land had made the most careful and exhaustive inquiry into ownership of land before committing trespass, it would nevertheless be liable therefor. Kopka v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 91 A. 2d 232." 87 C.J.S p. 992, Footnote, 45.
29 Restatement, Torts, 2d. Sec. 164, p. 297.
30 On Dec. 28, 1954.
31 Dizon v. Bayona, 98 Phil. 942, 948-949.
32 In Dizon v. Bayona, supra.
33 Supra.
34 See pp. 12-13 of this opinion. (pp. 512-513, this volume.)
35 See pp. 13-19 hereof. (pp. 514-520, supra.)
36 See p. 10 of this opinion. (p. 509, supra.)
37 L-20300-01 and L-20355-56, April 30, 1965.
38 Dizon v. Bayona, 98 Phil. 942.
39 CA-G.R. No. 24186-87-R.
40 L-20300-01 and L-20355-56. MACROADMINISTRATION
41 63 Phil. 87.
42 In other words, dispositive part of a decision.
43 30-A Am. Jur., pp. 212-213.
44 63 Phil. 231.
45 83 Phil. 491.
46 85 Phil. 43.
47 105 Phil. 814.
48 78 Phil. 570, 574, 575, 576-577.
49 1 Freeman on Judgments, 275.
50 Emphasis ours.
51 Emphasis ours.
52 98 Phil. 688.
53 102, Phil. 390.
54 104 Phil. 254, 258.
55 L-16250, June 30, 1964.
56 L-18930, Feb. 28, 1967.
57 Supra.
58 L-27377, March 31, 1971.
59 "We find merit in the contention of the petitioners much as we sympathize with the plight of respondents for, while it is true that in the decision in civil case No. 123 the court made a finding that respondents were entitled to demand the fulfillment of the contract of sale regarding the portion of the lot containing an area of 137 square meters, such however is not controlling for the purpose of res judicata but what appears in the dispositive part of the decision. In fact, the only portion of the decision that became the subject of execution is what is ordained or decreed in such dispositive part. Whatever my be found in the body of the decision can only be considered as part of the reasons or conclusions of the court and while they may serve as guide or enlightenment to determine the ratio decidendi, what is controlling is what appears in the dispositive part of the decision. Thus, in one case it was held that "The presumption of res adjudicata cannot be deduced from the grounds of the order, but from the fallo or from the dispositive part of the order, which is the real judgment in the case in litigation." (Archbishop of Manila vs. Director of Lands, 35 Phil. 339). In another case it was also held that, "In a case decided by the court on appeal, the true judgment of legal effect is that entered by the clerk of said court pursuant to the dispositive part of its decision." (Gutierrez Hermanos vs. De la Riva, 46 Phil. 827). And the reason why the same issue cannot be litigated again is that, "Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by the law. The very object for which courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies." ... .
"It may be contended that the court in civil case No. 123 committed a mistake in dismissing the case outright or in not making a partial adjudication in favor of respondents as regards the portion of the lot containing an area of 137 square meters in line with the finding it has made in the body of the decision, but such error, if any, cannot affect the applicability of the principle of res judicata for the same attaches even when the prior decision is erroneous. Thus, it is a well-settled rule that a final judgment or order on the merits, rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, is conclusive in a subsequent case between the same parties and their successors in interest litigating upon the same thing and issue, regardless of how erroneous it may be." ... .
"On the other hand, the plight of respondents can only be attributed to themselves or their counsel. Knowing well that an omission has been committed by the court, they should have filed a motion for reconsideration or appealed from its decision in order that the error or omission may be corrected, but they failed to take either action and instead allowed the decision to become final and executory. ... ." (Emphasis ours.)
60 Emphasis ours.
61 104 Phil. Phil. 254, 258.
62 L-16250, June 30, 1964.
63 L-18930, Feb. 28, 1967.
64 L-24318, August 29, 1969
65 At page 5 of this opinion. (p. 504, supra.)
66 Contreras v. Felix, 78 Phil. 570, 575-576; Li Kim Tho v. Sanchez, 82 Phil. 776; Frimm v. Atok-big Wedge, L-11887, Dec. 29, 1959; Tolentino v. Ongsiako, L-17938, April 30, 1963. See also, Dy Cay v. Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521; Layda v. Legazpi, 39 Phil. 83; Ebero v. Cañizares, 79 Phil 152, 154; Viquiera v. Baraña, 79 Phil. 486; Rili v. Chumaco, 98 Phil. 505; San Pablo Oil Factory v. CIR, L-18270, Nov. 28, 1962; People v. Villanueva, L-18769, May 27, 1966; Ocampo v. Caluag, L-21113, April 27, 1967.
67 The Law of Torts, by William L. Prosser, 3rd ed., 1964, pp. 14-15.
68 4 Pub. Am. Soc. Society (1920), p. 15.
69 Prosser, op cit., p.
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