G.R. No. L-26112




G.R. No. L-26112, October 4, 1971, ♦ Decision, Villamor, [J] ♦ Concurring Opinion, Barredo, [J] ♦ Dissenting Opinion, Teehankee, [J] ♦ Dissenting Opinion, Concepcion, [CJ] Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-26112 October 4, 1971 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, MIGUEL TOLENTINO, SR., ZOILA DE CHAVEZ, DEOGRACIAS MERCADO, MARIANO PANTOJA, GUILLERMO MERCADO, AGAPITO REYES, ISIDRO BESAS, LEONA LACHICA, ELENO MACALINDONG, DIONISIO MACALINDONG, DOROTEO SARA, JOAQUIN CAUNCERAN, VIRGILIO AGUILAR, FELIX DUMAN, PIO BACULI, ANTERO APOLINAR, FLAVIANO CURZADO, ROSENDO IBAÑEZ, ARCADIO GONZALES, FELIX BORJA and BLAS BASCO, petitioners, vs. HON. JAIME DE LOS ANGELES, Judge, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, Branch III, Balayan, Batangas; AYALA Y CIA. AND/OR HACIENDA CALATAGAN and ALFONSO ZOBEL, respondents. R E S O L U T I O N VILLAMOR, J.: Pending resolution by this Court in this special civil action are: (1) the Second Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents Ayala y Cia. and/or Hacienda Calatagan and Alfonso Zobel with leave of this Court, (2) the same respondents' Supplemental Second Motion for Reconsideration and Second Supplement to the Second Motion for Reconsideration, and (3) petitioner Miguel Tolentino's Motion to Order Respondent Judge to Respect and Comply with the Decision of this Court in this case dated June 30, 1967. Before proceeding to discuss the issues raised at this stage by the parties involved in this case, this Court deems it prudent, in order that it will be better understood why this consensus of opinion was arrived at, to refer back to the jurisprudence squarely applicable to, and in fact, the background of, the case, source of this special civil action. In cases CA-G.R. Nos. 24186-87-R of the Court of Appeals entitled Antonio Dizon, et al., vs. Juan de G. Rodriguez as Secretary of Agricuture and Natural Resources, Miguel Tolentino, Sr., et al., the said court, in resolving the issue of whether or not possession in good faith by virtue of a torrens title acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the moment the said title is adjudged null and void by a proper court, ruled that such an issue should be resolved in the affirmative. The said Court of Appeals pursuant to this ruling, then made the pronouncement that, corollarily, a possessor whose possession has been found to be one in good faith by virtue of such torrens title acquired in good faith, is, therefore, entitled to reimbursement by the owner of the parcels of land, the Government of the Philippines in that instance, for the necessary and useful expenses made thereon, with the right of retention until such reimbursement is made. This resolution of the Court of Appeals, which modified the decision previously rendered by it on October 31, 1961, was promulgated on August 20, 1962, (in the said cases CA-G.R. Nos. 24186-87-R) and was elevated on appeal by certiorari to this Court, which appeal was docketed as cases G.R. Nos. L-20300-01 and L-20355-56. This Court, on April 30, 1965, affirmed in toto the said resolution of the Court of Appeals. However, prior to the promulgation of the above-mentionedresolution of the Court of Appeals on August 20, 1962, the Court of First Instance of Batangas, then presided over by the Honorable Damaso S. Tengco, promulgated its decision in Civil Case No. 373, source of this special civil action, on, June 2, 1962. ln its said decision, the court a quo, on the question of compensatory damages claimed by plaintiff-intervenor therein, Miguel Tolentino, Sr., merely relied on the decision of the Court of Appeals in the aforementioned cases CA-G.R. Nos. 24186-87-R which was promulgated on October 31, 1961, and which was then not yet modified by the said resolution of August 20, 1962. Consequently, the defendants Dizons therein were considered by the court a quo as liable for the fruits of Lot 360, Psd 40891, which the said plaintiff-intervenor could have received from March 11, 1954 (Record on Appeal, G.R. No. L-20950, pp. 258-259). The decision of the court a quo in Civil Case No. 373 was appealed directly to this Court where it was docketed as G.R. No. L-20950. Speaking through Mr. Justice Jesus G. Barrera, we there held that: However, as we have ruled in this case of Dizon, et al., vs Rodriguez, etc., et al., there being no showing that defendants Dizons are not purchasers in good faith and for value, they have a right to retention of the property until they are reimbursed of the necessary expenses made on the land, which must properly be established and determined. It also follows that as such possessors in good faith, the defendants Dizons cannot also be held liable for damages allegedly suffered by other parties on account of their possession of the property. x x x x x x x x x WHEREFORE, thus modified, the decision of the lower court appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs. SO ORDERED. After our decision in the said case G.R. No. L-20950, May 31, 1965, had become final and executory, the court a quo, on December 27, 1965, issued a writ of execution commanding the Sheriff of Rizal to, among others, cause the defendants, private respondents herein, to jointly and severally pay plaintiff-intervenor Miguel Tolentino, Sr., petitioner herein, compensatory damages in the sum of P3,000.00 a year per hectare of Lot 360 (which consists of 29.8634 hectares) from March 11, 1954, until he is placed in lawful possession of the said lot. This writ of execution, obviously, was based on the impression of the court a quo that since paragraph (c) of its judgment in the said Civil Case No. 373 ordered all the defendants to jointly and severally pay intervenor Miguel Tolentino, Sr., such compensatory damages, and since the decision of this Court in the said case G.R. No. L-20950 appears to have absolved only the Dizons from the payment of such compensatory damages then the other set of defendants therein, i.e., Ayala Y Cia., Hacienda Calatagan and/or Alfonso Zobel, private respondents herein, remain solidarily liable to pay intervenor Miguel Tolentino, Sr., the compensatory damages awarded to him by the court a quo in its said decision. Upon motion of co-defendants Ayala y Cia., Hacienda Calatagan and/or Alfonso Zobel, the court a quo, on January 18, 1966, temporarily suspended the enforcement of the said writ of execution. On February 2, 1966, His Honor, the respondent Judge, issued an order quashing the writ of execution of December 27, 1965, on the ground that nowhere in the decision of the court a quo of June 2, 1962, nor in the decision of this Court in case G.R. No. L-20950, is there any pronouncement that defendants Ayala y Cia., Hacienda Calatagan and/or Alfonso Zobel have been found to be possessors in bad faith and therefore, liable for the payment of damages to Miguel Tolentino, Sr. The court a quo further based its order question the said writ of execution obviously on the ground of estoppel, i.e., that, precisely on May 31, 1965, plaintiff and intervenor Miguel Tolentino, Sr., filed a Motion for Reconsideration in case SC-G.R. L-20950 wherein he insisted that all the defendants be declared possessors in bad faith and liable for compensatorydamages. This Motion for Reconsideration, however, was denied by this Court. Plaintiff-intervenor Miguel Tolentino, Sr., then came up to this Court in this Special Civil Action for certiorari and mandamus for the issuance of an order for the respondent Judge to execute the decision of the court a quo in Civil Case No. 373 against herein private respondents and to annul the orders of the court a quo suspending the enforcement of the writ of execution of December 27, 1965 (order of January 18, 1966); quashing the same writ of execution (order of February 2, 1966); denying the motion of plaintiff Republic of the Philippines and Intervernor Tolentino for the issuance of another writ of execution of paragraph (a) of the decision in the said Civil Case No. 373 (order of February 8, 1966); and denying the motion for reconsideration of these orders of February 2 and 8, 1966 (order of April 13, 1966). On June 30, 1967, this Court rendered a decision in this case annulling the said orders of respondent Judge of January 18, February 2 and 8, and April 13, 1966. A Motion for Partial Reconsideration under date of August 3, 1967, was filed by counsel for the respondents, Attys. Jalandoni and Jamir. This motion was denied by our resolution of September 13, 1967. On September 19, 1967, a Second Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the respondents through the same counsel. A supplemental Second Motion for Reconsideration under date of September 22, 1967, was also filed for the same respondents, this time by Atty. Rafael Recto. A Second Supplement to the Second Motion for Reconsideration under date of October 12, 1968, was likewise filed by the said respondents. Since then, many pleadings, motions, memoranda, etc., have been filed before this Court with respect to the incident of the said Second Motion for Reconsideration of the private respondents. We are now called upon to resolve the issues raised by all these pleadings, motions and memoranda. After a careful and painstaking study of all the said pleadings, motions, memoranda and other pertinent papers, as well as the record of this case, with respect to the issues which this Court is now called upon to resolve, it is our considered opinion that the decision of this Court promulgated on June 30, 1967, should be reconsidered and set aside, not only on the grounds of law and justice but also on the ground of equity. This is because we can find no justification for an award of compensatory damages in favor of petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., much less make the private respondents herein liable for such damages. As the lessee of the government, his cause of action was necessarily against his lessor due to the failure of the latter to place him in peaceful possession of the property leased to him. By analogy, when a lessee rents a building which turns out, however, to be occupied by another person, and the former cannot obtain possession, his (the lessee's) cause of action is against the lessor for breach of contract in that the latter violated the obligation of delivering to him the peaceful possession of the leased premises. The lessee has no cause of action against the possessor because he has no relation contractual or ex-delicto, with the latter. A study of the Record on Appeal in Civil Case No. 373 of the court a quo, case G.R. No. L-20950 of this Court, shows that there is nothing therein to support a construction or interpretation of the judgment of the lower court in the sense that it makes the private respondents in this special civil action liable for the compensatory damages awarded to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. In point, there is nothing in the findings of fact or conclusions of law of the decision of the lower court in the said Civil Case No. 373 which could form the basis for an award of damages in favor of petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., and against the private respondents in this special civil action. Pursuant to these findings, it inextricably becomes our considered opinion that to construe the dispositive portion of the lower court in Civil Case No. 373 otherwise would mean the rendition of a verdict or judgment with absolutely nothing to support it, and in fact would constitute a plain and open contradiction of the conceded and admitted facts of the case. Such a verdict or decision, therefore, would be void (Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil. 598, 601). Furthermore, a minute scrutiny of the same Record on Appeal in case SC-G.R. No. L-20950 reveals the fact that the amended complaint of plaintiff Republic of the Philippines in that case is made up, by way of summary, of the following allegations: (a) The first cause of action (pp. 2-5, Record on Appeal) alleges, in brief, the irregular registration of close to 2,500 hectares of public land by defendant Alfonso Zobel; (b) The second cause of action (pp. 5-6, Record on Appeal) alleges the fraudulent and malicious sale and/or lease of the lots in this public land to other person including the defendants Dizons; (c) The third cause of action (pp. 7-10, Record on Appeal) alleges the filing with, and approval by, the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources of the fishpond application of, among others, herein petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. Paragraph 19 of the same amended complaint of the Republic of the Philippines under this cause of action (p. 10 of the said Record on Appeal) alleges damages of approximately P500,000.00 in the form of uncollected rentals from the permittees and awardees of the applicants to the said fishponds. This allegation of damages in the form of uncollected rentals, clearly, cannot be construed as applicable to the petitioner Tolentino's claim for damages or to the award of compensatory damages in his favor since his claim is for unrealized earnings and profits for prawns, crabs and milkfish (pp. 24-25, Record on Appeal); (d) The fourth cause of action (pp. 10-11, Record on Appeal) alleges the right of the plaintiff and/or its permittees or lessees to the use, enjoyment and possession of the lots, subject matter of Civil Case No. 373 of the lower court. Clearly, the amended complaint of plaintiff Republic of the Philippines in Civil Case No. 373 of the court a quo cannot be construed or interpreted in such a manner as to constitute a basis for an award of compensatory damages in favor of petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., since the damages claimed therein are alleged to be uncollected rentals from the permittees and awardees, or lessees, of the lots, subject matter thereof. With respect to the complaint-in-intervention of petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., (pp. 15-32 of the same Record on Appeal), the following constitute his allegations: (a) In paragraph 1 (pp. 15-16, Record on Appeal), he adopts allegations Nos. 1 to 22 of the complaint of the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines; (b) Paragraphs 2 to 7 (pp. 16-20, Record on Appeal) complain of the alleged acts of usurpation made by defendant Alfonso Zobel, et al.; (c) Paragraphs 8 to 15 (pp. 20-24, Record on Appeal) allege the fraudulent sale of several lots of Psd 40891 to the Dizons, et al.; the dismissal by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources of the protests by the lessees and vendees of Ayala y Cia., and/or the Hacienda Calatagan against the orders of the Director of Fisheries for them to vacate the said fishponds; and the alleged right of plaintiff-intervenor Miguel Tolentino, Sr., to the possession of Lot 360 of Psd 40891 from the date of the filing of the latter's application on March 11, 1954; (d) Paragraph 16 (pp. 24-25, Record on Appeals) which is entitled "DAMAGES" merely alleges that he (Tolentino) had ... suffered and will further suffer incalculable damages in the form of earnings and profits in the amount of P3,000 for "sugpo", P3,000.00 for "alimango" and P1,000.00 for "bangos" for each of the two (2) harvests a year of the 29.2638 hectares of the public fishponds, Lot 360 of Psd-40891 since March 11, 1954; as well as P100,000.00 moral, punitive and exemplary damages, he having unlawfully been deprived of his right to possess and enjoy the said fishpond. (e) Paragraphs 17 to 22 merely allege technicalities of failure to appeal by the defendants Dizons, from the orders of the Director of Fisheries for them to vacate the public fishponds; arguments dwelling on res judicata; and his (plaintiff-intervenor Tolentino's) alleged right to the enjoyment or possession of the lot he applied for as a basis for his additional prayer for the issuance by the court a quo of a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendants from committing acts of dispossession and usurpation against him. Clearly, therefore, there is no allegation for damages made by petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., in his complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No. 373 of the court a quo against the private respondents in this case. His allegation that he suffered damages in the form of unrealized earnings and profits as quoted above does not satisfy the requirement of allegation of ultimate facts constituting the act or omission of the respondents in this case in violation of his legal rights and for which, consequently, the latter should then be ordered to pay him compensatory damages. In brief, while it is true that he alleged that he suffered damages, yet he did not allege who caused him to suffer these damages; who is responsible therefor; and why precisely or additionally the respondents in this case should be liable therefor. Implicitly and necessarily, at the most, his allegation of having suffered the said damages must be construed as director against whoever was in possession of the said fishpond lots at the time he should have started to possess the same. And there is no dispute over the fact that only the Dizons were in possession of the fishpond lots at that time or on March 11, 1954, when petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., filed his, fishpond lease application with the Bureau of Fisheries. It should be remembered that every complaint must state at least the ultimate facts upon which a party relies for his cause of action. Hence, there is no allegation of ultimate facts by petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., in his complaint-in-intervention against the respondents in this case regarding what act or omission by the latter caused him damages, how can there be, in effect, an award of damages against the private respondents in the case, source of this special civil action? It must also be remembered that every ordinary civil suit must be based on the presence of a cause of action. And a cause of action, to exist, must have the following elements: 1. Legal right of the plaintiff; 2. Correlative obligation of the defendant; and 3. Act or omission of the defendant in violation of said right. (I Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 91.) As stated above, there is no allegation in the said petitioner's complaint-in-intervention that the private respondents in this case committed an act or comission in violation of his legal rights. In his third cause of action (p. 24, Record on Appeal, G.R. No. L-20950), he merely alleged damages due to the "defendants' stubborn refusal to vacate the portion of the public land ...", Lot 360 of Psd 40891. This allegation, even if construed to satisfy, the third element of a cause of action, can apply only to the Dizons who were the owners and possessors when petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., applied for a lease of that lot on March 11, 1954. However, the same allegation clearly cannot be constructed or considered to constitute an ultimate statement of any act or omission on the part of the private respondents in this case (Ayala y Cia., et al.) in violation of Tolentino's alleged right of possession. For, conceding an instance of following events to their natural conclusion, i.e., granting that the Dizons immediately turned over the possession of Lot 360 to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., when the latter filed his fishpond lease application on March 11, 1954, and acknowledged the title of the government over that same lot, could petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., validly sue the respondents in this case, Ayala y Cia., et al., for damages? Obviously not. In fact, neither could he have sued the Dizons also, for he then would not have any cause of action against both the respondents in this case and the Dizons. Granting, however, the foregoing pronouncements to be not indubitable, still the fact remains that this Court should not base its impressions on a merely casual reading of the dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 373. As we have stated in the case of Policarpio vs. Philippine Veterans Board, et al., 106 Phil. 125, 131, to get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be resorted to but the same must be considered in its entirety. Hence, in order to arrive at a just and equitable solution to the issues presented to this Court by this special civil action, we must read the decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 373 as a whole. If, in the said decision of the lower court, there is a finding of fact or conclusion of law that the private respondents herein, who were co-defendants along with the Dizons therein, were included in the liability for compensatory damages to herein petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., then we may say that our decision in this special civil action should stand. But if, as may be found after the said thorough and painstaking study of the issues and background of this case, the said decision of the lower court (particularly pp. 218- 219, and 257-259, Record on Appeal, G.R. No. L-20950, quoted verbatim hereafter) considered only the Dizons as liable to Tolentino for damages, then the necessary implication would be that the private respondents in the special civil action were not in reality included in the liability for damages to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius. This Court has promulgated many cases, viz., Velez vs. Martinez, et al., 63 Phil., 231; De Ralla vs. Director of Lands, 83 Phil., 491; Morelos vs. Go Chin Ling, et al., 105 Phil., 814; and Villones, et al. vs. Nable, et al., 85 Phil., 43, wherein it was held that a judgment must not be read separately but in connection with the other portions of the decision of which it forms a part. Hence, it behooves this Court now to be not overly technical and refuse to read the decision of the lower court as a whole or confine itself to the fallo thereof only. Rather, the decision of the court below should be taken as a whole and considered in its entirety to get the true meaning and intent of any particular portion thereof (De Ralla vs. Director of Lands, supra). Neither is this Court inclined to confine itself to a reading of the said fallo literally. On the contrary, the judgment portion of a decision should be interpreted and construed in harmony with the ratio decidendi thereof (Morales vs. Go Chin Ling, supra). As stated in the case of Policarpio vs. Philippine Veterans Board, et al., supra, to get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be resorted to but the same must be considered in its entirety. Hence, a resolution or ruling may and does appear in other parts of the decision and not merely in the fallo thereof. Applying these principles to this case, therefore, the pertinent portion of the decision in Civil Case No. 373 of the court a quo which states: Corollary to the present case, Civil Cases Nos. 135 and 136 of this Court were ventilated between the same parties as test cases over fishponds, with similar and identical nature to those now disputed and the Court of Appeals sustaining the findings of this Court ruled on October 31, 1961 that the defendants' subdivision titles are null and void and that the fishponds in question which have been in the possession of the Dizon belonged to the public domain and outside Transfer Certificate of Title No. 722, and that the Dizons were liable for damages suffered by defendants Tolentino; (p. 218, Record on Appeal, G.R. No. L-20950) (emphasis supplied) x x x x x x x x x To the mind of the Court, insofar as this Lot 360 is concerned, the Dizons began possessing in bad faith from the time that they became aware of a defect in their title or mode of acquisition (Art. 526 of the Civil Code, Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery Company, 37 Phil. 644.) This was on March 11, 1954, when the Director of Fisheries dismissed their protest to the fishpond application of the Tolentinos on the ground that the fishpond was outside the boundaries of Hacienda de Calatagan and a part of the territorial sea. As such possession, they are liable for the fruits received as well as those which the lawful possessors would have received pursuant to Article 54 of the Civil Code. From the time this complaint has been filed up to the present, it has been admitted that the defendants Dizons are in possession of the portion of the sea denominated as Lot 360 of Psd 40891. Evidence shows that the fruits that could be received were P1,000.00 per hectare of milkfish or bangus, and P2,000.00 per hectare for shrimps, crabs and other fishes. Intervenor Tolentino should therefore be awarded damages in the sum of P3,000.00 a year per hectare from March 11, 1954 until he is placed in lawful possession of the fishpond in Lot 360. (Ibid., pp. 258-259) (Emphasis supplied.) should control the deliberations of this Court in this case. In other words, it is clear from the above-quoted portions of the decision of the court a quo that only the Dizons, and not herein private respondents as well, were intended by the court a quo to be liable for compensatory damages to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., for the reason as stated by the same court a quo, that the former were admittedly the only ones in possession of the portions of the sea denominated as Lot 360 of Psd 40891, and not herein private respondents also, at the time when petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., filed his fishpond lease application with the Bureau of Fisheries on March 11, 1954. Additionally, article 10 of the Civil Code states that "[i]n case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail." This mandate of law, obviously, cannot be any less binding upon the courts in relation to its judgments. ... The judgment must be read in its entirety, and it must be construed as a whole so as to bring all of its parts into harmony as far as this can be done by fair and reasonable interpretation and so as to give effect to every word and part, if possible, and to effectuate the intention and purpose of the Court, consistent with the provisions of the organic law. (49 C.J.S., pp. 863-864.) Doubtful or ambiguous judgments are to have a reasonable intendment to do justice and avoid wrong. When a judgment is susceptible of two interpretations, that will be adopted which renders it the more reasonable, effective, and conclusive, and which makes the judgment harmonize with the facts and law of the case and be such as sought to have been rendered ... . (49 C.J.S., pp. 865-866.) When language of decree is susceptible of two constructions, from one of which it follows that the law has been correctly applied to facts and from other that law has been incorrectly applied, that construction should be adopted which correctly applies the law. (Footnote of 49 C.J.S., p. 866.) ... Necessary legal implications are included although not expressed in terms, but the adjudication does not extend beyond what the language used fairly warrants. The legal effect, rather than the language used, governs. In cases of ambiguity or doubt, the entire record may be examined and considered. Judgments are to have a reasonable intendment. Where a judgment is susceptible of two interpretations, that one will be adopted which renders it more reasonable, effective and conclusive, and which makes the judgment harmonize with the facts and the law of the case and be such as ought to have been rendered. ... . (34 C.J. 502). As a general rule, judgments are to be construed like other written instruments. The determinative factor is the intention of the court, as gathered from all parts of the judgment itself. In applying this rule, effect must be given to that which is unavoidably and necessarily implied in a judgment, as well as to that which is expressed in the most appropriate language. Such construction should be given to a judgement as will give force and effect to every word of it, if possible, and make it as a whole consistent, effective and reasonable. Sometimes, it is declared that the interpretation of a judgment must be characterized by justice and fairness. If a judgment is susceptible to two interpretations, one of which would render it legal and the other illegal, the court will adopt the former. The judgment may be read in connection with the entire record and construed accordingly, at least where there is uncertainty and ambiguity. In the latter case, it is proper to consider the pleadings, and verdicts or findings, in light of the applicable statutes. If a finding is inconsistent with the judgment proper or decretal part of the decree, the latter must control. The issues involved in the action are also important factors in determining what was intended by the judgment. (30A AM. Jur., pp. 212-213.) (Emphasis supplied) The foregoing pronouncements find support in the case of Locsin, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 63 Phil 87, 91-92, wherein this Court allowed a judgment that had become final and executory to be "clarified" by supplying a word which had been in advertently omitted and which, when supplied, in effect changed the literal import of the original phraseology, thus: ... it clearly appears from the allegations of the complaint, the promissory note reproduced therein and made a part thereof, the prayer and the conclusions of fact and of law contained in the decision of the respondent judge, that the obligation contracted by the petitioners is joint and several and that the parties as well as the trial judge so understood it. Under the juridical rule that the judgment should be in accordance with the allegations, the evidence and the conclusions of fact and of law, the dispositive part of the judgment under consideration should have ordered that the debt be paid severally, and in omitting the word or adverb "severally" inadvertently, said judgment became ambiguous. This ambiguity may be clarified at any time after the decision is rendered and even after it had become final (34 Corpus Juris, 235, 326). The respondent judge did not, therefore, exceed his jurisdiction in clarifying the dispositive part of the judgment by supplying the omission. (Emphasis supplied.) This is so because, in the first place, if an already final judgment can still be amended to supply an omission committed through oversight, this simply means that in the construction or interpretation of an already final decision, the fallo or dispositive portion thereof must be correlated with the body of such final decision. This is precisely what happened in the above-cited case. In the second place, granting that an amendment may be limited to the supplying only of an omission, then it may be correctly argued that a perusal of the fallo of the lower court's decision, in relation to the body thereof, shows, by simple logic, that the letters "se" were inadvertently omitted from the word "the" in paragraph (c) of the decision of the court a quo in Civil Case No. 373. Such omission, therefore, may be supplied to conform with the spirit of the decision as contained in the body thereof. In other words, paragraph (c) should have read "ordering all these defendants ...", hence, a clear case of omission. This is the only logical conclusion, applicable to this issue in this case because the succeeding paragraph (d) of the fallo of the lower court's decision which restrains and enjoins the exercise of further acts of ownership and possession again uses the phrase "all the defendants." Since, even prior to the time of the filing of Civil Case No. 373 before the lower court, only the Dizons were the registered owners and possessors of Lot 360, Psd 40891 cause of the award of damages by the court a quo, this paragraph (d) of the judgment in the said Civil Case No. 373 could then apply only to the Dizons. Likewise, therefore, it is obvious that in this paragraph (d), of the judgment of the court a quo in Civil Case No. 373, the word "these" was the one intended to be used by the lower court, and not the word "the"; hence, a case of omission again of the letters "se" from the word "the" in that paragraph (d). This observation is conclusively supported by the fact that the last paragraph (e) of the said decision of the lower court which orders the defendants to jointly and severally pay the costs of the suit does not contain the word "all" anymore. Hence, this paragraph (e), was clearly intended by the lower court to apply also to the private respondents in this case, as well as the Dizons, since all the defendants lost their case before the court a quo. In fine, the word "all," therefore, was clearly meant by the lower court to apply only to the several defendants Dizons as specifically identified in the second paragraph (b) of the fallo of its decision. Of course, it could also be that the word "said" should have been placed between the words "the" and "defendants" in the said paragraph (c), but was inadvertently omitted by the trial judge or his typist. This is especially so considering the fact that paragraph (a) of the judgment of the court a quo ends with a period as shall be shown and discussed hereafter. In the third place, if an already final decision can still be amended by means of supplying an omission, there is no reason why we cannot take the reverse proposition as also true, i.e., that words which were not really intended by the body of the decision to appear in the fallo thereof should also be stricken off or, at the very least, interpreted in a manner so as not to refer to what was, in the first place, not intended by the lower court. As the said case of Locsin, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., supra, states, ambiguity is not merely confined to a literal one, but may arise where the dispositive portion of the judgment under consideration is not in accordance with the allegations and the evidence of the parties, and the conclusions of fact and of law of the lower court. In the fourth place, if an amendment may be allowed after a decision has already become final, such amendment may consist, either in the supplying of an omission (as in the said case of Locsin, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., supra); the striking out of a superfluity (the word "all") in the fallo thereof; or the interpretation of an ambiguous phrase therein in relation to the body of the decision which gives it life. But the body of the lower court's decision does not say anything about the private respondents in this case being liable for damages in favor of petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. The spring cannot rise higher than the source. The decision in case G.R. No. L-26112 pronounced that the judgment in Civil Case No. 373 (G.R. No. L-20950) has been affirmed except only as regards subdivision (c) thereof which should be modified so as to read, in effect, as follows: (c) Ordering the defendants, except the Dizons, to jointly and severally pay ... and except also insofar as the Dizons have — pursuant to the decision, as amended — the right of retention therein stated. (p. 5, Decision, G.R. No. L-26112). After a mature deliberation upon that pronouncement of this Court as contained in the said decision in this case, we now do not agree with the observation that the decision in G.R. No. L-20950 is confined to these two (2) modifications only. Paragraph (b) of the said judgment of the court a quo which orders the defendants Dizon to vacate Lot 360 in favor of petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., is also necessarily modified so as to make them vacate the said Lot 360 only from the moment they are reimbursed the necessary and useful expenses they incurred thereon. Paragraph (d) which restrains and enjoins "all the defendants from further acts, of ownership and possession over Lot 360", etc., is also necessarily modified in the sense that the Dizon's who are the present possessors of the said Lot 360, cannot be restrained or enjoined from exercising acts of possession thereon until their right of retention is terminated by, again, their being reimbursed their said necessary and useful expenses. These observations only go to show that, really, this Court cannot just fold its arms and react in a merely passive manner by confining itself in this present case to considering paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 373 as standing alone. A contrario, it should read such dispositive portion as a whole. In fact, the whole decision itself, including the opinion portion thereof, should be read in order to arrive at the true meaning of any of its parts. And in so doing, especially as revealed by the body of the decision in Civil Case No. 373 of the court a quo (particularly the previously quoted portions appearing in pp. 218-219 and p. 258, et seq., of the Records on Appeal in case G.R. No. L-20950), the wording of the same decision was clearly for only the Dizons to pay damages to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. In brief, to say that the decision in case SC-G.R. No. L-20950 modifies only paragraph (c) of the decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 373 would be inconsistent with the obvious effects of the former decision upon paragraph (b) and (d) of the latter decision. This is because, unquestionably, the Dizons can neither be made to vacate nor be restrained from exercising acts of possession over the lots in question in Civil Case No. 373 of the lower court until they are reimbursed their expenses thereon. Going now to the dispositive portion of the judgment of the court a quo in civil Case No. 373 as reproduced in pp. 259-260 of the Record on Appeal in Case SC-G.R. No. L-20950, it should be noted that paragraph (a) thereof ends with a period, whereas paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) respectively end with a semi-colon. This fact is being brought out here to stress the fact that an examination of the said Record on Appeal shows that the said paragraph (a) of the dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas really ends with a period, and not with a semi-colon as the decision in this case of June 30, 1967, erroneously reproduced therein, thus: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: (a) Declaring as null and void transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9550 (or Exhibit "24") of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Batangas and other subdivision titles issued in favor of Ayala y Cia. and/or Hacienda de Calatagan over the areas outside its private land covered by TCT No. 722, which, including the lots in T-9550 (Lots 360, 362, 363 and 182) are hereby reverted to public dominion. (b) Ordering Defendants Antonino Dizon, Lucia Dizon, Adelaida Dizon Reyes, Consolacion Dizon Degollacion, Artemio Dizon, Ruben Dizon, Amoranda Dizon and Zenaida Dizon, to vacate Lot 360 in favor of Intervenor Miguel Tolentino; (c) Ordering all the defendants to jointly and severally pay Intervenor Miguel Tolentino compensatory damages in the sum of P3,000.00 a year per hectare of Lot 360 from March 11, 1954, until he is placed in lawful possession of the said area; (d) Restraining and enjoining all the defendants from further act of ownership and possession over Lots 360, 362, 363 and 182 of Psd-40891; and ℒαwρhi৷ (e) Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay the costs. SO ORDERED. Hence, paragraph (a) of the dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court, which paragraph declares as null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9550 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Batangas "and other subdivision titles issued in favor of respondents Ayala y Cia and/or Hacienda de Calatagan over the areas outside its private land covered by TCT No. 722, ..." was obviously intended by the lower court to be a ruling entirely distinct and separate from the succeeding paragraph of the same dispositive portion of the said decision. This can only be so since the said paragraph (a) refers exclusively to the private respondent in this case, while the succeeding paragraph (b), which is an order to vacate, refers only to, and in fact specifically names and enumerates, the defendants Dizons, namely, Antonino, Lucia, Adelaida, Consolacion, Artemio, Ruben, Amoranda and Zenaida, all surnamed Dizon. This paragraph (b), obviously, does not refer to Ayala y Cia., Alfonso Zobel and/or Hacienda de Calatagan private respondents herein, for the simple reason that they are not in possession of Lot 360, Psd-40891, as stated therein. Consequently, paragraph (c), the issue in this special civil action, of the same dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court which orders "all the defendants to jointly and severally pay compensatory damages ..." to Miguel Tolentino, Sr., which paragraph is necessarily connected to the preceding paragraph (b) since the latter ends with a semi-colon, can only refer to the defendants Dizon. To reiterate, it should be noted that the damages awarded in this paragraph (c) of the judgment of the court a quo in Civil Case No. 373 are compensatory. Hence, these damages refer only to, at the earliest, when Tolentino allegedly suffered them or when his cause of action accrued on March 11, 1954, when he filed his fishpond lease application with the Bureau of Fisheries. But at that time, only the Dizons were the possessors and registered owners of Lot 360, Psd-40891, subject matter of petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr.'s complaint-in-intervention. Hence, such order to pay damages could only have been meant against the Dizons. Moreover, to award damages in favor of petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., and against herein private respondents would violate the cardinal rule that a judgment must conform to and be supperted by both the pleadings and the proofs, and should be in accordance with the theory of the action on which the pleadings were framed and the case was tried (secundum allegata et probata). Dwelling now on the issue of the alleged bad faith of herein private respondents, granting, arguendo, that the latter were the ones who caused error by using the magnetic survey method resulting in the inclusion of Lot 360 of Psd-40891 of the Batangas Cadastre in their certificate of title (due to their causing the preparation of a composite plan which led to the issuance of TCT No. 20), still they should not be made liable for damages to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. In the first place, to follow such a theory would lead to absurd consequences. This because in such a case, the surveyor and even the manufacturer of the magnetic method surveying equipment himself, would, if such a contention is to be upheld, be also liable for damages to petitioner Miguel Tolentino. By analogy, where a pedestrian is injured in an automobile accident, to follow such a theory would lead to the absurd conclusion that the manufacturer of the automobile should also be liable for damages in favor of that pedestrian because by manufacturing such automobile, this act provided the occasion for the accident to happen. Clearly, this would lead to an unbroken chain of liability going back to the very first material used in the manufacture of that automobile, i.e., the steel manufacturer or, even further, the iron ore miner. In the second place, it is a fact that magnetic surveys can lead to error like, for example, where the survey should actually result in a curve, what appears is a straight line. The private respondents in this case, therefore, are not guilty of bad faith. Besides, and in any event, bad faith is a cause of action based on tort which, as applied to the case, source of this special civil action, has already prescribed, particularly with respect to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. This is because the alleged fraudulent survey facilitated by the said composite plan was performed during the year 1949 (Decision, Record on Appeal, G.R. No. L-20950, p. 169), and therefore, an action based on such a tortious act, if tenable, would have prescribed in 1953 or four (4) years thereafter (Art. 1146, Civil Code). As previously stated above, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, on this issue of damages in Civil Case No. 373, source of this special action, relied entirely on the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. Nos. 24186-87-R, October 31, 1961, awarding damages in favor of Miguel Tolentino, Sr., and against the Dizons. The said decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas was promulgated on June 2, 1962. This date was prior to the date of the resolution of the Court of Appeals of August 20, 1962, modifying its above-mentioned decision of October 31, 1961, in the said cases CA-G.R. Nos. 24186-87-R. ln that resolution and as previously expounded upon above, plaintiffs-appellants Antonio Dizon, et al., were eventually absolved from liability for damages, in favor of Miguel Tolentino, Sr., who is also the petitioner in this case, and the former were given the right of retention of the properties, subject matter of those cases, until they are reimbursed the useful and necessary expenses they made thereon. The said resolution of the court of Appeals of August 20, 1962, was affirmed in toto by this Court in G.R. Nos. L-20300-01 and 20355-56. It is therefore the opinion of this Court now that were it not for this circumstance of fate regarding dates, i.e., that the said resolution in cases CA-G.R. Nos. 24186-87-R was promulgated subsequent to the decision of the court a quo in Civil Case No. 373, there would surely be no dispute about this matter since the lower court would then not have relied for its ruling on this issue of damages upon the original decision of the Court of Appeals in those cases as cited above. In brief, the court a quo would not have made any award of damages in favor of petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. in Civil Case No. 373 if its decision had been promulgated after the issuance by the Court of Appeals of its said modifying resolution as affirmed later on by this Court in cases G.R. Nos. L-20300-01 and L-20355-56. The damages now being sought to be, in effect, awarded to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., being compensatory, such damages must be only against those responsible therefor when his cause of action accrued, that is, the Dizons. However, the latter were absolved by us from such liability in our decision in case G.R. No. L-20950. In point, it should be borne in mind that a case may be filed only when there is a cause of action present or upon the accrual of a cause of action. There is no dispute that the cause of action of petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., arose at the earliest, from the time that he filed his fishpond lease application for Lot 360 of Psd-40891 in 1954, a time when only the Dizons were in possession and were the registered owners thereof. Aside from the fact that the cause of action of petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., as stated previously above, was against his lessor (the Government) for the latter's inability to comply with its obligation to place him in possession of what was leased to him, a ruling which in effect, would make the private respondents herein liable for damages to the petitioner would be tantamount to this Court's giving sanction to the allowing of a case to be filed and decided favorably by a lower court, although the cause of action thereof had not yet accrued or where none exists. Therefore, had the said petitioner filed a case in the nature of the one he did file in Civil Case No. 373 of the Court a quo against the private respondents herein at the time when the latter were still the registered owners and possessors, his complaint would, at the very least, have been premature since his fishpond lease application had not yet been filed by him with the government at that time. In other words, there absolutely is no reason for awardingcompensatory damages against a prior possessor and registered owner (the respondent in this case), even assuming that the latter were in bad faith, in favor of a person who did not have a cause of action against him. The filing of a fishpond lease application by petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. was a condition sine qua non for his cause of action to accrue or come about. Hence, damages in his favor, if any, can be assessed only against those who deprived him of his right of possession of the said Lot 360 of Psd-40891 at the time he filed the said fishpond lease application on May 11, 1954, provided, of course, that the latter are found in bad faith. Thus, even if the predecessor of the present possessors were in bad faith, they cannot be held liable in favor of a person who did not have a cause of action against him. This is an elementary rule of civil procedure. With respect to the equitable aspect of this case, the injustice of, in effect, an award of damages against the respondents in this special civil action is very obvious. As stated above, neither the decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 373 nor the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-20950 has made any finding as to the amount of the necessary and useful expenses that will have to be reimbursed to the present possessors, the Dizons. The decision in the said case G.R. No. L-20950, in fact, stated that those expenses have yet to be properly established and determined. Neither did it say who is to make such reimbursement. Hence, so long as reimbursement is not made to them, they (the Dizons) will retain their right of possession. On the other hand, the private respondents in this special civil action will continue to be liable for damages to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. for about P90,000.00 a year. Aside from such obvious injustice and inequity, how much then will the private respondents in this case be made to pay perpetually to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr.? How much should the clerk of the lower court State in each writ of execution that he is called upon to issue as should be paid by the private respondents in this special civil action to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., when the basis for the compensatory damages is deprivation of possession, and such deprivation of possession cannot be terminated, that is, possession cannot be given to Tolentino until the Dizons are reimbursed their expenses? And such expenses have yet to be established and determined as stated by us in the said case G.R. No. L-20950. And after the five-year prescriptive period for a judgment to be enforced by an ordinary motion for execution, may this amount of practically P90,000.00 a year be still considered enforceable as a matter of course or without need of a new court action pursuant to Section 6 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court? These uncertainties which readily reflect the obvious injustice of the effects of our decision in this case is borne out by the Writ of Execution itself as issued by the lower court, which states to the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal that: ..., you cause the said defendants to jointly and severally pay Miguel Tolentino compensatory damages in the sum of P3,000.00 a year per hectare of Lot 360 (which consists of 29,8634 hectares) from March 11, 1954 until he is placed in lawful possession of the said area; to collect the lawful fees ... . Clearly, therefore, the damages which are required to be specific in amount, i.e., "..., and the amount actually due thereon if it be for money" (See. 8, Rule 39, Revised Rules of Court) are incapable of accurate estimation so as to put an end to all the incidents of Civil Case No. 373 of the lower court. In fact, petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., need not or can hardly be expected to obtain possession of the said lot at all since he will be paid P90,000.00 a year without any sweat or effort on his part. This is a similar situation to that contemplated in a positive potestative conditional obligation which is void under the civil law, e.g., Tolentino will enter into possession when he wants to, and only from that time will the respondents in this case cease to be liable in the payment of about P90,000.00 to him annually. If this Court, therefore, would not reconsider its decision in this case, the result would be clearly unjust and will lead to the iniquitous consequence of, in effect, ordering the respondents to pay alimony to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. In brief, the respondents would then have to pay P3,000.00 per hectare a year of Lot 360, Psd-40891, or about P90,000.00 annually to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. so long as the latter desists from entering into possession of the said lot. In return, the former get nothing from the said petitioner as cause or consideration for such desistance, but, on the contrary, have to continue paying him this alimony — a clear case of adding insult to injury. Coming now to the contention of one of the counsel for petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., during the oral argument last August 11, 1970, that the decision of this court in this case of June 30, 1967, is already final and executory based on the fact that herein private respondents filed their motion for partial reconsideration on the last day of the 15-day period before the judgment in this case was to become final, and that, therefore, the second motion for reconsideration which was filed the next day after the receipt of the resolution of denial of June 13, 1967 by said counsel, was filed out of time or one day late, suffice it to say that the decision of this Court in the case of Mara, Inc. vs. the Honorable Court of Appeals and Ace Lumber Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-26584, July 31, 1969 (28 SCRA 1075), squarely refutes this contention on all its four corners. We there held that a party who files a motion to reconsider on the last day of the period allotted by the Rules of Court may still validly take further steps to protect his interest the day after receiving the notice of denial of such motion. Petitioner Tolentino insists, nonetheless, that what should be applied here is Sec. 1 of Rule 52, which provides that "[a] second motion for reconsideration may be presented within fifteen (15) days from notice of the order or judgment deducting the time in which the first motion has beenn pending," and not Sec. 3 of Rule 41, which was applied in Lloren, etc. vs. Veyra, etc., et al., L-13929, March 28, 1962 (4 SCRA 637), and, later, in Mara. A similar argument was raised in Mara, and we there said that nothing but confusion could be gained by not applying a uniform rule. At any rate, to accord merit to petitioner Tolentino's contention would render nugatory — whenever the first motion for reconsideration is filed on the last day of the 15-day period — the above-quotedprovision of Sec. 1, Rule 52. Moreover, even if it may be considered that the decision in this case of June 30, 1967, has already become final pursuant to the said contention of petitioner's counsel, still, there is nothing to prevent this Court from applying the doctrine in the aforesaid case of Locsin vs. Paredes, supra, to the effect that even if the decision of the Court a quo in Civil Case No. 373 is already final, this Court may still clarify the ambiguity contained in the judgment of the lower court in its decision. By such clarification, there is no partial modification of the said judgment, but rather, and at the most, a mere interpretation thereof for purposes of clarifying an ambiguity. Accordingly, justice and equity now compel this Court to depart in this case from the general rule that for purposes of execution only the dispositive portion of a decision should be referred to. This course of action is not only justified by precedents but, in fact, is ordained by the Constitution itself which requires a decision to be in writing and to state the findings of fact and conclusions of law as bases for the judgment. Needless to say, a lower court may commit errors in its findings of fact and/or conclusions of law, but that does not affect the validity of its decision once it becomes final. However, a judgment or fallo without any basis at all in fact and in law or in the opinion portion of the decision from which it draws its breath and life can only be considered as null and void. Emphatically, such a judgment can never be elevated to the dignity of a judicial act. The final and true decision that should be considered, therefore, is the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-20950. In fact, even the decision of this Court in the said case G.R. No. L-20950 states, as its dispositive portion, the words: WHEREFORE, thus modified, the decision of the lower court appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs. SO ORDERED. It should be noted, therefore, that the above-quoted dispositive portion of the said decision in case G.R. No. L-20950 itself, has seen fit to implement a practice whereby the actual judgment of a court is also to be found in the opinion portion, and not in the fallo thereof always. And since it is the decision of this Court in Case G.R. No. L-20950 which should be considered as the more authoritative and final one regarding the rights and liabilities of the parties to Civil Case No. 373 of the Court a quo, reference should therefore be made to the contents of the said decision of this Court in said case G.R. No. L-20950 in order to determine the decisive question as to how the judgment of the court a quo was modified. To this end, and for convenience the following portions of the said decision in case G.R. No. L-20960 are pertinent: We have gone over the evidence presented in this case and found no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. It has been established that certain areas originally portions of the navigable water or of the foreshores of the bay were converted into fishponds or sold by defendant company to third persons. There is also no controversy as to the fact that the said defendant was able to effect these sales after it has obtained a certificate of title (TCT No. 722) and prepared a "composite plan" wherein the aforesaid foreshore areas appeared to be parts of Hacienda Calatagan. Defendants-appellants do not deny that there is an excess in area between those delimited as boundaries of the hacienda in TCT No. 722 and the plan prepared by its surveyor. This, however, was justified by claiming that it could have been caused by the system (magnetic survey) used in the preparation of the original titles, and anyway, the excess in area (536 hectares, according to defendants) is within the allowable margin given to magnetic survey. But even assuming for the sake of argument that this contention is correct the fact remains that the areas in dispute (those covered by permits issued by the Bureau of Fisheries) were found to be portions of the foreshores, beach, or of the navigable water itself. And, it is an elementary principle of law that said areas not being capable of registration, their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title on the registrant. (See G.R. No. L-8654, Dizon, et al. vs. Bayona, et al., April 28, 1956; also L-20300-01 & L-20355-56, Dizon, et al. vs. Rodriguez, etc., et al., April 30, 1965.) In the present case, as the lots covered by TCT No. T-9550 issued in the names of defendants Dizons (and which were purchased by the latter from defendants Ayala y Cia. and/or Alfonso Zobel) were found to be portions of the foreshore or of the territorial waters, the lower court committed no error in rendering judgment against said defendants and ordering the reversion of said properties to the public dominion. However, as we have ruled in the case of Dizon, et al. vs. Rodriguez, etc. et al., (Said purchasers who relied on the efficacy of their certificate of title, cannot be considered possessors in bad faith until after the legality of their said titles has been finally determined.) there being no showing that defendants Dizons are not purchasers in good faith and for value, they have a right to retention of the property until they are reimbursed of the necessary expenses made on the land, which must properly be established and determined. It also follows that as such possessors in good faith, the defendants Dizons cannot also be held liable for damages allegedly suffered by other parties on account of their possession of the property. In view of the foregoing, the revocation of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction previously issued by the lower court, and the suspension of the delivery of possession of the properties to plaintiff and intervenor Tolentino, were in order. WHEREFORE, thus modified, the decision of the lower court appealed from is hereby affirmed.(awÞhi( No costs. SO ORDERED. The above-quoted portion of the said decision in case G.R. No. L-20950 clearly shows that what was really in issue with respect to the question of the compensatory damages awarded by the court a quo to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., was the question of whether or not the Dizons were liable therefore. It necessarily follows, therefore, that it was never in the mind nor in the conviction of this Court that the private respondents in thus case were also considered by the court a quo as liable for the compensatory damages in question to petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr., for the simple reason that it was only the Dizons, as previously stated above, who were in possession and were the registered owners of Lot 360, Psd-40891 of the Batangas Cadastre, at the time petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. filed his fishpond least application on March 11, 1954, the date when his cause of action accrued. This is even conceding the proposition that petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. acquired the right to possess the same lot on that date and not at the time of the approval of the said application on February 10, 1959. And since the Torrens Titles of the Dizons served to shield them against any stigma of bad faith, the same legal rule must obtain as respects any imputation of bad faith against the private respondents herein. In other words, there is no reason why the reliance of the Dizons upon the indefeasibility of their Torrens Titles should vary in its effect from the reliance of Ayala y Cia., Hacienda Calatagan and/or Alfonso Zobel, or, for that matter, of any other person upon theirs. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the respondents' motions for reconsideration as stated in the first part of this resolution are hereby granted, and the motion of petitioner Miguel Tolentino, Sr. mentioned also thereat is denied. The decision of this Court heretofore rendered in this case G.R. No. L-26112 is hereby set aside and the petition for certiorari and mandamus in this case is dismissed without costs. Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur. Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., took no part. 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