SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 265123, July 29, 2024 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. RONNEL BUENAFE BERCADEZ, RESPONDENT.
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, SAJ.:
I concur with the ponencia in denying the Petition. The Information filed against respondent Ronnel Bercadez (Bercadez) was defective as it failed to allege all essential elements of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 (B.P. Blg. 6).
I
An Information is defined as "an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court."1 For it to be deemed sufficient, the Information must indicate "the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed."2
As to what should be alleged in the Information, Bustillo v. People3 emphasized that it "must clearly and sufficiently describe the charge and the elements and facts constituting the crime[.]"4 This rule is founded on the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the accusation against them.5 Bustillo expounds:
Article III, Section 14 (2) of the Constitution provides that the accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. Rule 110, Sections 8 and 9 of the Rules of Court manifest this Constitutional right:
. . . .
The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against an accused has the following objectives: (1) to furnish the accused with a description of the charge against him which will enable him to make a defense; (2) to avail himself of conviction or acquittal for protection against further prosecution for the same cause; and (3) to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if warranted.
An accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the Information. The allegations or facts which constitute the charge are substantial matters and the accused's right to question his conviction based on facts not alleged in the Information cannot be waived.
Conviction based on a ground not alleged is unfair and underhanded because the accused was tried on a ground for which they have not prepared for.(awÞhi( Thus, even if a crime is duly proven, an accused will not be convicted if the crime is not alleged or necessarily included in the Information filed against them.
Thus, an Information must clearly and sufficiently describe the charge and the elements and facts constituting the crime because it is presumed that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.6
In determining what facts and circumstances should be indicated in an Information, jurisprudence dictates that reference must be made "to the definitions and essentials of the"7 crime alleged to have been committed.8
Here, Bercadez was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 6. The law, as the ponencia correctly noted, is amendatory in nature which must be read with the provisions of the law it seeks to amend.9 Being an amendatory law, B.P. Blg. 6 must not be read independently but in conjunction with Presidential Decree No. 9 (P.D. No. 9).
P.D. No. 9 considers as unlawful the act of carrying "outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon[,]" unless these "articles are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being sued in connection therewith[.]" In particular, it states:
WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, the Philippines has been placed under a state of martial law;
WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General Order No. 6 dated September 22, 1972 and General Order No. 7 dated September 23, 1972, have been promulgated by me;
WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminally, chaos and public disorder mentioned in the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms, explosives and other deadly weapons;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in order to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:
. . . .
3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as "fanknife," "spear," "dagger," "bolo," "balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except where such articles are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being sued in connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
The provisions of P.D. No. 9 were amended by B.P. Blg. 6 by reducing the penalty imposed by the former law:
SECTION 1. Paragraph three of Presidential Decree Numbered Nine is hereby amended to read as follows:
"3. It is unlawful to carry outside or one's residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as 'knife', 'spear', 'pana', 'dagger', 'bolo', 'barong', 'kris', or 'chako', except where such articles are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood or in pursuit of a lawful activity. Any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than one month nor more than one year or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos nor more than Two Thousand Pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine as the Court may direct." (Emphasis supplied)
I also agree with the ponencia that B.P. Blg. 6 cannot be construed as a separate and distinct law from P.D. No. 9. It is an amendatory law as evidenced by its title and the rest of its provisions.10
Having determined that the amended provisions of P.D. No. 9 apply, reference must be made to these laws in determining the facts and circumstances which should be indicated in the information for its violation.
People v. Purisima11 teaches that the crime of violation of P.D. No. 9, paragraph 3 carries two elements:
In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged in the caption as well as in the body of the Information with a violation of paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the offense treated in the presidential decree in question?
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of the statute or the city ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without that motivation, the act falls within the purview of the city ordinance or some statute when the circumstances so warrant.12
In this case, a perusal of the Information filed against Bercadez reveals that it failed to comply with the test of sufficiency. As the ponencia aptly observed, it failed to allege the second element of the crime particularly that "the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder."13 Considering that the factual allegations in the Information are insufficient, I agree that the Metropolitan Trial Court correctly ordered the quashal of the Information.
II
On a final note, it appears that the factual circumstances of this case present an opportunity for this Court to discuss the constitutionality and continued application of P.D. No. 9, as amended by B.P. Blg. 6.
In Buella v. People14 this Court stressed that the continuing existence and effectivity of P.D. No. 9, as amended, raises an interesting question in light of its continued existence despite the cessation of Martial Law. However, Buella did not tackle the continuing applicability of P.D. No. 9 due to the absence of an actual case or controversy:
The Court will not delve into the question or the continuing applicability of P.D. No. 9, as amended, in the absence or an actual case or controversy. It only notes, at this point, that this question may be of particular interest considering that Martial Law is no longer in place and P.D. No. 9 was specifically enacted in order to attain the desired result of Proclamation No. 1081 (Declaration of Martial Law) and General Order Nos. 6 and 7 (in relation to the possession and carriage of firearms), as shown in the preamble of P.D. No. 9. Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex. Where the reason for the existence of a law ceases, the law itself should also cease.15
Notably, in not a few cases, this Court has declared as ineffective various provisions of law after it found that the reason for their existence has ceased to exist.
In Comendador v. De Villa,16 this Court decreed that Presidential Decree No. 39 (P.D. No. 39) became ineffective when General Order No. 8 was revoked. Comendador emphasized:
On January 17, 1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines. The proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 and declared the dissolution of the military tribunals created pursuant thereto upon final determination of the cases pending therein.
P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other general orders mentioned therein. With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul.
Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045. As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge.17
In this case, Bercadez contended in his motion to quash the information that since the spirit behind P.D. No. 9 and B.P. Blg. 6 already ceased to exist, these laws have also ceased to have any legal force.18
In as much as Bercadez included as one of his arguments the continuing applicability of P.D. No. 9, as amended, it is my opinion that this Court may address and tackle the question of the continuing applicability of P.D. No. 9, as amended.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the Petition.
Footnotes
1 A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 110, sec. 4.
2 A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 110, sec. 6.
3 898 Phil. 263 (2021) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
4 Id. at 275.
5 Id. at 274-275.
6 Id.
7 People v. Dimaano, 506 Phil. 635, 649 (2005) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
8 Id.
9 Ponencia, p. 8.
10 Ponencia, p. 8.
11 176 Phil. 191 (1978) [Per J. Muñoz Palma, En Banc].
12 Id. at 202.
13 Ponencia, p. 9.
14 G.R. No. 244027, April 11, 2023 [Per C.J. Gesmundo, En Banc].
15 Id.
16 277 Phil. 106 (1991) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].
17 Id. at 115-116.
18 Ponencia, p. 2.
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