SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 265585, April 15, 2024 ]
FELIX NATHANIEL "ANGEL" VILLANUEVA MANALO II, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, SAJ.:
I respectfully disagree with the ponencia in upholding the denial of petitioner Felix Nathaniel "Angel" Villanueva Manalo II's (Manalo) Motion to Quash the Amended Information on the ground of double jeopardy.1
Considering that what was read to Manalo was the original Information to which he already pleaded not guilty,2 the prosecution is bound by his initial plea and his conviction should only be based on the original Information. Otherwise, his constitutionally protected right against double jeopardy will be violated.
I
The proscription against double jeopardy is one of the fundamental rights enshrined in our Constitution which shields the accused not from the danger of a second punishment but from being prosecuted for the same offense.3 Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
The constitutional concept of double jeopardy assures "that an accused may not be harassed with constant charges or revisions of the same charge arising out of the same facts constituting a single offense."4 Once the accused goes over the allegations in the Information by entering a plea on arraignment, they are already placed in jeopardy of conviction. Having understood the charges and then entering a plea, the accused will thereafter prepare their arguments and defense based on the prosecution's possible evidence. The safeguard afforded to the accused by the double jeopardy rule attaches not only after an acquittal or conviction, but also after entry of plea and when there is a previous dismissal for violation of speedy trial.5
II
Pertinently, under Rule 117, Section 3 of the Revised Rules for Criminal Procedure, one of the grounds to quash an Information is double jeopardy:
Section 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
. . . .
i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against [them] was dismissed or otherwise terminated without [their] express consent.
For a plausible defense of double jeopardy, Section 7 of the same Rule states:
Section 7. Former Conviction or Acquittal; Double Jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against [them] dismissed or otherwise terminated without [their] express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.ℒαwρhi৷ (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the requisites of double jeopardy are that: "(1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first."6 The first jeopardy only attaches "(a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without [their] express consent."7
In my view, Manalo's invocation of his right against double jeopardy is meritorious.(awÞhi(8 Due to the trial court's inadvertence, he was read the original Information, to which he pleaded not guilty. When the prosecution brought the error to the trial court's attention, the latter directed the reading of the amended Information. Manalo refused to enter a plea. The trial court then entered a "not guilty" plea on his behalf.9 In doing so, the trial court effectively terminated the case based on the original Information.
However, Manalo's consent to the termination cannot simply be assumed or implied; it "must be expressed as to have no doubt as to [his] conformity,"10 which was evidently unavailing here. Therefore, the trial court cannot just move to read the amended Information and enter a plea of "not guilty" on his behalf without violating his right against double jeopardy.
The trial court's mistake in reading the original Information instead of the amended one should not also be taken against Manalo. Given that his life and liberty are at stake, courts ought to be more circumspect in dealing with criminal cases,11 as in the one at hand.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the Petition.
Footnotes
1 Ponencia, pp. 1, 9.
2 Id. at 4.
3 Pacoy v. Cajigal, 560 Phil 598, 607 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division].
4 Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular, 839 Phil. 731, 775 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division]. (Emphasis supplied)
5 Id. at 775-776.
6 Pacoy v. Cajigal, 560 Phil. 598, 612 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]. (Emphasis supplied)
7 Id. (Emphasis supplied)
8 Ponencia, p. 6.
9 Id. at 4.
10 Tupaz v. Ulep, 374 Phil. 474, 487 (1999) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].
8 Ponencia, p. 6.
9 Id. at 4.
10 Tupaz v. Ulep, 374 Phil. 474, 487 (1999) [Per J. Pardo, First Division].
11 People v. Tizon, 375 Phil. 1096, 1098 (1999) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
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