Manila
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 244461. September 28, 2021 ]
PNOC - EXPLORATION CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
LOPEZ, M., J.:
The propriety of Commission on Audit's (COA) denial of PNOC - Exploration Corporation's (PNOC-EC) post facto request for written concurrence in the engagement of a private counsel is the focal issue in this Petition for Certiorari with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction,1 filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Court. The petition seeks to annul, reverse, and set aside Decision No. 2015-2812 dated November 23, 2015 and Resolution3 dated November 26, 2018 of the COA Proper, which affirmed Legal Retainer Review (LRR) No. 2012-0914 dated July 26, 2012.
ANTECEDENTS
In 2009, PNOC-EC purchased steam coal from Wilson International Trading Private Limited (Wilson). A dispute later on arose between the contracting parties with Wilson claiming demurrage charges and losses against PNOC-EC amounting to US$1,392,064.53. As provided in their contract, Wilson referred the dispute to arbitration in Singapore. On February 1, 2010, PNOC-EC received the notice of request for arbitration dated January 18, 2010, which gave PNOC-EC 30 days from receipt of the notice, or until March 2, 2010, to either file an answer or apply for extension of time to file an answer in accordance with the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules of Arbitration. In either case, PNOC-EC was required to comment on Wilson's nomination of Mr. Neal Gregson as arbitrator within the same 30-day period.5
Faced with the urgent need to be represented by an international legal counsel who is: (a) highly experienced in arbitration before the ICC; (b) qualified to advise on English Law; and (c) qualified to practice law in Singapore, PNOC-EC immediately drafted the Terms of Reference for the selection of its counsel and sent invitations to different law firms for proposals.6
On February 15, 2010, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) gave its "authority in principle" for the PNOC-EC to engage private representation in the arbitration proceedings, subject to its review of the terms and conditions of the agreement, and its exercise of control and supervision over the case. On February 23, 2010, PNOC-EC informed the OGCC that among those law firms which responded to the invitation, it chose Baker Botts LLP (Baker Botts) to represent it before the ICC International Court of Arbitration (ICA) as it passed the required competence and offered the lowest fee for its services. On March 12, 2010, the OGCC approved, ratified, and confirmed Baker Botts' engagement. The arbitration then proceeded, and thereafter, resulted in an Award dated October 4, 2011 in favor of PNOC-EC.7
Meanwhile, the COA auditor found that PNOC-EC failed to secure the COA's written concurrence in the engagement of Baker Botts' legal services in violation of COA Circular No. 86-2558 dated April 2, 1986 and COA Circular No. 95-0119 dated December 4, 1995. Consequently, Notice of Suspension (NS) No. PNOC-EC 2011-00110 dated June 2, 2011 was issued, suspending the legal fees paid to Baker Botts in the total amount of P42,717,188.41. PNOC-EC was required to settle the NS by submitting the required written concurrence.11 The NS further stated that the failure to settle the suspended amount within 90 days from notice will result in its disallowance pursuant to Section 8212 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1445.13 This prompted PNOC-EC to file a post facto Letter-Request14 dated June 7, 2011 for the COA's concurrence in the hiring of Baker Botts. The request was supported by a certificate of availability of funds,15 but was nonetheless denied in LRR No. 2012-09116 dated July 26, 2012 in this wise:
After evaluation, the Commission is not inclined to grant PNOC-EC's request for written concurrence of COA as the said request was made more than a year after and not prior to the hiring of the private lawyer as required under the afore-cited COA Circular No. 86-255, as amended, and Memorandum Circular No. 9 dated August 27, 1998 of the Office of the President. The proposal of Baker Botts was made in a letter dated February 19, 2010, yet the request for COA concurrence was received by this Commission only on June 20, 2011.
In the case of Phividec Industrial Authority vs. Capitol, Steel Corporation, G.R. No. 155692, October 23, 2003, the Supreme Court (SC) cited the requirement of written concurrence of COA as an indispensable condition before any hiring of private lawyer could be made. COA's mandate to audit the disbursement of public funds carries with it the determination of compliance of transaction with laws and regulations. In the herein case, there is non-compliance with COA Circular No. 86-255, the governing regulation in the hiring of private lawyer by government agencies. Therefore, NS No. PNOC-EC 2011-001, which required the submission of the requisite written concurrence of COA, was correctly issued by the [Audit Team Leader] and [Supervising Auditor] of PNOC-EC.
Moreover, our initial review of the retainer agreement shows that advance payment for filing fees, messenger services and other charges are provided therein which is contrary to Section 88(1) of [PD] No. 1445, proscribing advance payments on government contracts. Likewise, the proposed time-based payment scheme (hourly rate of US$450 for the two private lawyers) is also against the policy of this Commission requiring retainer fees to be in fixed monetary amount.
In view of the foregoing, the instant request of PNOC-EC for written concurrence of COA in the hiring of Baker Botts LLP cannot be granted.17 (Citation omitted and emphasis supplied.)
PNOC-EC, through the OGCC, questioned the denial of the request, but the COA Proper affirmed LRR No. 2012-091 in its Decision No. 2015-28118 dated November 23, 2015 solely on the ground that the required written concurrence of the COA was not obtained before the engagement of the private counsel:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission hereby DENIES the instant motion for reconsideration of the [OGCC], legal counsel for [PNOC-EC], of [LRR] No. 2012-091 dated July 26, 2012 for lack of merit.19 (Emphases in the original.)
Significantly, COA Chairperson Michael G. Aguinaldo (COA Chairperson Aguinaldo) inscribed with his signature that the COA Proper's Decision was still "subject to [the] rule on quantum meruit."20
PNOC-EC sought reconsideration, but was again denied in a Resolution dated November 26, 2018 as stated in COA En Banc Notice No. 2019-01821 dated February 6, 2019. Hence, this petition.
PNOC-EC begs for liberality in the application of the rules on the engagement of a private counsel under COA Circular No. 86-255 and COA Circular No. 95-011, citing the urgency to secure proper representation in the international arbitration as justification for its admitted failure to obtain the COA's written concurrence. PNOC-EC also argues that the government already benefitted from the services rendered by Baker Botts, and thus will be unjustly enriched if the payment of the legal fees remains suspended, and eventually disallowed at the expense of the PNOC-EC officers.22
For its part, the COA Proper, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), acknowledges the urgency, as well as the exceptional or extraordinary nature of the matter, but maintains that compliance with the requirement of first securing the COA's written concurrence cannot be disregarded, nor was it difficult to observe.23
ISSUE
Whether the COA Proper gravely abused its discretion in affirming LRR No. 2012-091, which denied PNOC-EC's belatedly filed request for the COA's written concurrence in the engagement of Baker Botts, and affirmed the suspension of the legal fees paid.
RULING
Since the early 1960s, a general prohibition against the hiring of private counsels by government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCC) has been in place as the law has designated the Government Corporate Counsel to be the principal law officer of all GOCCs.24 The prohibition was primarily aimed to curtail unnecessary expenditures of public funds on legal services of private practitioners, which may readily be provided by statutorily-mandated agencies like the OGCC.25 The rule, however, is not ironclad. The government has recognized exceptional situations, which unavoidably demand consultations from and representations by private counsels. Thus, over the years, the government has allowed GOCCs to hire private lawyers subject to certain conditions. For one, pursuant to its constitutional mandate to be the guardian of public funds,26 the COA issued Circular No. 86-25527 dated April 2, 1986 to regulate the hiring of private counsels. This was, later on, amended by Circular No.1aшphi1 95-011 dated December 4, 1995 as follows:
x x x [W]here a government agency is provided by law with a legal officer or office who or which can handle its legal requirements or cases in courts, it (agency) may not be allowed to hire the services of private lawyers for a fee, chargeable against public funds, unless exceptional or extraordinary circumstances obtain x x x.
Accordingly and pursuant to this Commission's exclusive authority to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant and/or unconscionable expenditure or uses of public funds and property (Sec. 2-2, Art. IX-D, Constitution), public funds shall not be utilized for payment of the services of a private legal counsel or law firm to represent government agencies in court or to render legal services for them. In the event that such legal services cannot be avoided or is justified under extraordinary or exceptional circumstances, the written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be, and the written concurrence of the Commission on Audit shall first be secured before the hiring or employment of a private lawyer or law firm. (Emphasis supplied.)
Apropos, as well, is Office of the President Memorandum Circular No. 928 dated August 27, 1998, issued by the Chief Executive pursuant to its supervision and control over GOCCs:
SEC. 1. All legal matters pertaining to government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs), their subsidiaries, other corporate offsprings and government acquired asset, corporations shall be exclusively referred to and handled by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC).
x x x x
SEC. 3. GOCCs are likewise enjoined to refrain from hiring private lawyers or law firms to handle their cases and legal matters. But in exceptional cases, the written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be, and the written concurrence of the Commission on Audit shall first be secured before the hiring or employment of a private lawyer or law firm. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus far, the following indispensable conditions must then be fulfilled before a GOCC can hire a private lawyer: (1) hiring is only in exceptional cases; (2) the written conformity and acquiescence of the OGCC must first be secured; and (3) the prior written concurrence of the COA must also be secured.29 This Court has consistently sustained the application of these regulations,30 and notably, an action directly attacking31 the validity or constitutionality of these administrative and executive issuances in the proper forum is yet to be filed. Basic is the rule that administrative issuances have in their favor the presumption of legality; and as such, cannot be disregarded even by this Court, especially when their validity is not put in issue on review.32 Similarly, the case at bar does not question the validity or constitutionality of the regulatory measure requiring the written concurrence of the COA before engagement of a private counsel. Rather, to obviate disallowance, PNOC-EC merely pleads for the exercise of liberality in the application of the regulation given the exigencies that they faced relating to the arbitration proceedings. Opportunely, the COA has recently issued Circular No. 2021-00333 dated July 16, 2021 to address such situation.
As a brief background, Circular No. 2021-003 explained that "the purpose for requiring the COA's written concurrence [in the engagement of private counsels] is to ensure the reasonableness of the amount of [their] legal fees."34 The COA, however, found the need to revisit such requirement, cognizant of the fact that such purpose ''may be guaranteed by safeguards other than the requisite COA's written concurrence."35 The COA also acknowledged the inefficacy and impracticability of the rule's rigid implementation in urgent and extraordinary or exceptional circumstances, wherein the legal services of private practitioners are necessary. Hence, "to avoid unnecessary delay[s] in the hiring of a private lawyer or legal retainer to address the urgent need for legal services in national government agencies and GOCCs under extraordinary or exceptional circumstances, and improve efficiency in government operations,"36 the new Circular exempts GOCCs from the requirement of the COA's prior written concurrence under COA Circular No. 86-255 and COA Circular No. 95-011 subject to the following conditions:
4.0 CONDITIONS
4.1 Lawyers under Contract of Service or Job Order Contract.
a) The engagement is covered by a contract between the government agency and the lawyer, under a Contract of Service or Job Order Contract arrangement, not to exceed one (1) year, renewable at the option of the head of the national government agency or GOCC, but in no case to exceed the term of the head;
b) The engagement shall have the written approval of the OSG, in the case of national government agencies, or the OGCC in the case of GOCCs;
c) The duties and responsibilities to be assigned to the lawyer are similar to those ordinarily performed by lawyers employed by the government agency or GOCC and holding attorney, legal officer, or other lawyer positions in the plantilla;
d) The government agency or GOCC does not have any plantilla positions or does not have sufficient plantilla positions to support its current requirement for legal services;
e) The lawyer meets the minimum eligibility and qualification standards imposed by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) for comparable positions in the government;
f) The compensation of the lawyer shall be the same as the salary of the comparable position in the government agency or GOCC, with no other entitlements except for a premium of up to twenty percent (20%) which may be paid monthly, lump sum, or in tranches (i.e. mid-year and end of the year) as may be stated in the contract. Comparable position is determined based not solely on salary grade but also on the duties and responsibilities of the positions and level of position in the organizational structure or plantilla of the agency. Positions may be considered to be comparable if they belong to the same occupational grouping and the duties and responsibilities of the positions are similar and/or related to each other (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 03, s. 2014); and
g) The lawyer is not employed nor engaged by any private entity or other government agency or GOCC for the duration of the contract.
4.2 Legal Consultants
a) The engagement is covered by a contract between the government agency or GOCC and the lawyer, as a legal consultant, specifying the activity/project/program, the nature of the engagement (full time or part time), and for a term no to exceed one (1) year, renewable at the option of the head of the government agency or GOCC if the activity/project/program has not yet been completed, but in no case to exceed the term of the head;
b) The engagement shall have written approval of the OSG, in the case of national government agencies, or the OGCC in the case of GOCCs;
c) The lawyer possesses the relevant expertise in the matter to which he has been engaged, and such expertise cannot be found among the lawyers employed by the government agency or GOCC, or if comparable expertise does exist, is unavailable;
d) The procurement process for the engagement of the lawyer as legal consultant has been complied with;
e) The lawyer is not employed or engaged as a contract of service or job order contract by any other government agency or GOCC, although the lawyer may be engaged as a part-time consultant in up to two (2) government agencies or GOCCs; and
f) The consultancy fee of the lawyer, including other remunerations and allowances, does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos ([₱]50,000.00) per month.
If any of the conditions listed above are not met, the COA's written concurrence shall be required for such engagement.
x x x x
In this case, We note that aside from the fact that Baker Botts' engagement was with the written approval of the OGCC, nothing more of the relevant factual conditions above-enumerated is established at this juncture. In fact, LRR No. 2012-091 states that the COA was still in its "initial review"37 of the retainer agreement when the request for concurrence was denied. With the advent of this procedural development, thus, it is only proper to REMAND the case to the COA for the determination of the propriety of exempting PNOC-EC from the written concurrence requirement, especially so because such determination entails the evaluation of purely factual and evidentiary matters, not available on record and beyond the purview of this judicial review.38 Moreover, the application of this fairly new COA issuance should be entrusted to COA itself, especially so because COA Circular No. 2021-003 expressly states that:
All pending requests written concurrence and appeals from or reconsideration of Legal Retainer Review or petitions for review of Notice of Disallowances issued on the ground of lack of COA's written concurrence shall be granted after a finding by this Commission of the existence of the abovementioned conditions.39
Clearly, it is not for the Court to make such determinations. In this certiorari proceedings, we are merely tasked to review if the COA's actions are tainted with grave abuse of discretion. As we have consistently held, the Court's general policy is to give due deference to the COA's constitutional prerogatives in the absence of grave abuse of discretion,40 not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers, but also of their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. No less than the fundamental law of the land expressly made the COA the guardian of public funds; endowed it with wide latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of government funds; and vested it with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property, including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods for such review, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations.41
Proceeding further, We find it unnecessary, if not irrelevant and premature, to belabor on PNOC-EC's argument that the government will be unjustly enriched if its request for concurrence remains denied, and consequently, the suspension of the legal fees paid to Baker Botts ripens into a disallowance. PNOC-EC's fear that its officers will be held liable to return the entire amount of legal fees paid to Baker Botts is more apparent than real. As can be gleaned from the assailed COA Proper Decision, the denial of the request for the COA's written concurrence was not made the sole basis of the civil liability in the disallowance that was supposedly underway. Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence,42 despite the COA Proper's affirmance of the denial of the request for concurrence, COA Chairperson Aguinaldo required the conduct of a further post-audit to determine the proper amount of disallowance and corresponding liabilities in accordance with the rule on quantum meruit.43 In the same vein, the new Circular instructs:
Notwithstanding the exemption from the requirement of COA's written concurrence, any disbursements made to the private lawyer engaged by the national government agency or GOCC, shall still be subject to post-audit based on existing rules and regulations of the Commission and to applicable rules and regulations issued by the CSC and other government agencies.44 (Emphasis supplied.)
Verily, Circular No. 2021-003 made it clear that compliance or non-compliance with the requirement of the COA's written concurrence is not the only factor to be considered in assessing whether a disbursement for legal fees should be disallowed, and in imposing liabilities arising from a disallowance. For one, the hiring of private lawyers or law firms is allowed under extraordinary or exceptional circumstances, and there is no hard and fast rule to justify it. As in this case, which involves international arbitration, the totality of all the circumstances cognizant of the parties' contract and existing laws flexibly determines whether the expenses incurred were illegal, irregular, excessive, or unreasonable. Indeed, transactions or expenditures which are not in accordance with law,45 or incurred without adhering to established rules, regulations, procedural guidelines, policies, principles or practices that have gained recognition in laws46 may result in a disallowance,47 which renders the transaction participants (approving/certifying officers and payees) civilly liable. However, certain established statutory and equitable principles, as well as jurisprudential rules, must be considered in determining the disallowance liability such as the concepts of solutio indebiti48 and unjust enrichment,49 the rule on quantum meruit,50 the good faith and diligence of the approving and certifying officers,51 and the solidary nature of the officers' liability in a disallowance.52
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED without prejudice to the Commission on Audit's determination of the propriety of exempting PNOC – Exploration Corporation from the written concurrence requirement in the engagement of Baker Botts LLP and the conduct of a post-audit in accordance with Item No. 4.0 of the Commission on Audit Circular No. 2021-003 dated July 16, 2021.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, (S.A.J.), Caguioa, Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, and Dimaampao, JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., see concurring opinion.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 3-23.
2 Id. at 30-37; Signed by Chairperson Michael G. Aguinaldo with Commissioners Heidi L. Mendoza and Jose A. Fabia.
3 See Notice No. 2019-018 dated February 6, 2019; id. at 38.
4 Id. at 96-98.
5 Id. at 8-9.
6 Id. at 9.
7 Id. at 106-201.
8 Entitled "INHIBITION AGAINST EMPLOYMENT BY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS, OF PRIVATE LAWYERS TO HANDLE THEIR LEGAL CASES" dated April 2, 1986.
9 Entitled "PROHIBITION AGAINST EMPLOYMENT BY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS, OF PRIVATE LAWYERS TO HANDLE THEIR LEGAL CASES" dated December 4, 1995.
10 Id. at 56-57.
11 The following approving officers were named liable in the NS: (1) Leocadio M. Ostrea, Vice President (VP) for Petroleum Division; (2) Candido M. Magsombol, Manager for Trading and Marketing Department; (3) Lionel Q. Calo, Jr., VP for Finance; (4) Lourdes S. Gelacio, VP for Corporate Services, Information Communications Technology, and Accounting Division; and (5) Raymundo B. Savella, VP for Petroleum and Coal Operations Division; rollo, pp. 56-57.
12 SEC. 82. Auditor's notice to accountable officer of balance shown upon settlement. — The auditor concerned shall, at convenient intervals, send a written notice under a certificate of settlement to each officer whose accounts have been audited and settled in whole or in part by him, stating the balances found due thereon and certified, and the charges or differences arising from the settlement by reason of disallowances, charges, or suspensions. The certificate shall be properly itemized and shall state the reasons for disallowance, charge, or suspension of credit. A charge of suspension which is not satisfactorily explained within ninety days after receipt of the certificate or notice by the accountable officer concerned shall become a disallowance, unless the Commission or auditor concerned shall in writing and for good cause shown, extend the time for answer beyond ninety days.
13 Rollo, p. 57; Entitled "ORDAINING AND INSTITUTING A GOVERNMENT AUDITING CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES," approved on June 11, 1978.
14 Id. at 40-49.
15 Id. at 32-33.
16 Id. at 96-98.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 30-37.
19 Id. at 36.
20 Id. at 34-55.
21 Id. at 38.
22 Id. at 16.
23 See Comment; id. at 521-550.
24 See Republic Act No. 3838, entitled "AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED Two THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TWENTY-SEVEN, ENTITLED "AN ACT TO DECLARE THE POSITION OF GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL DISTINCT AND SEPARATE FROM THAT OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, PROVIDE FOR HIS APPOINTMENT AND SALARY AND APPROPRIATE THE NECESSARY FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 22, 1963, SEC. 1. x x x x "SEC. 1. x x x He shall be the principal law officer of all government-owned or controlled corporations. To enable him to discharge, his functions as such, it shall he the duty of all said corporations to refer to him all important legal questions for opinion, advice and determination, all proposed contracts and all important court cases for his services. He shall, moreover, exercise control and supervision over all legal divisions maintained separately by said corporations. No government-owned or controlled corporation shall hire a private law practitioner to handle any of its legal cases without the written consent of the Government Corporate Counsel or of the Secretary of Justice." (Emphasis supplied.); See also PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel Corporation, 460 Phil. 493 (2003).
25 See PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel Corporation, id.; and Alejandrino v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 245400, November 12, 2019.
26 SEC. 2(1) and (2), Art. IX, 1987 Constitution; See also Yap v. Commission on Audit, 633 Phil. 174 (2010).
27 Supra note 9.
28 Entitled "PROHIBITING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS (GOCCs) FROM REFERRING THEIR CASES AND LEGAL MATTERS TO THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, PRIVATE LEGAL COUNSEL OR LAW FIRMS AND DIRECTING THE GOCCs TO REFER THEIR CASES AND LEGAL MATTERS TO THE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, UNLESS OTHERWISE AUTHORIZED UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES," dated August 27, 1998.
29 Alejandrino v. Commission on Audit, supra note 24 citing PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel Corporation, supra note 23.
30 See Polloso v. Gangan, 390 Phil. 1101 (2000); PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel Corp., supra note 23; The Law Firm of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo v. Commission on Audit, 789 Phil. 258 (2015); Oñate v. Commission on Audit, 789 Phil. 260 (2016); and Alejandrino v. Commission on Audit, id.
31 See Province of Camarines Sur v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 227926, March 10, 2020.
32 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, 515 Phil. 467 (2006); See also Yap v. Commission on Audit, supra note 25.
33 Entitled "EXEMPTING GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS FROM THE REQUIREMENT OF WRITTEN CONCURRENCE FROM THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT ON THE ENGAGEMENT OF: (1) LAWYERS UNDER CONTRACTS OF SERVICE OR JOB ORDER CONTRACTS; AND (2) LEGAL CONSULTANTS, SUBJECT TO SPECIFIC CONDITIONS," dated July 16, 2021; Item 8.0 thereof states that the "Circular shall take effect after 15 days from publication in a newspaper of general circulation." A copy of the Circular was published July 28, 2021 in "The Philippine Star," hence, Circular No. 2021-003 became effective on August 12, 2021.
34 Circular No. 2021-003, Item 1.0, Par. 4.
35 Circular No. 2021-003, Item 1.0, Par. 6.
36 Circular No. 2021-003, Item 2.0.
37 Rollo, p. 98.
38 "[T]he Constitution and the Rules of Court limit the permissible scope of inquiry Rules 64 and 65 certiorari petitions only to errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion." See Fontanilla v. Commission Proper, 787 Phil. 713 (2016).
39 COA Circular No. 2021-003, Item 4.0, last paragraph.
40 Espinas v. Commission on Audit, 731 Phil. 67 (2014).
41 Yap v. Commission on Audit, supra note 25.
42 See Melchor v Commission on Audit, 277 Phil. 801 (1991); Alejandrino v. Commission on Audit, supra note 24; Torreta v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 242925, November 10, 2020.
43 Rollo, p. 36.
44 Circular No. 2021-003, Item 4.0, Par. 2.
45 "Illegal Expenditures," see Miralles v. Commission on Audit, 818 Phil. 380, 405 (2017); and National Transmission Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 232199, December 1, 2020.
46 "Irregular Expenditures;" See COA Circular No. 2012-003 entitled “UPDATED GUIDELINES FOR THE PREVENTION AND DISALLOWANCE OF IRREGULAR, UNNECESSARY, EXCESSIVE, EXTRAVAGANT AND UNCONSCIONABLE EXPENDITURES” dated October 29, 2012, Section 3.1.
47 See Miralles v. Commission on Audit, supra note 44; and National Transmission Corporation v. Commission on Audit, supra note 44.
48 Art. 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises.
49 Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
50 Alejandrino v. Commission on Audit, supra note 24; Madera v. Commission on Audit; G.R. No. 244128, September 8, 2020; and Toretto v. Commission on Audit, supra note 41.
51 Madera v. Commission on Audit, id.; and Toretto v. Commission on Audit, supra note 41.
52 Id.
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