EN BANC
G.R. No. 132480 September 30, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RANDY RAQUIÑO, accused-appellant.
Separate Opinions
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;
In my Separate Opinion1 in People vs. Esparas2 I wrote that the duty of this Court to review death penalty decisions where the appellant has escaped or jumped bail arises only after the appellant is re-arrested and taken back into the custody of the law; that is, after the Court resumes jurisdiction over his person. in other words, while I agree with the Court's holding that it has the mandatory duty to review cases imposing the death sentence3 such review, however, should be deferred until the escapees or fugitives4 are re-arrested.
I submit that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the person of a death convict who is at large is similar to that of a trial court over the accused who has not been arraigned. in the latter case, trial cannot proceed until the accused is arrested and enters a plea. the case is, in the meantime, "archived." Similarly, while the case of a person whom the trial court has sentenced to death is automatically elevated to this Court for review, the Court should defer such review if the convict has chosen to abscond. in this way, the Court does not avoid or forsake its mandatory duty. At the same time, the death convict does not enjoy a greater privilege than ordinary appellants who are deemed to have given up their appeal upon their escape from the fold of the law, and whose sentences (lower than death) are thereby deemed affirmed.
In immediately reviewing the cases of escaped death convicts, the Court is practically endowing a greater privilege to them than to ordinary fugitives, because the former could be benefited by penalties lower than reclusion perpetua, even acquittal, as a result of the automatic review of their cases. as demonstrated in the case at bar, Raquiño's death sentence has been reduced to mere imprisonment ranging from prision mayor medium to reclusion temporal medium, despite having made a mockery of the jurisdiction, authority, dignity and the processes of this very Court.
On the other hand, ordinary escapees, who may also deserve lesser penalties or acquittal, are forever doomed, because by their escape they are deemed to have abandoned their right to appeal.ℒαwρhi৷
This policy adopted by the majority unduly favors fugitives who have been sentenced to death by the trial court, as against one who has been sentenced to reclusion perpetua only. It encourages death convicts to escape from imprisonment because, anyway, their escape will not be interpreted as admission of their guilt. Besides, the Court will nevertheless review their conviction, and if it will be to their favor, they may chose to surrender; otherwise, they could remain fugitives.
With due respect, I submit that the course taken by the Court effectively countenances a trifling of the law and our judicial processes. Worse, it encourages death convicts to escape and to mock this Court and the judicial system as a whole. the instant case clearly illustrates the folly and impracticality of the majority's interpretation of the Court's mandatory review of death penalty cases.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to defer the Court's review of Randy Raquino's appeal and promulgation of Decision thereon until after the re-arrest of accused-appellant.
Footnotes
1 260 SCRA 539, 552-554, August 20, 1996.
2 Ibid.
3 Pursuant to § 22 of RA 7659 and § 10, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.
4 in Rodriguez v. Comelec (259 SCRA 296, July 24, 1996), the Court defined fugitive from justice as one who flees after conviction to avoid punishment or who, after being charged, flees to avoid prosecution.
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