EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47883 March 25, 1978
LAKAS NG BAYAN (LABAN), petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS & NACIONALISTA PARTY, respondents.
Primitivo R. de Leon, Neptali A. Gonzales, Napoleon G. Rama, Francisco E. Rodrigo, Jr. and Joker Arroyo for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Vicente V. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno for respondent Commission on Elections.
Ronald D. Roy and Edwin L. Segovia for respondent Nacionalista Party.
Separate Opinions
CASTRO, C.J., concurring:
I concur. In view of the environmental circumstances of this case, the petition is to be considered as dismissed for lack of merit, and this dismissal as immediately executory.
Separate Opinions
GUERRERO, J., concurring:
I vote for dismissal of the petition.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
The ably-written opinion of Justice Barredo for the Court rests on a conception of law that takes into account the realities of the situation and the need for adjusting to the demands of the new forces at work in the political milieu. With due recognition of its force, persuasiveness, and clarity, I would like to view the matter before us in the light of traditional doctrines and what, for me at least, are applicable precedents. While the result reached compels acceptance on my part, I would qualify the dismissal of this certiorari and prohibition petition with instruction to respondent Commission on Elections to consider the words LAKAS and BAYAN in addition to LABAN as a vote for the slate of the petitioner LAKAS NG BAYAN. That is the extent of my lack of conformity to the decision of this Court.
1. I concur in the dismissal of this certiorari and prohibition petition against the Commission on Elections as under Section 140 of the Election Code, the validity of which has not been challenged and therefore must be given fun force and effect, respondent Nacionalista Party is entitled to a place in the ballot, but certainly not a favored place. That deficiency had been remedied. So with the other infirmities imputed to the assailed decision. They were based on the alleged discrimination insofar as its joint candidates with the Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan, KBL for short, would be entitled: (1) "to two separate advertising spaces (sic) in radio, television, and print media;" (2) "would be able to spend double the amount snowed by the 1978 Election Code, one expended for them by the KBL and the other by the Nacionalista Party;" and (3) "would be entitled to three watchers each in every voting center or a total of six watchers for their joint candidates" as against three for the candidates of petitioner. Commission on Elections Resolution No. 1929, dated March 4, 1978 took care of the matter. It reads: "[Now, therefore], the Commissioner Elections, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution and the 1978 Election Code, promulgates, as it hereby promulgates, the following rules to govern the election expenses, appointment of watchers and use of print and broadcast media by Political parties or groups that nominated a common set of candidates in the April 7, 1978 elections: [Section] 1. Limitation upon expenses of political parties or groups with a common set of candidates When two or more political parties, groups or aggrupations have nominated a common set of official can. candidates, the said political parties, groups or aggrupations may jointly spend for their common candidates an amount the aggregate segregate of which shall not exceed fifty centavos for every voter currently registered therein. In case the political parties, groups or aggrupations fail to agree, the political party, group or aggrupation that first nominated the common set of candidates shall have the right to spend for the campaign of the said candidates to the exclusion of the other. [Sec.] 2. Purchase of air time and/or advertising space for campaign purposes. Political parties, groups or aggrupations supporting a common set of candidates shag be allowed to purchase jointly air time and/or advertising space for the campaign of their common candidates, but the total duration and quality of the air time and the aggregate amount of advertising space purchase shall not exceed that allotted to other political parties, groups or aggrupations that nominated only one set of candidates. As far as practicable, in the case of candidates nominated by more than one political party, group or aggrupation, the sale of air-time and/or advertising space shall be made only to the candidates, the contract for the use of such air-time and/or advertising space being signed by the candidates concerned [Sec.] 3. Common watchers. Political parties, groups or aggrupations that nominated a common set of candidates shall be entitled to appoint jointly not more than three watchers in every voting center. In case of disagreement, the political party, group or aggrupation that first nominated the candidates shall have the right to appoint the watchers to the exclusion of the other."1
2. The crucial issue, to my mind, in any election controversy where an actuation of the respondent Commission on Elections is challenged, is the respect, or lack of it, accorded the fundamental right of suffrage.2 In the leading case of Moya v. del Fierro,3 a 1939 decision, Justice Laurel stressed its significance in words that even now possess the impress of validity. Thus: "As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form devised, must continue to be the means by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of good government and the common qqqweal Republican in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the established authority. He has a voice in his Government and whenever possible it is the solemn duty of the judiciary, when called upon to act in justifiable cases, to give it efficacy and not to stifle or frustrate it. This, fundamentally, is the reason for the rule that ballots should be read and appreciated, if not with utmost, with reasonable, liberality. Counsel for both parties have caged our attention to the different and divergent rules laid down by this Court on the appreciation of ballots. It will serve no good and useful purpose for us to engage in the task of reconciliation or harmonization of these rules, although this may perhaps be undertaken, as no two cases will be found to be exactly the same in factual or legal environment. It is sufficient to observe, however, in this connection that whatever might have been said in cases heretofore decided, no technical rule or rules should be permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, if that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself, not from evidence aliunde. This rule of interpretation goes to the very root of the system."4
3. So it is in American constitutional law. This is made clear by the doctrines announced by the United States Supreme Court since "the right to vote," according to United States v. Bathgate5 is "personal."6 It follows that any impairment of the constitutionally protected right to vote, in the language of Skinner v. Oklahoma,7 the opinion being penned by Justice Douglas, "touches a sensitive and important area of human rights," and "involves one of the basic civil rights of man," presenting questions of "invidious discrimination"8 offensive to the equal protection clause. Chief Justice Warren gave eloquent expression to such a view in what has been con. considered as the landmark decision in the apportionment cases, Reynolds v. Sims:9 "Undeniably the Constitution of the United States protects the right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal elections. A consistent line of decisions by this Court in cases involving attempts to deny or restrict the right of suffrage has made this indelibly clear. It has been repeatedly recognized that all qualified voters have a constitutionality Protected right to vote, Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 US 651, 28 L ed 274, 4 S Ct 152, and to have their votes counted, United States v. Mosley, 238 US 383, 59 L ed 1355, 35 S Ct. 904. ... And history has seen a continuing expansion of the scope of the right of suffrage in this country. The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government."10 Further: "Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservation of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized."11
4. In the light of the foregoing fundamental postulate, it is my considered opinion, as set forth at the outset, that the dismissal of the petition should be without prejudice to respondent Commission on Elections being instructed to include the words LAKAS and BAYAN in addition to LABAN, as indicating the clear and manifest intention of the voter to casts his ballot in favor of LAKAS NG BAYAN. To my mind, this would suffice to remove what otherwise could be an unconstitutional taint as a denial of equal protection, considering that the joint candidates for the KILUSAN NG BAGONG LIPUNAN and the NACIONALISTA PARTY could be voted for, as the petition alleged,12 in six different ways, unlike the candidates of the petitioner under the optional block voting scheme, which, without the suggested addition, could be voted for in only two ways, LAKAS NG BAYAN and LABAN. It may be stated that even then there is lacking the full measure of similar or Identical treatment which Ideally is the mandate of the equal protection guarantee. Nonetheless, such failure to attain that degree of full equivalence is inherent in the fact that under Section 140 of the 1978 Election Code, the joint candidates of the Kilusan and the Nacionalista Party enjoy that advantage. Under such a circumstance, the judiciary can go only so far as to minimize the resulting inequality. It cannot completely eradicate it. Professor Emerson, a constitutionalist of note, had occasion to state that even the adoption of the equal rights amendment, which would ban discrimination based on sex, would not change matters in cases where lack of equality is inherent in a situation. That would be a case of a necessary consequence, not purposeful discrimination. He pointed out that as to wet nurses, only women can qualify, and as to donors in a semen bank, so necessary in these days of artificial official insemination, only the men can be expected to volunteer. Yet there is no violation of the guarantee of equal protection.13
5. Nor is there anything unorthodox in this approach. Even with the dismissal of a petition by this Court, an affirmative relief may be granted, especially so where the quit comes under our equity powers, which is intended to avoid the exaltation of legalism at the expense of justice. If it were otherwise, our jurisdiction could be reduced to the level of mere futility. This is not a matter of pure theory. In the leading case of Colgate- Palmolive Philippines, Inc. v. De la Cruz,14 this Court, through Justice Makasiar, while dismissing in unfair labor practice suit, which ordinarily would have ted the matter as there was no unfair labor practice proven, recognized the competence of the then Court of Industrial Relations to pay the sum equivalent to the earned but unused sick leave of private respondents, the laborers involved. Justice Makasiar cited with approval an earlier decision, Philippine Engineers' Syndicate, Inc. v. Bautista,15 The teaching of American Supreme Court in apportionment cases, all election controversies, impressive for their number and unanimity is to the same effect.16 For me, where not controlling, they are of persuasive weight.
6. One other matter. While the petition did not touch on the question of whether or not under Section 140 of the Election Code a candidate is required to be in the ticket of only one political party, group or aggrupation, Senator Francisco Soc Rodrigo, who likewise argued at the hearing, vigorously pressed the contention that since both the Nacionalista Party and the Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan had a common slate of candidates, everyone included therein should "inform the Commission as to the ticket he chooses to be included," his failure being a sufficient cause for his exclusion from the election. It must be admitted that the point was argued with a great deal of plausibility, but as against such a submission, Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza ably pointed out that the requirement, in the language of the law, applies only when the political party, group or aggrupation presents "different sets of candidates." The situation is, therefore, not covered by the provision invoked. It is a case of casus omisus. In addition, the Solicitor General who is himself a Candidate and has been facing the rigors of an electoral campaign, stressed that, realistically, the assumption that a candidate of two parties or aggrupations would necessarily be placed at an advantage is not home out by the experience in past campaigns where due to past loyalties or accumulated resentments, the Identification with any of such contending party or aggrupation may even be a handicap. There is, for me at least, lacking that assurance that would justify a finding that on this particular issue, petitioner has made out a case of grave abuse of discretion, which is the basis of this certiorari and prohibition proceeding.
It is thus clear why, for me at least, this petition for certiorari and prohibition cannot be granted. The assailed decision of respondent Commission on Elections is not just the rationalization of the arbitrary and the irrational. Nor can it be, as seems to be the impression created at the oral argument, merely the cleverly contrived justification of the outrageous. This is not to say that it could be considered impeccable in all respects. Whatever failings may be attributed to it, however, would be due to the novelty and complexity of the problems and the infitude of human vision. Nor, in the light of the authorities that, for me, have relevance, can it be said that respondent Commission on Elections was enslaved by outworn tradition and obsolete concepts. It was not in the grip of the suffocating literalness of provisions that perhaps could have been better phrased to avoid ambiguity. It is no exaggeration to look upon it as an earnest effort to meet the question at issue in terms of what is fair, what is just, and what is legal Except for the qualification above mentioned, it is my considered opinion to repeat, that no recourse could be had to the remedies of certiorari and prohibition.
Footnotes
1 COMELEC Resolution No. 1292 dated March 4, 1978.
2 According to Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution: "Suffrage shall be exercised by citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage. The National Assembly shall provide a system for the purpose of securing the secrecy and sanctity of the vote."
3 69 Phil. 199.
4 Ibid, 204.
5 246 US 220 (1918).
6 Ibid, 227.
7 316 US 535 (1942).
8 Ibid, 541.
9 377 US 533 (1964).
10 Ibid, 544-555.
11 Ibid, 561-562.
12 Petition, par. 14.
13 Cf. Emerson, Brown, Falk, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 Yale Law Journal, 871, 893 (1971).
14 L-23015, May 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 190.
15 L-16440, February 29, 1964, 10 SCRA 379.
16 Cf. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 US 1 (1964); Wright v. Rocket, 376 US 52 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US 533 (1964); WMCA v. Lomenzo, 377 US 633 (1964); Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 377 US 656; (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 US 678 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 US 695 (1964); Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 US 713 (1964); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 US 433 (1965); Burns v. Richardson, 384 US 73 (1966); Sailors v. Kent Board of Education, 387 US 105 (1967); Dusch v. Davis, 387 US 112 (1967); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 US 526 (1969); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 US 542 (1969); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 US 814 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 US 621 (1969); Connor v. Johnson, 402 US 690 (1971); Ely v. Klahr, 403 US 108 (1971); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 US 124 (1971); Abate v. Mundt, 403 US 182 (1971); Connor v. Williams, 404 US 549 (1972).
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the majority's denial of the petition and its ruling that "contrary to the contention of petitioner, the adoption by the Nacionalista Party (NP) of all the 21 candidates of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) is not multiplication by that number of the violation of the injunction in Section 140 against a candidate being in the ticket of more than one party."1
I. The main issue at bar is the legality of the questioned Comelec ruling allowing double listing of all 21 government KBL candidates also under the NP in patent violation of the Election Decree's express and unqualified injunction that "a candidate may be in the ticket of only one party, group or aggrupation" and of its mandate that "if he is included in the ticket of more than one political party, group or aggrupation presenting different sets of candidates, he shall inform the Commission as to which ticket he chooses to be included, and if he fails to do so, he shall cease to be considered to belong to any ticket."2
1. To ask the question is to answer it. The first sentence of the pertinent provisions of Section 140 of the Election Decree sets forth a plain, complete and absolute prohibition (admitting of no room for administrative or judicial interpretation) against a candidate being in the ticket of more than one political party or group, regardless of whether or not such parties or groups "present different sets of candidates." The second sentence of the cited section provides that where the candidate is included in the ticket of more than one political party or groups "Presenting different sets of candidates", he must inform the Comelec as to the ticket under which he chooses to be included under pain of being considered as not belonging to any ticket.
Even read literally in the singular, petitioner has cause to complain that if the decree unequivocally enjoins that "a candidate may be in the ticket of only one political party, group aggrupation", the adoption by the NP of all 21 KBL candidates in Metro Manila multiplies by that number the violation of the decree's injunction against a candidate being in more than one ticket. If a single candidate is prohibited from being in more than one ticket, so must all the government's 21 KBL candidates in Metro Manila as well as the remaining (unopposed) 139 KBL candidates in the rest of the nation be covered by the prohibition.
2. Such a plain and simple view is but to obey the plain and simple letter of the decree as well as its spirit. Such a view accords with the parliamentary system established by the 1973 Constitution which is supposed to be based on the party system and party government under which it is an absurdity for the same candidates to run under or be "adopted" in the tickets of two or more political parties or groups and for the second party to adopt in toto the candidates of another political party or group as the NP has done here, not only with regard to all the 21 candidates of the KBL in Metro Manila or Region IV (who appear to have substantial opposition from petitioner's slate of candidates) but also as to all the other 139 candidates of the KBL in all the other 12 regions throughout the country who are running practically unopposed.3 As stressed earlier this month by the majority in the block-voting cases "such a [parliamentary] system implies the existence of responsible political parties with distinct programmers of government" and "the maintenance and development of the party system becomes not only necessary but indispensable for the enforcement of the Idea and the rule of government responsibility and accountability to the people in the political management of the country."4 Such a view is but in consonance with the constitutional injunctions prescribing political opportunism and turncoatism.5
3. The arbitrary and oppressive edge given the government's KBL slate of candidates even without their double listing as Nacionalista Party candidates actually amounts to five (5) ways whereby KBL candidates, as per the Comelec official ballot may be voted upon as a block by writing either (1) Kilusang Bagong Lipunan, (2) Kilusan, (3) Bagong Lipunan, (4) KBL or (5) KBL as against only two (2) ways for block-voting for petitioner LABAN's candidates, namely, by writing (a) Lakas ng Bayan or (b) Laban. This 5 to 2 edge is now made even heavier and raised to 8 to 2 with the majority's sustaining of the Comelec ruling whereby the KBL candidates may also be voted for as a block by writing (6) Nacionalista, (7) NP or (8) just the letter N. As against the strictly independent candidate who has no party or group, the KBL edge is 8 to 0. Even though the majority in the block-voting cases, supra, 6 upheld the block voting device despite the express Constitutional provision that bona fide candidates "shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination" and the Fajardo committee's official report in the 1971 Constitutional Convention that the said provision was adopted to outlaw block voting "with special reference to unaffiliated or partyless bona fide candidates", such unfair and onerous odds must be held to be constitutionally impermissible since they are violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution.ℒαwρhi৷
4. The majority would sustain the Comelec decision (as supported by the Solicitor General as its counsel) which simplistically ruled that under the provisions of section 140 of the 1978 Election Decree "a candidate nominated by more than one political party or group has the duty to indicate 'to which ticket he chooses to be included' if such political parties or groups have 'presented different sets of candidates.' However, when the political parties or groups have presented a common or identical set of candidates, such commonality of ticket or slate is legal, and the candidate so favored with such dual nomination need not inform the Commission 'to which ticket he chooses to be included.' The candidates shall be common candidates, can continue to run under both nominating party or group (sic) and be voted upon as such."
(a) The Comelec decision is manifestly untenable. It totally disregards the unequivocal and unqualified injunction and mandate in the first provision of the cited section that "a candidate may be in the ticket of only one political party group or aggrupation." This prohibition against a candidate running ' in the ticket of more than one party or group is complete, absolute and without qualification (regardless of whether such parties or groups present different sets of candidates) and without exception (regardless of whether such parties or groups enter into a coalition).
What happens if a second party, such as the NP in this case, nevertheless includes the KBL candidate in its ticket by adoption with the written consent of the candidate? The second provision of the cited section requires that the candidate "shall inform the Commission as to which ticket he chooses to be included, and if he fails to do so, he shall cease to be considered to belong to any ticket. "
(b) It is neither necessary nor a prerequisite as held by the majority that the two parties or groups must "present different sets of candidates" (which phrase appears only in the second provision) in order that the candidate must be required to indicate "to which ticket he chooses to be included" under pain of not being considered to belong to any ticket. This phrase in the second provision "presenting different sets of candidates" is but a mere descriptive superfluity since the first provision already sets forth the absolute and unqualified injunction that a candidate may be in the ticket of only one political party or group, whether or not such parties or groups present different sets of candidates. Consequently, if the two parties or groups do not present "different sets of candidates" but common or identical set of candidates", the correct conclusion is not that the candidate can legally run under both tickets without having to choose between them (as erroneously ruled by the Comelec) but that he must nevertheless make such a choice because of the absolute and unqualified first provision which prohibits a candidate from running under more than one ticket whether the tickets be common and identical or present differents of candidates.
(c) How did the phrase "presenting different sets of candidates" come to be written into the second provision of the cited Decree and which is now availed of to justify the Comelec ruling that a candidate may be in the party of more than one party or group not presenting different sets of can. candidates despite the absolute and unqualified prohibition to the contrary? During the hearing of March 14, 1978, the Solicitor General manifested that:
I happen to be the one who wrote it. Maybe it could have been written in a better way. I must say that the reason why it was writ. ten this way is that we were endeavoring to finish this Election Code within a brief period of time. I was precisely trying to conceive of an the possible situations to avoid any ambiguity. I must say I was not thinking of shifting between political parties. What was uppermost in my mind was to assure that there would be no difficulty on the part of the voter in deciding to vote for a straight party ticket, and also that there would be no difficulty on the part of the voter in deciding to vote for a straight party ticket, and also that there would be no difficulty on the part of the Citizens" Election Committee in appreciating the ballot. That is why, if Your Honor please, there is that first proviso. But the second proviso is an integral part of the whole thing....7
The Solicitor General stressed repeatedly that the second provision requiring the candidate to make a choice was It simply intended to allow party voting to operate without any confusion whatsoever" citing ..." For example, you have a candidate in the tickets of two political parties presenting different sets of candidates. How would you credit him if a voter should vote for one group and also for the other group? It win not seem to be fair. " unless the candidate made of record his choice "as to which ticket he chooses to be included."
He conceded that if say in the Metro Manila area, the NP merely adopted 18 out of the 21 KBL candidates, or one-half, or only its (NP) members, the NP and the KBL would have had different sets of candidates requiring different listings and the candidates adopted would be required to make their choice of a single ticket.
But with the same identical set of KBL candidates adopted by the NP as actually happened, there would be no possible source of confusion and in such a case the absolute prohibition in the first provision applies, viz, that a candidate may be in the ticket of only one party or group, and therefore the candidates adopted wholesale must likewise make their choice of ticket under pain of not being included in any ticket. Quod erat demonstrandum showing that the phrase "presenting different sets of candidates" in the second provision is but a descriptive superfluity inserted under time pressure,
(d) To this, the Solicitor General replied that the right of a political party, viz, the NP to support an Identical set of candidates should not be denied and that "there is no provision in the 1978 Election Code that proscribes two political units from supporting Identical sets of candidates."8 The majority would uphold him thus: "(W)e are convinced there is no point in reading Section 140 of the Election Code of 1978 in the sense that it is illegal for a political party to adopt the complete set of candidates of another political party, group or aggrupation."9
This is not the point at all. The point is that it is not being declared illegal nor prohibited for a political party to adopt another party's candidates wholesale or in part nor for parties to enter into a coalition. The Election Decree precisely recognizes that parties may adopt the same candidates or agree on a coalition but absolutely requires that the candidate "be in the ticket of only one" party or group and further expressly requires Mm to make of record his choice of ticket under pain of not being included in any ticket. This is but in consonance with the parliamentary system wherein "political parties play vital roles and are therefore sought to be strengthened" in the Comelec's own language10 as well as with the 1973 Constitution which rules out "election malpractices, political opportunism, guest or nuisance candidacy, or other similar acts."11 It may be added that requiring the KBL candidates who are NP's to comply with the decree's requirement of making their choice of ticket (to be included and voted for as NP's would be in line with the main opinion's dictum that "by nominating as its own the candidates of the KBL, the Nacionalista Party merely gave the mass of its loyal and die-hard partymen the opportunity to vote distinctly as Nacionalista in the coming election."12
(e) It would not do then for the main opinion to rule that "(C)ontrary to the contention of petitioner, the adoption by the Nacionalista Party of all the 21 candidates of the KBL is not multiplication by that number of the violation of the injunction in Section 140 against a candidate being in the ticket of more than one party. While indeed it would appear that instead of only one candidate, 21 candidates are in the ticket of more than one party, the truth of the matter is that they actually compose the whole ticket and that ticket is only one. "13 Where KBL candidates are adopted wholesale by the NP, it cannot be said that there is only one ticket. The two parties or groups (NP and KBL) do have a common or Identical ticket but each has its own ticket and the official Comelec ballot reflects this. What the decree absolutely and unequivocally enjoins reflects this. What the decree absolutely and unequivocally enjoins is that a candidate may be in the ticket of only one party or group, whether the tickets be Identical or different, and no one disputes that the NP and the KBL are two separate entities or groups.
5. The majority ruling does not quite clearly resolve the other point raised by petitioner as to the peculiar, if not absurd, situation whereby with the NP adoption of the entire KBL slate of 160 candidates (which is unopposed outside of Metro Manila and certain sectors), the NP and the KBL, with a common and Identical set of candidates, win for purposes of accreditation under Article XII (C), section 8 of the 1973 Constitution be considered as having obtained the first and second highest number of votes in the April 7, 1978 elections.
The majority opinion would now consider the KBL as an "improvisation" and declares that "(T)he KBL is not a political party." In the block-voting cases decided earlier this month however, in disposing of the issue that the KBL (and LABAN) could not be registered as political parties under Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution and section 199 of the 1978 Election Decree, the majority opinion in that case held that while the KBL (and LABAN) did not profess to be political parties, "(I)t does not follow, however, that the KBL and LABAN are not political parties, in a generic sense, since a political party has been generally defined as 'an association of voters believing in certain principles of government, formed to urge the adoption and execution of such principles of governmental affairs through officers of like belief.'"14
It should be noted, furthermore, that at the March 14, 1978 hearing, Comelec Chairman Leonardo Perez in answer to the interpellations of the writer of the main opinion declared that the KBL has submitted to the Comelec its constitution and by-laws, a complete platform and system of organization and can be considered as political party in the sense that it "acts like a party and works like a party" and "enjoys the status of a party without calling itself a party, because it would involve the problem of affiliation later on.
II. This opinion is rendered by the writer subject to his dissenting opinion in the block-voting cases decided earlier on March 11, 1978, inter alia, that the block-voting device authorized for the scheduled April 7, 1978 elections violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, aside from the fact that block-voting has been proscribed and outlawed by the new provision in Article XII C, section 9 (1) of the 1973 Constitution that Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." As was stressed during the hearings then, block-voting was outlawed in the 1973 Constitution because of the massive frauds and vote-buying with which it was Identified and led to the election of unknowns and incompetents simply because of their inclusion in -the ticket of the party in power so much so that even the late great opposition leader Juan Sumulong could not be elected to the Senate in 1940 over a last hour replacement in the ticket of the party in power until the system was finally repudiated by the people which abolished it through Congress in 1951.
I wrote then that the so-called optional block-voting scheme adopted for the coming April elections is just as bad as the so-called pre-war compulsory block-voting scheme, for then, the written party's name was counted over the individual candidates' names (whether of the same or opposing parties) whereas now, the writing of the name of the party where individual candidates from other parties or independents have also been written and voted for invalidates the whole ballot and no candidate receives any vote. This is in contrast to the post-war block voting scheme (used in 1947 and 1949) wherein the individual candidates' names as written (whether from mixed parties or not) prevailed and were counted even though the party's name was also written.
It is to be noted that as late as last March 17, the newspapers reported Comelec Chairman Perez as saying that "block voting is an intricate system and the electorate is not yet fully familiar with its mechanics" and citing fieldmen's reports "that unless the current information drive is intensified there is a possibility that about 30 percent of the votes to be cast would be declared stray and null."15
Since then, the Comelec has caused to be published daily in the newspapers as set of three rules to Vote Right, as follows
VOTE RIGHT or your vote will be nullified. Follow these rules strictly:
1. For 'straight' voter: Write name of the party or group in the space provided. After that, do not write any name on the spaces for individual voting, for if you do, your vote win be nullified.
2. For 'individual' voter: Write names of your choice in the space provided. After that do not write anything in the space for party/group voting, or else your vote win also be nullified.
3. For 'mixed' voter: Here, the party or group did not nominate a full ticket. Only in such case, you can 'mix' party or group with individual candidates.
In the interest of a better understanding of the rules since we are faced with the reality of block voting now having been resurrected since its abolition in 1951 and after 5-1/2 years of no political activity, the following deficiencies and inaccuracies in the Comelec Rules should be pointed out:
Re Rule 1. For "straight" voter only the writing of the names of candidates from another party or group will nullify the vote.16 If the voter, to be sure, writes in also the names of some or all of the candidates from the same party or group for which he has voted "straight," the ballot is not nullified and in such case, all candidates of the party or group voted for shall receive one vote each.17
Re Rule 2. For "individual" voter.-Here again, only the writing of the name of another party or group to which the individual candidates voted for do not belong will nullify the vote. If the voter (to be sure that this ballot is not nullified by the writing of the name of another party or group) writes in also the name of the same party as the individual candidates he has voted for, the ballot is not nullified and will be considered as a "straight" vote for all candidates of the same party, as in Rule 1 above.18
Re Rule 3. For "mixed voter. This is of no real relevance for it is generally conceded that the KBL and petitioner LABAN are the principal protagonists in the Metro area. They both have fun tickets of 21 candidates and the "mixing" of one party with any candidate(s) of the other party nullifies the ballot. But the voter can validly "mix" the candidates from both KBL and LABAN by choosing and voting for them individually.
What appears to be of more relevance and importance to the voter who votes straight or individual is that his ballot be not invalidated by unauthorized persons "mixing" and nullifying the same by writing in the names of a candidate from the other party in his straight ballot or by writing in the name of another party to which the candidates in his individual ballot do not belong.
What the Comelec should make clear and add to its Rules being published daily, as brought out by Comelec Chairman Perez at the March 14th hearing, is that a voter who votes straight may cross out the remaining spaces for individual candidates (by circles, crosses or plain lines) to indicate his desistance from voting individually, and that a voter who votes for individual candidates may likewise cross out the top space for party voting to indicate his desistance from party voting and where he has not voted for all candidates, he may further cross out the remaining spaces for individual names to indicate his desistance from further voting.
This is plainly stated in Instruction 19 of the Comelec Instructions or the Citizens Election Committee, and should properly be disseminated for the guidance of all voters, as follows:
19. Circles, crosses or lines put on the spaces on which the voter has not voted shall be considered as signs to indicate his desistance from voting but shall not invalidate the ballot.19
Example: After writing the names of five candidates in the proper spaces, the voter crossed out the remaining space or spaces. The ballot is valid.
Footnotes
1 Main opinion at page 13, emphasis supplied.
2 Sec.140, P.D. 1296 (1978 Election Code or Decree).
3 Main opinion of Justice Barredo, at page 8.
4 Peralta vs. Comelec, L-47771 et al., March 11, 1978, Main opinion at page 15.
5 Art. XII-C, sec. 10, 1975 Constitution provides:
SEC. 10. No elective public Officer may change his political party affiliation during his term of office, and no candidate for any elective public office may change his political party affiliation within six months immediately preceding or following an election.
6 Peralta vs. Comelec, et al, see fn. 4.
7 See also main opinion, at pages 9-10.
8 Main opinion, at page 6.
9 Idem, at page 10.
10 Comelec decision, Annex E, petition, at page 7.
11 Art. XII-C, sec. 2(6).
12 Main opinion, at page 12.
13 Main opinion, at page 13, employee supplied.
14 Peralta vs. Comelec, supra, fn. 4, at pages 24- 25.
15 Times Journal issue of March 17, 1978.
16 This is Situation No. IV in the Comelec Rule on appreciation of ballots under party/group or individual voting as based on Rule 28, option 155, P.D. 1296 (1978 Election Decree). Comelec Instructions for the Citizens Election Committee, page 20.
17 Situation No III of Comelec Instructions at page 19, based on Rule 27, section 155, P.D. 1296.
18 This is also in effect covered by Situations Nos. III and IV of Comelec instructions.
19 Text copied from Rule 19, section 155, P.D. 1296, emphasis supplied.
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