G.R. No. L-27860, March 29, 1974,
♦ Decision,
Barredo, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion,
Fernando, Teehankee, [JJ]
♦ Concurring Opinion,
Makalintal, [CJ]
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1307). TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES NEWTON HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1672). PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, administrator-appellant,
vs.
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR GUZMAN, BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PEPITO IYULORES, ESPERIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA, ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFA PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, the last as Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307, appellees, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, INC., movant-appellee.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin for Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank.
Manglapus Law Office, Antonio Law Office and Rizal R. Quimpo for private respondents and appellees Avelina A. Magno, etc., et al.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
I concur on the basis of the procedural pronouncements in the opinion.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the result of dismissal of the petition for certiorari and prohibition in Cases L-27860 and L-27896 and with the affirmance of the appealed orders of the probate court in Cases L-27936-37.
I also concur with the portion of the dispositive part of the judgment penned by Mr. Justice Barredo decreeing the lifting of the Court's writ of preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967 as amended on October 4, and December 6, 19671 and ordering in lieu thereof that the Court's resolution of September 8, 19722 which directed that petitioner-appellant PCIB as administrator of C. N. (Charles Newton) Hodges' estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 and respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno as administratrix of Linnie Jane Hodges' estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) should act always conjointly never independently from each other, as such administrators, is reiterated and shall continue in force and made part of the judgment.
It is manifest from the record that petitioner-appellant PCIB's primal contention in the cases at bar belatedly filed by it with this Court on August 1, 1967 (over ten (10) years after Linnie Jane Hodges' death on May 23, 1957 and (over five (5) years after her husband C.N. Hodges' death on December 25, 1962 — during which time both estates have been pending settlement and distribution to the decedents' respective rightful heirs all this time up to now) — that the probate court per its order of December 14, 1957 (supplementing an earlier order of May 25, 1957)3 in granting C. N. Hodges' motion as Executor of his wife Linnie's estate to continue their "business of buying and selling personal and real properties" and approving "all sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages" made and to be made by him as such executor under his obligation to submit his yearly accounts in effect declared him as sole heir of his wife's estate and nothing remains to be done except to formally close her estate (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) as her estate was thereby merged with his own so that nothing remains of it that may be adjudicated to her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs after him,4 — is wholly untenable and deserves scant consideration.
Aside from having been put forth as an obvious afterthought much too late in the day, this contention of PCIB that there no longer exists any separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges after the probate court's order of December 14, 1957 goes against the very acts and judicial admissions of C.N. Hodges as her executor whereby he consistently recognized the separate existence and identity of his wife's estate apart from his own separate estate and from his own share of their conjugal partnership and estate and "never considered the whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively to himself" during the entire period that he survived her for over five (5) years up to the time of his own death on December 25, 19625 and against the identical acts and judicial admissions of PCIB as administrator of C.N. Hodges' estate until PCIB sought in 1966 to take over both estates as pertaining to its sole administration.
PCIB is now barred and estopped from contradicting or taking a belated position contradictory to or inconsistent with its previous admissions 6 (as well as those of C.N. Hodges himself in his lifetime and of whose estate PCIB is merely an administrator) recognizing the existence and identity of Linnie Jane Hodges' separate estate and the legal rights and interests therein of her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs in her will.
PCIB's petition for certiorari and prohibition to declare all acts of the probate court in Linnie Jane Hodges' estate subsequent to its order of December 14, 1957 as "null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction" must therefore be dismissed with the rejection of its belated and untenable contention that there is no longer any estate of Mrs. Hodges of which respondent Avelina Magno is the duly appointed and acting administratrix.
PCIB's appeal7 from the probate court's various orders recognizing respondent Magno as administratrix of Linnie's estate (Sp. Proc No. 1307) and sanctioning her acts of administration of said estate and approving the sales contracts executed by her with the various individual appellees, which involve basically the same primal issue raised in the petition as to whether there still exists a separate estate of Linnie of which respondent-appellee Magno may continue to be the administratrix, must necessarily fail — a result of the Court's main opinion at bar that there does exist such an estate and that the two estates (husband's and wife's) must be administered cojointly by their respective administrators (PCIB and Magno).
The dispositive portion of the main opinion
The main opinion disposes that:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition in G. R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, and AFFIRMING, in G. R. Nos. L-27936-37 and the other thirty-one numbers hereunder ordered to be added after payment of the corresponding docket fees, all the orders of the trial court under appeal enumerated in detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this decision:
The existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix thereof is recognized, and
It is declared that, until final judgment is ultimately rendered regarding (1) the manner of applying Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines to the situation obtaining in these cases and (2) the factual and legal issues of whether or not Charles Newton Hodges has effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under the will of Linnie Jane Hodges, the said estate consists of one-fourth of the community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until his death, provided, first, that with respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue to be part of the wife's estate, unless subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third parties by the husband, and second, that should the purported renunciation be declared legally effective, no deduction whatsoever are to be made from said estate;
In consequence, the preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967, as amended on October 4 and December 6, 1967, is lifted and the resolution of September 8, 1972, directing that petitioner-appellant PCIB, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges in Special Proceedings 1672, and respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges in Special Proceedings 1307, should act thenceforth always conjointly, never independently from each other, as such administrators, is reiterated, and the same is made part of this judgment and shall continue in force, pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of the deceased spouses and the determination and segregation from each other of their respective estates; provided, that upon the finality of this judgment, the trial court should immediately proceed to the partition of the presently combined estates of the spouses, to the end that the one-half share thereof of Mrs. Hodges may be properly and clearly identified;
Thereafter, the trial court should forthwith segregate the remainder of the one-fourth herein adjudged to be her estate and cause the same to be turned over or delivered to respondent for her exclusive administration in Special Proceedings 1307, while the other one-fourth shall remain under the joint administrative of said respondent and petitioner under a joint proceedings in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, whereas the half unquestionably pertaining to Hodges shall be administered by petitioner exclusively in Special Proceedings 1672, without prejudice to the resolution by the trial court of the pending motions for its removal as administrator;
And this arrangement shall be maintained until the final resolution of the two issues of renvoi and renunciation hereby reserved for further hearing and determination, and the corresponding complete segregation and partition of the two estates in the proportions that may result from the said resolution.
Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo are directed to adhere henceforth, in all their actuations in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to the views passed and ruled upon by the Court in the foregoing opinion.8
Minimum estimate of Mrs. Hodges' estate:
One-fourth of conjugal properties.
The main opinion in declaring the existence of a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges which shall pass to her brothers and sisters with right of representation (by their heirs) as her duly designated heirs declares that her estate consists as a minimum (i.e. assuming (1) that under Article 16 of the Philippine Civil Code C. N. Hodges as surviving husband was entitled to one-half of her estate as legitime and (2) that he had not effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under her will) of "one-fourth of the community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death of the wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until his death," with the proviso that proceeds of remunerative dispositions or sales for valuable consideration made by C. N. Hodges after his wife Linnie's death shall continue to be part of her estate unless subsequently disposed of by him gratuitously to third parties subject to the condition, however, that if he is held to have validly and effectively renounced his inheritance under his wife's will, no deductions of any dispositions made by Hodges even if gratuitously are to be made from his wife Linnie's estate which shall pass intact to her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs called in her will to succeed to her estate upon the death of her husband C. N. Hodges.ℒαwρhi৷
Differences with the main opinion
I do not share the main opinion's view that Linnie Jane Hodges instituted her husband as her heir under her will "to have dominion over all her estate during his lifetime ... as absolute owner of the properties ..."9 and that she bequeathed "the whole of her estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them only during his lifetime, which means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence of any remainder of her estate then."10
As will be amplified hereinafter, I do not subscribe to such a view that Linnie Jane Hodges willed "full and absolute ownership" and "absolute dominion" over her estate to her husband, but rather that she named her husband C. N. Hodges and her brothers and sisters as instituted heirs with a term under Article 885 of our Civil Code, to wit, Hodges as instituted heir with a resolutory term whereunder his right to the succession ceased in diem upon arrival of the resolutory term of his death on December 25, 1962 and her brothers and sisters as instituted heirs with a suspensive term whereunder their right to the succession commenced ex die upon arrival of the suspensive term of the death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962.
Hence, while agreeing with the main opinion that the proceeds of all remunerative dispositions made by C. N. Hodges after his wife's death remain an integral part of his wife's estate which she willed to her brothers and sisters, I submit that C. N. Hodges could not validly make gratuitous dispositions of any part or all of his wife's estate — "completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself" in the language of the main opinion, supra — and thereby render ineffectual and nugatory her institution of her brothers and sisters as her designated heirs to succeed to her whole estate "at the death of (her) husband." If according to the main opinion, Hodges could not make such gratuitous "complete and absolute dispositions" of his wife Linnie's estate "mortis causa," it would seem that by the same token and rationale he was likewise proscribed by the will from making such dispositions of Linnie's estate inter vivos.
I believe that the two questions of renvoi and renunciation should be resolved preferentially and expeditiously by the probate court ahead of the partition and segregation of the minimum one-fourth of the conjugal or community properties constituting Linnie Jane Hodges' separate estate, which task considering that it is now seventeen (17) years since Linnie Jane Hodges' death and her conjugal estate with C. N. Hodges has remained unliquidated up to now might take a similar number of years to unravel with the numerous items, transactions and details of the sizable estates involved.
Such partition of the minimum one-fourth would not be final, since if the two prejudicial questions of renvoi and renunciation were resolved favorably to Linnie's estate meaning to say that if it should be held that C. N. Hodges is not entitled to any legitime of her estate and at any rate he had totally renounced his inheritance under the will), then Linnie's estate would consist not only of the minimum one-fourth but one-half of the conjugal or community properties of the Hodges spouses, which would require again the partition and segregation of still another one-fourth of said. properties to complete Linnie's separate estate.
My differences with the main opinion involve further the legal concepts, effects and consequences of the testamentary dispositions of Linnie Jane Hodges in her will and the question of the best to reach a solution of the pressing question of expediting the closing of the estates which after all do not appear to involve any outstanding debts nor any dispute between the heirs and should therefore be promptly settled now after all these years without any further undue complications and delays and distributed to the heirs for their full enjoyment and benefit. As no consensus appears to have been reached thereon by a majority of the Court, I propose to state views as concisely as possible with the sole end in view that they may be of some assistance to the probate court and the parties in reaching an expeditious closing and settlement of the estates of the Hodges spouses.
Two Assumptions
As indicated above, the declaration of the minimum of Mrs. Hodges' estate as one-fourth of the conjugal properties is based on two assumptions most favorable to C. N. Hodges' estate and his heirs, namely (1) that the probate court must accept the renvoi or "reference back"11 allegedly provided by the laws of the State of Texas (of which state the Hodges spouses were citizens) whereby the civil laws of the Philippines as the domicile of the Hodges spouses would govern their succession notwithstanding the provisions of Article 16 of our Civil Code (which provides that the national law of the decedents, in this case, of Texas, shall govern their succession) with the result that her estate would consist of no more than one-fourth of the conjugal properties since the legitime of her husband (the other one-fourth of said conjugal properties or one-half of her estate, under Article 900 of our Civil Code) could not then be disposed of nor burdened with any condition by her and (2) that C.N. Hodges had not effectively and legally renounced his inheritance under his wife's will.
These two assumptions are of course flatly disputed by respondent-appellee Magno as Mrs. Hodges' administratrix, who avers that the law of the State of Texas governs her succession and does not provide for and legitime, hence, her brothers and sisters are entitled to succeed to the whole of her share of the conjugal properties which is one-half thereof and that in any event, Hodges had totally renounced all his rights under the will.
The main opinion concedes that "(I)n the interest of settling the estates herein involved soonest, it would be best, indeed, if these conflicting claims of the parties were determined in these proceedings." It observes however that this cannot be done due to the inadequacy of the evidence submitted by the parties in the probate court and of the parties' discussion, viz, "there is no clear and reliable proof of what the possibly applicable laws of Texas are. Then also, the genuineness of the documents relied upon by respondent Magno [re Hodges' renunciation] is disputed."12
Hence, the main opinion expressly reserves resolution and determination on these two conflicting claims and issues which it deems "are not properly before the Court now,"13 and specifically holds that "(A)ccordingly, the only question that remains to be settled in the further proceedings hereby ordered to be held in the court below is how much more than as fixed above is the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and this would depend on (1) whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more, such as, when there is no legitime provided therein, and (2) whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges."14
Suggested guidelines
Considering that the only unresolved issue has thus been narrowed down and in consonance with the ruling spirit of our probate law calling for the prompt settlement of the estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance — considering that the estates have been long pending settlement since 1957 and 1962, respectively — it was felt that the Court should lay down specific guidelines for the guidance of the probate court towards the end that it may expedite the closing of the protracted estates proceedings below to the mutual satisfaction of the heirs and without need of a dissatisfied party elevating its resolution of this only remaining issue once more to this Court and dragging out indefinitely the proceedings.
After all, the only question that remains depends for its determination on the resolution of the two questions of renvoi and renunciation, i.e. as to whether C. N. Hodges can claim a legitime and whether he had renounced the inheritance. But as already indicated above, the Court without reaching a consensus which would finally resolve the conflicting claims here and now in this case opted that "these and other relevant matters should first be threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedings hereinafter to be held for the purpose of ascertaining and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her duly probated will."15
The writer thus feels that laying down the premises and principles governing the nature, effects and consequences of Linnie Jane Hodges' testamentary dispositions in relation to her conjugal partnership and co-ownership of properties with her husband C. N. Hodges and "thinking out" the end results, depending on whether the evidence directed to be formally received by the probate court would bear out that under renvoi C. N. Hodges was or was not entitled to claim a legitime of one-half of his wife Linnie's estate and/or that he had or had not effectively and validly renounced his inheritance should help clear the decks, as it were, and assist the probate court in resolving the only remaining question of how much more than the minimum one-fourth of the community properties of the Hodges spouses herein finally determined should be awarded as the separate estate of Linnie, particularly since the views expressed in the main opinion have not gained a consensus of the Court. Hence, the following suggested guidelines, which needless to state, represent the personal opinion and views of the writer:
1. To begin with, as pointed out in the main opinion, "according to Hodges' own inventory submitted by him as executor of the estate of his wife, practically all their properties were conjugal which means that the spouses have equal shares therein."16
2. Upon the death of Mrs. Hodges on May 23, 1957, and the dissolution thereby of the marriage, the law imposed upon Hodges as surviving husband the duty of inventorying, administering and liquidating the conjugal or community property.17 Hodges failed to discharge this duty of liquidating the conjugal partnership and estate. On the contrary, he sought and obtained authorization from the probate court to continue the conjugal partnership's business of buying and selling real and personal properties.
In his annual accounts submitted to the probate court as executor of Mrs. Hodges' estate, Hodges thus consistently reported the considerable combined income (in six figures) of the conjugal partnership or coownership and then divided the same equally between himself and Mrs. Hodges' estate and as consistently filed separate income tax returns and paid the income taxes for each resulting half of such combined income corresponding to his own and to Mrs. Hodges' estate. 18 (Parenthetically, he could not in law do this, had he adjudicated Linnie's entire estate to himself, thus supporting the view advanced even in the main opinion that "Hodges waived not only his rights to the fruits but to the properties themselves."19
By operation of the law of trust20 as well as by his own acknowledgment and acts, therefore, all transactions made by Hodges after his wife's death were deemed for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership and community estate and were so reported and treated by him.
3. With this premise established that all transactions of Hodges after his wife's death were for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership and community estate, share and share alike, it should be clear that no gratuitous dispositions, if any, made by C. N. Hodges from his wife Linnie's estate should be deducted from her separate estate as held in the main opinion. On the contrary, any such gratuitous dispositions should be charged to his own share of the conjugal estate since he had no authority or right to make any gratuitous dispositions of Linnie's properties to the prejudice of her brothers and sisters whom she called to her succession upon his death, not to mention that the very authority obtained by him from the probate court per its orders of May 25, and December 14, 1957 was to continue the conjugal partnership's business of buying and selling real properties for the account of their unliquidated conjugal estate and co-ownership, share and share alike and not to make any free dispositions of Linnie's estate.
4. All transactions as well after the death on December 25, 1962 of Hodges himself appear perforce and necessarily to have been conducted, on the same premise, for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership and/or co-ownership, share and share alike — since the conjugal partnership remained unliquidated — which is another way of saying that such transactions, purchases and sales, mostly the latter, must be deemed in effect to have been made for the respective estates of C. N. Hodges and of his wife Linnie Jane Hodges, as both estates continued to have an equal stake and share in the conjugal partnership which was not only left unliquidated but continued as a co-ownership or joint business with the probate court's approval by Hodges during the five-year period that he survived his wife.
This explains the probate court's action of requiring that deeds of sale executed by PCIB as Hodges' estate's administrator be "signed jointly" by respondent Magno as Mrs. Hodges' estate's administratrix, as well as its order authorizing payment by lot purchasers from the Hodges to either estate, since "there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto."22
And this equally furnishes the rationale of the main opinion for continued conjoint administration by the administrators of the two estates of the deceased spouses, "pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership,"23 since "it is but logical that both estates should be administered jointly by the representatives of both, pending their segregation from each other. Particularly ... because the actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance." 24 5. Antly by the representatives of both, pending their segregation from each other. Particularly ... because the actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance."24
5. As stressed in the main opinion, the determination of the only unresolved issue of how much more than the minimum of one-fourth of the community or conjugal properties of the Hodges spouses pertains to Mrs. Hodges' estate depends on the twin questions of renunciation and renvoi. It directed consequently that "a joint hearing of the two probate proceedings herein involved" be held by the probate court for the reception of "further evidence" in order to finally resolved these twin questions.25
(a) On the question of renunciation, it is believed that all that the probate court has to do is to receive formally in evidence the various documents annexed to respondent Magno's answer at bar,26 namely: Copy of the U.S. Estate Tax Return filed on August 8, 1958 by C. N. Hodges for his wife Linnie's estate wherein he purportedly declared that he was renouncing his inheritance under his wife's will in favor of her brothers and sisters as co-heirs designated with him and that it was his "intention (as) surviving husband of the deceased to distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in their community estate to the devisee and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid;"27 and
The affidavit of ratification of such renunciation (which places him in estoppel) allegedly executed on August 9, 1962 by C. N. Hodges in Iloilo City wherein he reaffirmed that "... on August 8, 1958, I renounced and disclaimed any and all right to receive the rents, emoluments and income from said estate" and further declared that "(T)he purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm, and I do hereby ratify and confirm, the declaration made in schedule M of said return and hereby formally disclaim and renounce any right on my part to receive any of the said rents, emoluments and income from the estate of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. This affidavit is made to absolve me or my estate from any liability for the payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges since the death of the said Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957."28
(b) On the question of renvoi, all that remains for the probate court to do is to formally receive in evidence duly authenticated copies of the laws of the State of Texas governing the succession of Linnie Jane Hodges and her husband C. N. Hodges as citizens of said State at the time of their respective deaths on May 23, 1957 and December 25, 1962.29
6. The text and tenor of the declarations by C. N. Hodges of renunciation of his inheritance from his wife in favor of her other named heirs in her will (her brothers and sisters and their respective heirs) as ratified and reiterated expressly in his affidavit of renunciation executed four years later for the avowed purpose of not being held liable for payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to his wife's estate since her death indicate a valid and effective renunciation.
Once the evidence has been formally admitted and its genuineness and legal effectivity established by the probate court, the renunciation by C. N. Hodges must be given due effect with the result that C. N. Hodges therefore acquired no part of his wife's one-half share of the community properties since he removed himself as an heir by virtue of his renunciation. By simple substitution then under Articles 857 and 859 of our Civil Code30 and by virtue of the will's institution of heirs, since "the heir originally instituted C. N. Hodges) does not become an heir"31 by force of his renunciation, Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters whom she designated as her heirs upon her husband's death are called immediately to her succession.
Consequently, the said community and conjugal properties would then pertain pro indiviso share and share alike to their respective estates, with each estate, however, shouldering its own expenses of administration, estate and inheritance taxes, if any remain unpaid, attorneys' fees and other like expenses and the net remainder to be adjudicated directly to the decedents' respective brothers and sisters (and their heirs) as the heirs duly designated in their respective wills. The question of renvoi becomes immaterial since most laws and our laws permit such renunciation of inheritance.
7. If there were no renunciation (or the same may somehow be declared to have not been valid and effective) by C. N. Hodges of his inheritance from his wife, however, what would be the consequence?
(a) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do provide for renvoi or "reference back" to Philippine law as the domiciliary law of the Hodges' spouses governing their succession, then petitioners' view that Mrs. Hodges' estate would consist only of the minimum of "one-fourth of the community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of (her) death on May 23, 1957" would have to be sustained and C. N. Hodges' estate would consist of three-fourths of the community properties, comprising his own one-half (or two-fourths) share and the other fourth of Mrs. Hodges' estate as the legitime granted him as surviving spouse by Philippine law (Article 900 of the Civil Code) which could not be disposed of nor burdened with any condition by Mrs. Hodges as testatrix.
(b) If the laws on succession of the State of Texas do not provide for such renvoi and respondent Magno's assertion is correct that the Texas law which would then prevail, provides for no legitime for C. N. Hodges as the surviving spouse, then respondent Magno's assertion that Mrs. Hodges' estate would consist of one-half of the community properties (with the other half pertaining to C. N. Hodges) would have to be sustained. The community and conjugal properties would then pertain share and share alike to their respective estates, with each estate shouldering its own expenses of administration in the same manner stated in the last paragraph of paragraph 6 hereof. .
8. As to the nature of the institution of heirs made by Mrs. Hodges in her will, the main opinion holds that "(T)he brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges; rather, they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges," but goes further and holds that "it was not the usufruct alone of her estate ... that she bequeathed to Hodges during his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although the same was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there was no restriction against his disposing or conveying the whole or any portion thereof anybody other than himself" and describes Hodges "as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over Mrs. Hodges' estate (except over their Lubbock, Texas property ),32 adding that "Hodges was not obliged to preserve anything for them" (referring to Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters as instituted co-heirs).33
Contrary to this view of the main opinion, the writer submits that the provisions of Mrs. Hodges' will did not grant to C.N. Hodges "full ownership" nor "absolute dominion" over her estate, such that he could as "universal and sole heir" by the mere expedient of gratuitously disposing to third persons her whole estate during his lifetime nullify her institution of her brothers and sisters as his co-heirs to succeed to her whole estate "at the death of (her) husband," deprive them of any inheritance and make his own brothers and sisters in effect sole heirs not only of his own estate but of his wife's estate as well.
Thus, while Linnie Jane Hodges did not expressly name her brothers and sisters as substitutes for Hodges because she willed that they would enter into the succession upon his death, still it cannot be gainsaid, as the main opinion concedes, "that they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject however to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law."34
Hence, if Hodges is found to have validly renounced his inheritance, there would be a substitution of heirs in fact and in law since Linnie's brothers and sisters as the heirs "simultaneously instituted" with a suspensive term would be called immediately to her succession instead of waiting for the arrival of suspensive term of Hodges' death, since as the heir originally instituted he does not become an heir by force of his renunciation and therefore they would "enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted" (Hodges) under the provisions of Article 857 and 859 of our Civil Code, supra,35 thus accelerating their succession to her estate as a consequence of Hodges' renunciation.
Consequently, Linnie Jane Hodges willed that her husband C.N. Hodges would "during his natural lifetime ... manage, control, use and enjoy said estate" and that only "all rents, emoluments and income" alone shall belong to him. She further willed that while he could sell and purchase properties of her estate, and "use any part of the principal estate," such principal notwithstanding "any changes in the physical properties of said estate"(i.e. new properties acquired or exchanged) would still pertain to her estate, which at the time of his death would pass in full dominion to her brothers and sisters as the ultimate sole and universal heirs of her estate.36
The testatrix Linnie Jane Hodges in her will thus principally provided that "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real ... to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold with him ... during his natural lifetime;"37 that "(he) shall have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, ... to make any changes in the physical properties of said estate, by sale ... and the purchase of any other or additional property as he may think best ... . All rents, emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him and he is further authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire, ... he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the improved property now owned by us, located at ... City of Lubbock, Texas ... . He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein, and may sell unimproved town lots;"38 that "(A)t the death of my said husband, Charles Newton, I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both personal and real, ... to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike, namely: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Roman and Nimroy Higdon;"39 and that "(I)n case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters ... prior to the death of my husband ... the heirs of such deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the share which would have gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived."40
Such provisions are wholly consistent with the view already fully expounded above that all transactions and sales made by Hodges after his wife Linnie's death were by operation of the law of trust as well as by his own acknowledgment and acts deemed for and on behalf of their unliquidated conjugal partnership and community estate, share and share alike, with the express authorization of the probate court per its orders of May 25, and December 14, 1957 granting Hodges' motion to continue the conjugal partnership business of buying and selling real estate even after her death. By the same token, Hodges could not conceivably be deemed to have had any authority or right to dispose gratuitously of any portion of her estate to whose succession she had called her brothers and sisters upon his death.
9. Such institutions of heirs with a term are expressly recognized and permitted under Book III, Chapter 2, section 4 of our Civil Code dealing with "conditional testamentary dispositions and testamentary dispositions with a term."41
Thus, Article 885 of our Civil Code expressly provides that:
ART 885. The designation of the day or time when the effects of the institution of an heir shall commence or cease shall be valid.
In both cases, the legal heir shall be considered as called to the succession until the arrival of the period or its expiration. But in the first case he shall not enter into possession of the property until after having given sufficient security, with the intervention of the instituted heir.
Accordingly, under the terms of Mrs. Hodges' will, her husband's right to the succession as the instituted heir ceased in diem, i.e. upon the arrival of the resolutory term of his death on December 25, 1962, while her brothers' and sisters' right to the succession also as instituted heirs commenced ex die, i.e. upon the expiration of the suspensive term (as far as they were concerned) of the death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962 .42
As stated in Padilla's treatise on the Civil Code, "A term is a period whose arrival is certain although the exact date thereof may be uncertain. A term may have either a suspensive or a resolutory effect. The designation of the day when the legacy "shall commence" is ex die, or a term with a suspensive effect, from a certain day. The designation of the day when the legacy "shall cease" is in diem or a term with a resolutory effect, until a certain day." He adds that "A legacy based upon a certain age or upon the death of a person is not a condition but a term. If the arrival of the term would commence the right of the heir, it is suspensive. If the arrival of the term would terminate his right, it is resolutory" and that "upon the arrival of the period, in case of a suspensive term, the instituted heir is entitled to the succession, and in case of a resolutory term, his right terminates."43
10. The sizable estates herein involved have now been pending settlement for a considerably protracted period (of seventeen years counted from Linnie's death in 1957), and all that is left to be done is to resolve the only remaining issue (involving the two questions of renunciation and renvoi) hereinabove discussed in order to close up the estates and finally effect distribution to the deceased spouses' respective brothers and sisters and their heirs as the heirs duly instituted in their wills long admitted to probate. Hence, it is advisable for said instituted heirs and their heirs in turn44 to come to terms for the adjudication and distribution to them pro-indiviso of the up to now unliquidated community properties of the estates of the Hodges spouses (derived from their unliquidated conjugal partnership) rather than to get bogged down with the formidable task of physically segregating and partitioning the two estates with the numerous transactions, items and details and physical changes of properties involved. The estates proceedings would thus be closed and they could then name their respective attorneys-in-fact to work out the details of segregating, dividing or partitioning the unliquidated community properties or liquidating them — which can be done then on their own without further need of intervention on the part of the probate court as well as allow them meanwhile to enjoy and make use of the income and cash and liquid assets of the estates in such manner as may be agreed upon between them.
Such a settlement or modus vivendi between the heirs of the unliquidated two estates for the mutual benefit of all of them should not prove difficult, considering that it appears as stated in the main opinion that 22.968149% of the share or undivided estate of C. N. Hodges have already been acquired by the heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges from certain heirs of her husband, while certain other heirs representing 17.34375% of Hodges' estate were joining cause with Linnie's heirs in their pending and unresolved motion for the removal of petitioner PCIB as administrator of Hodges' estate,45 apparently impatient with the situation which has apparently degenerated into a running battle between the administrators of the two estates to the common prejudice of all the heirs.
11. As earlier stated, the writer has taken the pain of suggesting these guidelines which may serve to guide the probate court as well as the parties towards expediting the winding up and closing of the estates and the distribution of the net estates to the instituted heirs and their successors duly entitled thereto. The probate court should exert all effort towards this desired objective pursuant to the mandate of our probate law, bearing in mind the Court's admonition in previous cases that "courts of first instance should exert themselves to close up estate within twelve months from the time they are presented, and they may refuse to allow any compensation to executors and administrators who do not actively labor to that end, and they may even adopt harsher measures."46
Timeliness of appeals and imposition of thirty-one (31) additional docket feesℒαwρhi৷
Two appeals were docketed with this Court, as per the two records on appeal submitted (one with a green cover and the other with a yellow cover). As stated at the outset, these appeals involve basically the same primal issue raised in the petition for certiorari as to whether there still exists a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges which has to continue to be administered by respondent Magno. Considering the main opinion's ruling in the affirmative and that her estate and that of her husband (since they jointly comprise unliquidated community properties) must be administered conjointly by their respective administrators (PCIB and Magno), the said appeals (involving thirty-three different orders of the probate court approving sales contracts and other acts of administration executed and performed by respondent Magno on behalf of Linnie's estate) have been necessarily overruled by the Court's decision at bar.
(a) The "priority question" raised by respondent Magno as to the patent failure of the two records on appeal to show on their face and state the material data that the appeals were timely taken within the 30-day reglamentary period as required by Rule 41, section 6 of the Rules of Court, has been brushed aside by the main opinion with the statement that it is "not necessary to pass upon the timeliness of any of said appeals" since they "revolve around practically the same main issues and ... it is admitted that some of them have been timely taken."47 The main opinion thus proceeded with the determination of the thirty-three appealed orders despite the grave defect of the appellant PCIB's records on appeal and their failure to state the required material data showing the timeliness of the appeals.
Such disposition of the question of timeliness deemed as "mandatory and jurisdictional" in a number of cases merits the writer's concurrence in that the question raised has been subordinated to the paramount considerations of substantial justice and a "liberal interpretation of the rules" applied so as not to derogate and detract from the primary intent and purpose of the rules, viz "the proper and just determination of a litigation"48 — which calls for "adherence to a liberal construction of the procedural rules in order to attain their objective of substantial justice and of avoiding denials of substantial justice due to procedural technicalities."49
Thus, the main opinion in consonance with the same paramount considerations of substantial justice has likewise overruled respondents' objection to petitioner's taking the recourse of "the present remedy of certiorari and prohibition" — "despite the conceded availability of appeal" — on the ground that "there is a common thread among the basic issues involved in all these thirty-three appeals — (which) deal with practically the same basic issues that can be more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single special civil action . . . "50
(b) Since the basic issues have been in effect resolved in the special civil action at bar (as above stated) with the dismissal of the petition by virtue of the Court's judgment as to the continued existence of a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and the affirmance as a necessary consequence of the appealed orders approving and sanctioning respondent Magno's sales contracts and acts of administration, some doubt would arise as to the propriety of the main opinion requiring the payment by PCIB of thirty-one (31) additional appeal docket fees. This doubt is further enhanced by the question of whether it would make the cost of appeal unduly expensive or prohibitive by requiring the payment of a separate appeal docket fee for each incidental order questioned when the resolution of all such incidental questioned orders involve basically one and the same main issue (in this case, the existence of a separate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges) and can be more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single special civil action" (for which a single docket fee is required) as stated in the main opinion.51 Considering the importance of the basic issues and the magnitude of the estates involved, however, the writer has pro hac vice given his concurrence to the assessment of the said thirty-one (31) additional appeal docket fees.
Footnotes
1 This writ enjoined respondent court from acting in Sp. Proc. No. 1307 (Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges) and respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno from interfering and intervening therein, pending determination of the main issue raised by petitioner-appellant PCIB as to whether or not Mrs. Hodges' estate continued to exist as such so as to require the services of said Avelina A. Magno as administratrix thereof in view of PCIB's contention that her (Mrs. Hodges') entire estate had been adjudicated in 1957 by the probate court to her surviving husband C. N. Hodges as "the only devisee or legatee" under her will, which contention has now been rejected in the Court's decision at bar.
2 This resolution was based on "the inherent fairness of allowing the administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges [Avelina A. Magno] to jointly administer the properties, rights and interests comprising both estates [Linnie Jane Hodges' and that of her husband C. N. Hodges] until they are separated from each other" in order to give adequate protection to the rights and interests of their respective brothers and sisters as their designated heirs rather than "if the whole [both] proceedings were to be under the administration of the estate of Mr. Hodges [PCIB] to the exclusion of any representative of the heirs of Mrs. Hodges."
3 See page 5 et seq of main opinion.
4 See page 91 et seq of main opinion.
5 See page 100 of main opinion.
6 "Sec. 2. Judicial Admissions. — Admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings do not require proof and can not be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake." (Rule 129). See also 5 Moran's 1970 Ed. 65 and cases cited.
7 See p. 114-1 et seq. of main opinion.
8 At pp., 136-137 of main opinion; paragraphing and emphasis supplied.
9 At page 121 of main opinion.
10 At pages 110-11 of main opinion.
11 See In re: Testate Estate of Edward E. Christiansen, deceased, Aznar vs. Garcia, 7 SCRA 95, 103, 107 (1963).
12 At p. 112, main opinion. See also p. 103, where the main opinion refers to still other documents evidencing Hodges' renunciation and observes that "we cannot close our eyes to their existence in the record." (emphasis supplied).
13 At p. 113, main opinion.
14 At p. 114-I, main opinion, emphasis supplied.
15 At page 112, main opinion.
16 At page 109, main opinion; emphasis supplied.
17 "SEC 2. Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. — When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either." (Rule 73) 18 At pp. 129-130, main opinion.
19 At page 103, main opinion, fn. 5.
20 Pamittan vs. Lasam, 60 Phil. 908 (1934), where the Court stressed the "high degree of trust" reposed in the surviving husband as "owner of a half interest in his own right of the conjugal estate which he was charged to administer" and that the conjugal property which thus comes into his possession upon his wife's death "remains conjugal property, a continuing and subsisting trust" for as long as it remains unliquidated.
21 Order of August 6, 1965, p. 248 Green Record on Appeal; see p. 30, main opinion.
22 Appealed order of November 23, 1965 against Western Institute of Technology, Inc. as purchaser-appellee, pp. 334-335, Green Rec. on App. see pp. 33-34, main opinion.
23 At p. 137, main opinion.
24 At pp. 108-109, main opinion.
25 At p. 114, main opinion, which notes that "the question of what are the laws of Texas governing the matter here in issue is . . . one of fact, not of law."
26 See p. 102 et seq. main opinion; Annexes 4 and 5 Answer, pp. 163-264 of Rollo.
27 Annex 4, Answer, p. 263 of Rollo; emphasis supplied. 28 Annex 5, Answer, see p. 103, main opinion; emphasis supplied. 29 See pp. 114 et seq. main opinion.
30 "ART. 857. Substitution is the appointment of another heir so that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted." (Civil Code)
"ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish, or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance.
"A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall comprise the three mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided." (Civil Code, emphasis supplied)
31 6 Manresa 116, cited in III Padilla's Civil Code 1973 Ed., p. 241.
32 At pp. 110-112, main opinion; emphasis supplied.
33 At p. 134, main opinion.
34 At page 110, main opinion.
35 Text reproduced in fn. 30 hereof.
36 C.N. Hodges' own will contained identical provisions in favor of his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges to "manage, control, use and enjoy (his)estate during her lifetime" and making specific bequests of his whole estate to his full and half-brothers and sisters in clauses Fifth to Tenth thereof all "at the death of my said wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. "At p. 18 et seq. main opinion.
37 Second of seven clauses of will, emphasis supplied.
38 Third clause of will, idem.
39 Fourth clause of will, idem.
40 Fifth clause of will, idem.
41 Art. 871, Civil Code provides that "(T)he institution of an heir may he made conditionally, or for a certain purpose or cause."
42 An analogous case is found in Crisologo vs. Singson, 4 SCRA 491 (1962) where the testatrix provided that the property willed by her to a grandniece was to pass to her brothers "to be effective or to take place upon the death of the (grandniece)" — whether this happens before or after the testatrix's own death.
43 Padilla's Civil Code, 1973 Ed. p. 284. The main opinion at pp. 110-111 also concedes the suspensive and resolutory effects of Mrs. Hodges' institution of heirs.
44 Linnie Jane Hodges' brothers and sisters at her death on May 23, 1957 had ages ranging from 62 to 74 yrs. (except for Nimroy Higdon who was then 50 yrs. old) and most likely have all passed away or are already too old to enjoy their inheritance. Green Rec. on Appeal, p. 2.
45 At page 89-a, main opinion.
46 Medina et al. vs. C. A., L-34760, September 28, 1973, citing Lizarraga Hnos. vs. Abada, 40 Phil. 124 and other cases.
47 At p. 90, main opinion.
48 Ronquillo vs. Marasigan, 5 SCRA 304, cited in Berkenkotter vs. C.A., L-36629, September 28, 1973, per Esguerra, J.
49 See the writer's concurring op. in Sison vs. Gatchalian, L-34709, June 15, 1973 and dissenting op. in Velasco vs. C.A., L-31018, June 29, 1973.
50 At pp. 90-91, main opinion.
51 At p. 91, main opinion.
Separate Opinions
MAKALINTAL, C.J., concurring:
I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Teehankee, which in turn agrees with the dispositive portion of the main opinion of Justice Barredo insofar as it dismisses the petition for certiorari and prohibition in Cases L-27860 and L-27896 and affirms the appealed orders of the probate court in cases L-27936-37.
However, I wish to make one brief observation for the sake of accuracy. Regardless of whether or not C. N. Hodges was entitled to a legitime in his deceased wife's estate — which question, still to be decided by the said probate court, may depend upon what is the law of Texas and upon its applicability in the present case — the said estate consists of one-half, not one-fourth, of the conjugal properties. There is neither a minimum of one-fourth nor a maximum beyond that. It is important to bear this in mind because the estate of Linnie Hodges consists of her share in the conjugal properties, is still under administration and until now has not been distributed by order of the court.
The reference in both the main and separate opinions to a one-fourth portion of the conjugal properties as Linnie Hodges' minimum share is a misnomer and is evidently meant only to indicate that if her husband should eventually be declared entitled to a legitime, then the disposition made by Linnie Hodges in favor of her collateral relatives would be valid only as to one-half of her share, or one-fourth of the conjugal properties, since the remainder, which constitutes such legitime, would necessarily go to her husband in absolute ownership, unburdened by any substitution, term or condition, resolutory or otherwise. And until the estate is finally settled and adjudicated to the heirs who may be found entitled to it, the administration must continue to cover Linnie's entire conjugal share.
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