EN BANC
A.C. No. 134-J January 21, 1974
IN RE: THE HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH I, SILAY CITY.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
The high quality of craftsmanship that is so typical of the work of Justice Antonio is once again in evidence. What is more, his opinion for the Court is so well-researched and so thorough that to add a few words might yield the impression that to do so is to magnify a trifling difference. That risk, if so it is, I take if only to give expression to a point of view not infused with too great a significance, I must admit, but possessed, in my way of thinking, of an implication that did preclude a full and complete acceptance of what is set forth in the dispositive portion of the decision of the Court. Hence this brief concurrence.
In addition to exonerating respondent Judge of charges filed against him by another city fiscal, Norberto L. Zulueta of Capiz, the resolution of this Court would censure the complainant for the use of offensive and abusive language. On both grounds, I am fully in agreement. I am not, at this stage, prepared to go along, however, with the last clause in the dispositive portion of our resolution with its "warning that repetition of the same may strain Us to impose a more severe sanction."1 It is that such a penalty would be inappropriate. Certainly, a proper sense of decorum, not to say the degree of civility expected of a dignitary like a city fiscal, ought to have cautioned against resort to what Dean Pound aptly termed epithetical jurisprudence. To paraphrase the then Justice Bengzon in Lagumbay v. Comelec,2 the employment of intemperate language serves no purpose but to detract from the force of the argument. That is to put at its mildest a well-deserved reproach to such a propensity. A member of the bar who has given vent to such expression of ill will, not to say malevolence, betrays gross disrespect not only to the adverse party, but also to this Tribunal. That is not all there is to the matter though. I view with a certain degree of misgiving, perhaps not altogether justified, the warning is to the more severe penalty to be inflicted in case of a repetition of such offense thus made the dispositive portion of the opinion for, to my mind, it could, in some way, however slight, limit the freedom of a future Court to deal with such a situation if and when it occurs. It is only in that sense that I am unable to the rest of my colleagues in yielding complete and unconditional assent to the highly persuasive and otherwise impeccable opinion of Justice Antonio.
Footnotes
1 Adm. Case No. 134-J.
2 L-25444, January 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 175.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the result of the main opinion of Mr. Justice Antonio, which exonerates respondent judge of the charges, since a judicial officer required to exercise his judgment or discretion who in the process acquits an accused on grounds of reasonable doubt in view of his non-identification by the prosecution witnesses (notwithstanding his admission and "the damaging inferences derived from his staying away (as a newly elected councilor) from the ceremony (on January 1, 1968) when the newly-elected officials of Bantayan (Cebu) were inducted into office" as he was charged with participation in the pirate raid in Cadiz City on the night of December 31, 1967, as noted by respondent judge himself in his decision)1 may not be held liable criminally or administratively for any error of judgment that he may commit, absent of any showing of bad faith, corruption, malice, a deliberate intent to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules and principles.
Respondent judge based his acquittal verdict on the stated premises that "(T)he bold assault did not take place in absolute darkness.ℒαwρhi৷ Why could no one in the Chua and Uy households say that Carlos Caramonte was one of the team of robbers" and followed this up with a statement of judicial notice that "the Uy Chua compound is the hub of a large fishing industry, and is located barely 500 meters from the Cadiz police station and City Hall. Also that there are many houses in the neighborhood. Under the circumstances, the failure of anyone — the members of the Chua and Uy households, the security guards and other employees of the fishing business, the police, the neighbors — to perceive the presence of Caramonte at the time of the attack raises doubts as to his participation therein."
Such taking of judicial notice in turn was the result of an ex-parte ocular inspection conducted by himself alone without notice to nor the presence of the parties on August 11, 1968, over a month after the hearings had been closed and the case submitted for decision on July 1, 1968 and is the main target of the present complaint.
In view of the result reached, respondent judge's verdict of acquittal on the ground of non-identification is now a closed matter, although the prosecutor-complainant could cite the fear and terror under which the victims-witnesses were held by the notorious band of pirates who hogtied them and made them lie on the floor face down. They had previously ordered their security guards to offer no resistance "because (their) children might be hit" and the wife of one them (Mr. Uy) was brought along by the armed as a hostage.2
The purpose of this brief opinion is merely to avoid undue inference of approval or sanction of the ex-parte ocular inspection conducted by respondent judge. As noted by then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice Antonio P. Barredo in his comment3 "the validity of the ocular inspection conducted by the lower court is open to doubt."
Indeed, such ex-parte ocular inspection conducted by respondent judge alone without notice to nor the presence the parties and after the case had already been submitted for decision was improperly made and may not be sanctioned. If he had entertained doubts that he wished to clear up after the trial had already terminated, he should have ordered motu proprio the reopening of the trial for the purpose, with due notice to the parties for their participation therein is essential to due process.
As succinctly restated by Chief Justice Moran, "(T)he inspection or view outside the courtroom should be in made in the presence of the parties or at least with previous notice to them in order that they may show the object to be viewed. Such inspection or view is a part of the trial, inasmuch as evidence is thereby being received, which expressly authorized by law.<äre||anº•1àw> The parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial, and consequently they are entitled to be at least notified of the time and place for the view. It is an error for the judge to go alone to the land in question, or to the place where the crime committed and take a view, without previous knowledge or consent of the parties, inspected the place of collision, in his decision stated that after having viewed the place, he was convinced that the testimony of one of the witnesses was incredible."4
As was aptly held by the appellate court in setting aside such ex-parte ocular inspection conducted by a trial judge "(W)e know of no rule of law or practice which authorizes a trial judge, after a cause had been submitted to him for determination, to search of his own motion and without the consent of the parties for extrinsic testimony and circumstances, and apply what he may learn in this way to corroborate the testimony upon one side or to cast discredit on the testimony of the adverse party."5
Footnotes
1 At page 6, main opinion.
2 At page 7-10, main opinion.
3 At page 3, main opinion.
4 5 Moran's Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 81, emphasis supplied.
5 Idem, at p. 82, quoting from Denver Omnibus & Cab Co. vs. Ward Auction Co. 47 Colo. 446, cited in Balon vs. Moreno, 57 Phil. 60, 69.
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