Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35027 September 10, 1973
HONORABLE CESAR VIRATA, et al., petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, Presiding Judge Court of First Instance, Pasig, Rizal, JUANITO P. TINSAY, and GREGORIO C. GUIDO, etc., respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Santiago M. Kapunan for petitioners.
Narciso V. Cruz, Jr. for respondent Juanito P. Tinsay.
CASTRO, J.:
The respondent Juanito P. Tinsay sought the enforcement in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, presided by the respondent judge, of a general power of attorney allegedly executed in his favor by a religious corporation which calls itself "Los Hijos del Dios Vivo y Omnipotente" (hereinafter simply referred to as Los Hijos). In connection with his action, the respondent Tinsay petitioned for and was granted a writ of attachment covering 2,523 cases of assorted foodstuffs in the custody of the Bureau of Customs and consigned to the said religious corporation. Disputing the authority of the respondent court to issue the said writ, the petitioners, all representing the interests of the Bureau of Customs, came to this Court on special civil action of certiorari with preliminary injunction.
The background facts are not controverted.
On July 2, 1970, the shipment in question, valued at US $34,211.40, arrived at the Port of Manila on board the S.S. Tokuku Maru, consigned as a donation to Los Hijos. The latter then applied with the Department of Finance for a certificate of tax exemption under Republic Act 1916, but the application was denied on the ground that the shipment was in commercial quantity. Los Hijos subsequently sued the Secretary of Finance in civil case 81126 of the Court of First Instance of Manila to compel the release of the goods under a tax exemption certificate. Later, however, Los Hijos offered to pay the duties, taxes and other charges on the shipment. With the concurrence of the Secretary of Finance, the trial court on December 7, 1971 ordered the release of the goods upon payment of the corresponding duties, taxes and other charges due thereon.
On January 14, 1972, the respondent Tinsay filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as civil case 85926, against Los Hijos and the petitioners Collector of Customs and Commissioner of Customs, seeking delivery to him of the goods in question, based on his alleged acquisition thereof by purchase sometime in August, 1970. On motion of the customs officials, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of want of jurisdiction.
On February 27, 1972, the respondent Tinsay filed a second action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against Los Hijos and all the members of its board of trustees, docketed as civil case 15818. The complaint seeks the declaration of the validity of the general power of attorney allegedly executed by Los Hijos constituting the respondent Tinsay as its attorney-in-fact with authority to take delivery of the goods in question from the Bureau of Customs. Further, the complaint alleges that the general power of attorney was arbitrarily revoked by Los Hijos, for which reason the release of the goods to the latter would work injustice to the respondent Tinsay.
On the same date that the complaint was received by the court, the respondent judge issued an order enjoining the petitioners Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Customs and Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila, from releasing the goods in question to Los Hijos.
On March 8, 1972, the petitioners, all representing the interests of the Bureau of Customs, moved to lift the restraining order the trial court had issued, on the grounds that it lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action and over the persons of the public officials who were not party defendants therein, and because the respondent judge cannot enjoin the acts of public officials performed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. On March 13, 1972, the respondent Tinsay amended his complaint to include the public officials mentioned. The next day, March 14, the respondent judge issued another restraining order enjoining the said officials from releasing the goods in question to Los Hijos.
On March 18, 1972, the said public officials moved to dismiss the complaint, opposed the issuance of a preliminary injunction, and asked for the lifting of the restraining order issued by the trial court. Appreciating the argument that the respondent Tinsay had no cause of action against the petitioners, the respondent judge dismissed the complaint insofar as it affected them. In the same order, however, the respondent judge granted Tinsay's ex parte petition for a writ of attachment against the goods in question, upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P100.000. The order of attachment was served on the officials of the Bureau of Customs on April 5, 1972, and on May 3, 1972, the petitioners commenced the present special civil action of certiorari with preliminary injunction.
On May 11, 1972, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents "from enforcing, implementing or carrying out the writ of attachment" abovementioned, until further orders.7!ᕼdMᗄ7 We likewise enjoined the petitioners from disposing of the goods in question.
Subsequently, or on September 21, 1972, the petitioners, in their memorandum of arguments, informed this Court that the respondent judge, by his order of July 5, 1972, had lifted the writ of attachment subject of the present petition, upon the filing by Los Hijos of a counterbond in the sum of P100,000. Among others, the respondent judge cited the perishable state of the goods in dispute and their probable loss if held any longer in the custody of the Bureau of Customs. Thus, the petitioners would have us dismiss the present petition as having become moot and academic and dissolve our injunction against their disposition of the goods, paving the way to a delivery of the same to Los Hijos after payment of taxes, duties and other charges. Asked for his comment, the petitioner Tinsay vigorously opposed such course of action, averring, first, that the respondent judge had no authority to act on the writ before this Court resolved the premier question of the trial court's jurisdiction to issue the said writ, and, second, that the sum of P100,000 posted by Los Hijos as counterbond is inadequate.
The lifting by the court a quo of the writ of attachment sought to be annulled by the present petition, while advisedly intended to salvage the object of litigation from probable loss, does not altogether obliterate the basic question posed to us in this case. The authority of the trial court to quash the writ of attachment subject of the present petition can only proceed from the authority to issue the same in the first place. But, precisely, this case squarely raises the issue of the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to reach, by the process of attachment, goods in the possession of the Bureau of Customs. To agree that this case at bar has become moot and academic due to the subsequent developments cited could be to concede that the trial court had proceeded according to law. This, as will hereafter be shown, is not the case.
It is long settled in this jurisdiction that the customs authorities acquire exclusive jurisdiction over goods sought to be imported into the Philippines, for the purpose of the enforcement of Philippine customs laws, from the moment the goods come to their actual possession and control, even if no warrant for seizure or detention thereof has previously been issued by the port collector of customs.1 It is the duty of the port collector to cause all such articles to be appraised and classified, and assess and collect the duties, taxes and other charges thereon, and hold possession of all imported articles upon which duties, taxes and other charges have not been paid or secured to be paid, disposing of the same according to law.2 And it has been held that this jurisdiction of the customs authorities over the goods ceases "only upon payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at a port of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted."3
The placing of the goods under attachment as a result of an action commenced by a third party against the consignee, while the liabilities due on the said goods to the Government have not been fully settled and while they remain in the custody of customs authorities, undermines the efficacy of our customs laws and is void.
A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued upon order of the court where an action is pending, to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant therein, the same to be held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment might be secured in said action by the attaching creditor against the defendant.4 On proper grounds, to be determined by the trial court in accordance with the Rules of Court, the writ will issue and be levied upon the property of the defendant. In the present case, however, the Government of the Philippines "having a lien on the goods for the payment of the duties accruing thereon, and being entitled to a virtual custody of them from the time of their arrival in port until the duties are paid or secured, any attachment by [the sheriff] is an interference with such lien and right of custody."5
Moreover, although the Collector of Customs might have been properly served a copy of the writ of attachment, he cannot act as bailee over the goods under his custody for the benefit of third-party litigants because such office is incompatible with his duty under the Tariff and Customs Code to hold possession of the goods for the Government of the Philippines in the interest of revenue collection.
By ruling that the provisional remedy resorted to by the respondent Tinsay is ineffective and void, this Court does not make any pronouncement as to the merits of the principal action exclusively between the private parties, nor does it preclude remedies which, at a proper time and on proper grounds, the trial court might consider issuing in the case for the protection of the interests of the parties pending final adjudication thereof. We merely rule that the particular writ of attachment therein issued is not binding upon the officials of the Bureau of Customs.
With the result that the writ of attachment issued by the respondent judge is void and of no effect, it will serve no useful purpose for us to discuss the other errors raised by the petitioners.
ACCORDINGLY, our order of May 11, 1972, insofar as it enjoins the respondent court and the special sheriff of Rizal from enforcing the writ of attachment of April 4, 1972, hereby made permanent. Our injunction in the same order against the petitioners, enjoining them from disposing of the goods subject matter of the present case, is hereby lifted. Costs against the respondent Juanito Tinsay.
Fernando, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, Actg. C.J., concurs in the result.
Footnotes
1 Seneres vs. Frias, L-32921-40, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 533, 541.
2 Section 1206, Tariff and Customs Code (Republic Act 1937).
3 Papa vs. Mago, L-27360, February 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 857, 865-866; Sec. 1202, Tariff and Customs Code, supra.
4 Rule 57, Revised Rules of Court.
5 Harris vs. Dennie, 3 Pet. 292, 7 L. Ed. 683, 688; cited in Shinn on Attachment and Garnishment, Vol. 2, p. 62.
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