EN BANC
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., dissenting:
I bow in respectful and sincere admiration, but my sense of duty compels me to dissent.
The background of this case may be found principally in the stipulation of facts upon which the decision under review is based. It is as follows:
1. That complainant Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc., is a corporation existing and operating under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines with corporate address at 666 Muelle de Binondo, Manila, which is the employer of respondent;
2. That Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization PBMEO for short, is a legitimate labor organization, and the respondents herein are either officers of respondent PBMEO or members thereof;
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass demonstration at Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM — 2:00 PM workers as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM in the morning of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang, (2) Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon, Jr. (3) and all department and section heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as the spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked. Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodulfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers may join the Malacañang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV "NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE". All those who will not follow this warning of the Company shall be dismissed; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the Malacañang demonstration will be held the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.
Additionally, the trial court found that "the projected demonstration did in fact occur and in the process paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the complainant company". (p. 5, Annex F).
Upon these facts the Prosecution Division of the Court of Industrial Relations filed with said court a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice against petitioners charging that: .
3. That on March 4, 1969, respondents (petitioners herein) particularly those in the first shift, in violation of the existing collective bargaining agreement and without filing the necessary notice as provided for by law, failed to report for work, amounting to a declaration of strike;
4. That the above acts are in violation of Section 4(a) subparagraph 6, in relation to Sections 13, 14 and 15 of Republic Act No. 875, and of the collective bargaining agreement. (Pars. 3 and 4, Annex C.)
After due hearing, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive part of which read's:
IN VIEW HEREOF, the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization is found guilty of bargaining in bad faith and is hereby ordered to cease and desist from further committing the same and its representatives namely: respondent Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Monsod who are directly responsible for perpetrating this unfair labor practice act, are hereby considered to have lost their status as employees of the Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. (p. 8, Annex F.)
Although it is alleged in the petition herein that petitioners were notified of this decision on September 23, 1969, there seems to be no serious question that they were actually served therewith on September 22, 1969.ℒαwρhi৷ In fact, petitioners admitted this date of notice in paragraph 2 of their Petition for Relief dated October 30, 1969 and filed with the industrial court on the following day. (See Annex K.)
It is not controverted that it was only on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days after they were notified of the court's decision, that petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration with the industrial court; as it is also not disputed that they filed their "Arguments in Support of the Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration" only on October 14, 1969. (See Annex I.) In other words, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days after the lapse of the five (5) day period provided for the filing thereof in the rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, whereas the "Arguments" were filed five (5) days after the expiration of the period therefor also specified in the same rules.
Accordingly, the first issue that confronts the Court is the one raised by respondent private firm, namely, that in view of the failure of petitioners to file not only their motion for reconsideration but also their arguments in support thereof within the periods respectively fixed in the rules therefor, the Court of Industrial Relations acted correctly and within the law in rendering and issuing its impugned order of October 9, 1969 dismissing petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Respondent's contention presents no problem. Squarely applicable to the facts hereof is the decision of this Court in Elizalde & Co. Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations1wherein it was ruled that:
August 6, 1963. Petitioner received a copy of the decision of the then Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez, the dispositive part of which was set forth earlier in this opinion.
August 12, 1963. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. No arguments were advanced in support thereof.
August 21, 1963. Petitioner moved for additional time to file its arguments in support of its motion to reconsider.
August 27, 1963. Petitioner filed its arguments in support of its aforesaid motion seeking reconsideration.
September 16, 1963. CIR en banc resolved to dismiss the motion for reconsideration. Ground therefor was that the arguments were filed out of time.
October 3, 1963. Petitioner filed its notice of appeal and at the same time lodged the present petition with this Court.
Upon respondent Perlado's return and petitioner's brief (respondents did not file their brief), the case is now before us for resolution.
1. That the judgment appealed from is a final judgment — not merely an interlocutory order — there is no doubt. The fact that there is need for computation of respondent Perlado's overtime pay would not render the decision incomplete. This in effect is the holding of the Court in Pan American World Airways System (Philippines) vs. Pan American Employees Association, which runs thus: 'It is next contended that in ordering the Chief of the Examining Division or his representative to compute the compensation due, the Industrial Court unduly delegated its judicial functions and thereby rendered an incomplete decision. We do not believe so. Computation of the overtime pay involves a mechanical function, at most. And the report would still have to be submitted to the Industrial Court for its approval, by the very terms of the order itself. That there was no specification of the amount of overtime pay in the decision did not make it incomplete, since this matter should necessarily be made clear enough in the implementation of the decision (see Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. vs. CIR, et al., L-8718, May 11, 1956).
2. But has that judgment reached the stage of finality in the sense that it can no longer, be disturbed?
CIR Rules of Procedure, as amended, and the jurisprudence of this Court both answer the question in the affirmative.
Section 15 of the CIR Rules requires that one who seeks to reconsider the judgment of the trial judge must do so within five (5) days from the date on which he received notice of the decision, subject of the motion. Next follows Section 16 which says that the motion must be submitted with arguments supporting the same. But if said arguments could not be submitted simultaneously with the motion, the same section commands the 'the movant shall file the same within ten (10) days from the date of the filing of his motion for reconsideration.' Section 17 of the same rules admonishes a movant that "(f)ailure to observe the above-specified periods shall be sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the supporting arguments, as the case may be".
Not that the foregoing rules stand alone. Jurisprudence has since stabilized the enforceability thereof. Thus, in Bien vs. Castillo, (97 Phil. 956) we ruled that where a pro forma motion for reconsideration was filed out of time its denial is in order pursuant to CIR rules, regardless of whether the arguments in support of said motion were or were not filed on time. Pangasinan Employees Laborers & Tenants Association (PELTA) vs. Martinez, (L-13846, May 20, 1960) pronounced that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, the order or decision subject of reconsideration comes final. And so also, where the arguments in support of the motion for reconsideration are filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period, the pre forma motion for reconsideration although seasonably filed must nevertheless be denied. This in essence is our ruling in Local 7, Press & Printing Free Workers (FFW) vs. Tabigne. The teaching in Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, is that where the motion for reconsideration is denied upon the ground that the arguments in support thereof were filed out of time, the order or decision subject of the motion becomes "final and unappealable".
We find no difficulty in applying the foregoing rules and pronouncements of this Court in the case before us. On August 6, petitioner received a copy of the judgment of Judge Arsenio I. Martinez aforesaid. Petitioner's motion to reconsider — without arguments in support thereof — of August 12 was filed on time. For, August 11, the end of the five-day reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration, was a Sunday. But, actually, the written arguments in support of the said motion were submitted to the court on August 27. The period from August 12 to August 27, is a space of fifteen (15) days. Surely enough, said arguments were filed out of time — five (5) days late. And the judgment had become final.
3. There is, of course, petitioner's motion of August 21, 1963 seeking extension of time within which to present its arguments in support of its motion. Counsel in his petition before this Court pleads that the foregoing motion was grounded on the 'extremely busy and difficult schedule of counsel which would not enable him to do so within the stated ten-day reglementary period. The arguments were only filed on August 27 — five (5) days late, as aforesaid.
The foregoing circumstances will not avail petitioner any. It is to be noted that the motion for expansion of time was filed only on August 21, that is, one day before the due date which is August 22. It was petitioner's duty to see to it that the court act on this motion forthwith or at least inquire as to the fate thereof not later than the 22nd of August. It did not. It merely filed its arguments on the 27th.
To be underscored at this point is that "obviously to speed up the disposition of cases", CIR "has a standing rule against the extension of the ten-day period for filing supporting arguments". That no-extension policy should have placed petitioner on guard. It should not have simply folded its arms, sit by supinely and relied on the court's generosity. To compound petitioner's neglect, it filed the arguments only on August 27, 1953, knowing full well that by that time the reglementary period had expired.
Petitioner cannot complain against CIR's ruling of September 16, 1963 dismissing the motion for reconsideration on the ground that the supporting arguments were filed out of time. That ruling in effect denied the motion for extension.
We rule that CIR's judgment has become final and unappealable. We may not review the same.
Notwithstanding this unequivocal and unmistakable precedent, which has not been in any way modified, much less revoked or reversed by this Court, the main opinion has chosen not only to go into the merits of petitioners' pose that the respondent court erred in holding them guilty of bargaining in bad faith but also to ultimately uphold petitioners' claim for reinstatement on constitutional grounds.
Precisely because the conclusions of the main opinion are predicated on an exposition of the constitutional guarantees of freedoms of speech and peaceful assembly for redress of grievances, so scholarly and masterful that it is bound to overwhelm Us unless We note carefully the real issues in this case, I am constrained, over and above my sincere admiration for the eloquence and zeal of Mr. Justice Makasiar's brilliant dissertation, to dutifully state that as presented by petitioners themselves and in the light of its attendant circumstances, this case does not call for the resolution of any constitutional issue. Admittedly, the invocation of any constitutional guarantee, particularly when it directly affects individual freedoms enshrined in the bill of rights, deserves the closest attention of this Court. It is my understanding of constitutional law and judicial practices related thereto, however, that even the most valuable of our constitutional rights may be protected by the courts only when their jurisdiction over the subject matter is unquestionably established and the applicable rules of procedure consistent with substantive and procedural due process are observed. No doubt no constitutional right can be sacrificed in the altar of procedural technicalities, very often fittingly downgraded as niceties but as far as I know, this principle is applied to annul or set aside final judgments only in cases wherein there is a possible denial of due process. I have not come across any instance, and none is mentioned or cited in the well-documented main opinion, wherein a final and executory judgment has been invalidated and set aside upon the ground that the same has the effect of sanctioning the violation of a constitutional right, unless such violation amounts to a denial of due process.
Without support from any provision of the constitution or any law or from any judicial precedent or reason of principle, the main opinion nudely and unqualifiedly asserts, as if it were universally established and accepted as an absolute rule, that the violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights". Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, which is mentioned almost in passing, does uphold the proposition that "relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even after the finality of the judgment". And, of course, Chavez is correct; as is also Abriol vs. Homeres2which, in principle, served as its precedent, for the very simple reason that in both of those cases, the accused were denied due process. In Chavez, the accused was compelled to testify against himself as a witness for the prosecution; in Abriol, the accused was denied his request to be allowed to present evidence to establish his defense after his demurrer to the People's evidence was denied.
As may be seen, however, the constitutional issues involved in those cases are a far cry from the one now before Us. Here, petitioners do not claim they were denied due process. Nor do they pretend that in denying their motion for reconsideration, "the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon any of their constitutional immunities ...," contrary to the statement to such effect in the main opinion. Indeed, neither in the petition herein nor in any of the other pleading of petitioners can any direct or indirect assertion be found assailing the impugned decision of the respondent court as being null and void because it sanctioned a denial of a valued constitutional liberty.
In their petition, petitioners state the issue for Our resolution as follows:
Petitioners herein humbly submit that the issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent Court en banc under the facts and circumstances, should consider the Motion for Reconsideration filed by your petitioners.
Petitioners, therefore, in filing this petition for a writ of certiorari, humbly beg this Honorable Court to treat this petition under Rule 43 and 65 of the Rules of Court.
x x x x x x x x x
The basic issue therefore is the application by the Court en banc of the strict and narrow technical rules of procedure without taking into account justice, equity and substantial merits of the case.
On the other hand, the complete argument submitted by petitioners on this point in their brief runs thus:
III
ISSUES
1. Does the refusal to heed a warning in the exercise of a fundamental right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances constitute bargaining in bad faith? and,
Do the facts found by the court below justify the declaration and conclusion that the union was guilty of bargaining in bad faith meriting the dismissal of the persons allegedly responsible therefore?
2. Was there grave abuse of discretion when the respondent court refused to act one way or another on the petition for relief from the resolution of October 9, 1969?
IV
ARGUMENT
The respondent Court erred in finding the petition union guilty of bargaining in bad faith and consequently dismissing the persons allegedly responsible therefor, because such conclusion is country to the evidence on record; that the dismissal of leaders was discriminatory.
As a result of exercising the constitutional rights of freedom to assemble and petition the duly constituted authorities for redress of their grievances, the petitioners were charged and then condemned of bargaining in bad faith.
The findings that petitioners were guilty of bargaining in bad faith were not borne out by the records. It was not even alleged nor proven by evidence. What has been alleged and which the respondent company tried to prove was that the demonstration amounted to a strike and hence, a violation of the provisions of the "no-lockout — no strike" clause of the collective bargaining agreement. However, this allegation and proof submitted by the respondent company were practically resolved when the respondent court in the same decision stated categorically:
'The company alleges that the walkout because of the demonstration is tantamount to a declaration of a strike. We do not think so, as the same is not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is a concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work.' (Emphasis supplied, p. 4, 5th paragraph, Decision.)
The respondent court's findings that the petitioner union bargained in bad faith is not tenable because:
First, it has not been alleged nor proven by the respondent company; .
Second, before the demonstration, the petitioner union and the respondent company convened twice in a meeting to thresh out the matter of demonstration. Petitioners requested that the employees and workers be excused but the respondent company instead of granting the request or even settling the matter so that the hours of work will not be disrupted, immediately threatened the employees of mass dismissal;
Third, the refusal of the petitioner union to grant the request of the company that the first shift shall be excluded in the demonstration is not tantamount to bargaining in bad faith because the company knew that the officers of the union belonged to the first shift, and that the union cannot go and lead the demonstration without their officers. It must be stated that the company intends to prohibit its officers to lead and join the demonstration because most of them belonged to the first shift; and
Fourth, the findings of the respondent court that the demonstration if allowed will practically give the union the right to change the working conditions agreed in the CBA is a conclusion of facts, opinionated and not borne by any evidence on record. The demonstration did not practically change the terms or conditions of employment because it was only for one (1) day and the company knew about it before it went through. We can even say that it was the company who bargained in bad faith, when upon representation of the Bureau of Labor not to dismiss the employees demonstrating, the company tacitly approved the same and yet while the demonstration was in progress, the company filed a ULP Charge and consequently dismissed those who participated.
Records of the case show that more or less 400 members of the union participated in the demonstration and yet, the respondent court selected the eight officers to be dismissed from the union thus losing their status as employees of the respondent company. The respondent court should have taken into account that the company's action in allowing the return of more or less three hundred ninety two (392) employees/members of the union is an act of condonation and the dismissal of the eight (8) officers is an act of discrimination (Phil. Air Lines Inc., vs. Phil. Air Lines Employees Association, G.R. No. L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958). Seemingly, from the opinion stated in the decision by the court, while there is a collective bargaining agreement, the union cannot go on demonstration or go on strike because it will change the terms and conditions of employment agreed in the CBA. It follows that the CBA is over and above the constitutional rights of a man to demonstrate and the statutory rights of a union to strike as provided for in Republic Act 875. This creates a bad precedent because it will appear that the rights of the union is solely dependent upon the CBA.
One of the cardinal primary rights which must be respected in proceedings before the Court of Industrial Relations is that "the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected." (Interstate Commerce Commission vs. L & N R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their rights to know and meet the case against them. (Ang Tibay vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-45496, February 27, 1940.)
The petitioners respectfully and humbly submit that there is no scintilla of evidence to support the findings of the respondent court that the petitioner union bargained in bad faith. Corollary therefore, the dismissal of the individual petitioners is without basis either in fact or in law.
Additionally, in their reply they also argued that:
1) That respondent court's finding that petitioners have been guilty of bargaining in bad faith and consequently lost their status as employees of the respondent company did not meet the meaning and comprehension of "substantial merits of the case." Bargaining in bad faith has not been alleged in the complaint (Annex "C", Petition) nor proven during the hearing of the can. The important and substantial merit of the case is whether under the facts and circumstances alleged in respondent company's pleadings, the demonstration done by the petitioners amounted to on "illegal strike" and therefore in violation of the "no strike — no lock out" clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Petitioners respectfully reiterate and humbly submit, that the respondent court had altogether opined and decided that such demonstration does not amount to a strike. Hence, with that findings, petitioners should have been absolved of the charges against them. Nevertheless, the same respondent court disregarding, its own findings, went out of bounds by declaring the petitioners as having "bargained in faith." The stand of the respondent court is fallacious, as it follows the principle in logic as "non-siquitor";
2) That again respondents wanted to impress that the freedom to assemble peaceably to air grievances against the duly constituted authorities as guaranteed in our Constitution is subject to the limitation of the agreement in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The fundamental rights of the petitioners to free speech and assembly is paramount to the provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement and such attempt to override the constitutional provision would be null and void. These fundamental rights of the petitioners were not taken into consideration in the deliberation of the case by the respondent court;
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing contentions that petitioners are not raising any issue of due process. They do not posit that the decision of the industrial court is null and void on that constitutional ground. True it is that they fault the respondent court for having priced the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement herein involved over and above their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of their grievances against the abuses of the Pasig police, but in no sense at all do they allege or contend that such action affects its jurisdiction in a manner that renders the proceedings a nullity. In other words, petitioners themselves consider the alleged flaw in the court's action as a mere error of judgment rather than that of jurisdiction which the main opinion projects. For this Court to roundly and indignantly condemn private respondent now for the grievous violation of the fundamental law the main opinion sees in its refusal to allow all its workers to join the demonstration in question, when that specific issue has not been duly presented to Us and properly argued, is to my mind unfair and unjust, for the simple reason that the manner this case was brought to Us does not afford it the opportunity to be heard in regard to such supposed constitutional transgression.
To be sure, petitioners do maintain, that respondent court committed an error of jurisdiction by finding petitioners guilty of bargaining in bad faith when the charge against them alleged in the complaint was for having conducted a mass demonstration, which "amounted to a strike", in violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, but definitely, this jurisdictional question has no constitutional color. Indeed, We can even assume for the sake of argument, that the trial judge did err in not giving preferential importance to the fundamental freedoms invoked by the petitioners over the management and proprietary attributes claimed by the respondent private firm — still, We cannot rightly hold that such disregard of petitioners' priceless liberties divested His Honor of jurisdiction in the premises. The unbending doctrine of this Court is that "decisions, erroneous or not, become final after the period fixed by law; litigations would be endless, no questions would be finally settled; and titles to property would become precarious if the losing party were allowed to reopen them at any time in the future".3
I only have to add to this that the fact that the error is in the interpretation, construction or application of a constitutional precept not constituting a denial of due process, should not make any difference. Juridically, a party cannot be less injured by an overlooked or erroneously sanctioned violation of an ordinary statute than by a misconstrued or constitutional injunction affecting his individual, freedoms. In both instances, there is injustice which should be intolerable were it not for the more paramount considerations that inform the principle of immutability of final judgments. I dare say this must be the reason why, as I have already noted, the main opinion does not cite any constitutional provision, law or rule or any judicial doctrine or principle supporting its basic holding that infringement of constitutional guarantees, other than denial of due process, divests courts of jurisdiction to render valid judgments.
In this connection, it must be recalled that the teaching of Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs. Secretary of Education,4 following Santiago vs. Far Eastern Broadcasting,5is that "it is one of our (the Supreme Court's) decisional practices that unless a constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately argued, the court will not consider it". In the case at bar, the petitioners have not raised, they are not insisting upon, much less have they adequately argued the constitutional issues so extendedly and ably discussed in the main opinion.
Indeed, it does not seem wise and sound for the Supreme Court to hold that the erroneous resolution by a court of a constitutional issue not amounting to a denial of due process renders its judgment or decision null and void, and, therefore, subject to attack even after said judgment or decision has become final and executory. I have actually tried to bring myself into agreement with the views of the distinguished and learned writer of the main opinion, if only to avoid dissenting from his well prepared thesis, but its obvious incongruity with settled jurisprudence always comes to the fore to stifle my effort.
As a matter of fact, for a moment, it appeared to me as if I could go along with petitioners under the authority of our constitutionally irreducible appellate jurisdiction under Section 2(5) of Article VII of the Philippines6(reenacted practically ipssisimis verbis in Section 5(2) of the 1973 Constitution), only to realize upon further reflection that the very power granted to us to review decisions of lower courts involving questions of law(and these include constitutional issues not affecting the validity of statutes, treaty, executive agreement, etc.) is not unqualified but has to be exercised only in the manner provided in the law of the Rules of Court. In other words, before We can exercise appellate jurisdiction over constitutional issues, no matter how important they may be, there must first be a showing of compliance with the applicable procedural law or rules, among them, those governing appeals from the Court of Industrial Relations involved herein. Consequently, if by law or rule, a judgment of the industrial court is already final and executory, this Court would be devoid of power and authority to review, much less alter or modify the same, absent any denial of due process or fatal defect of jurisdiction. It must be borne in mind that the situation confronting Us now is not merely whether or not We should pass upon a question or issue not specifically raised by the party concerned, which, to be sure, could be enough reason to dissuade Us from taking pains in resolving the same; rather, the real problem here is whether or not We have jurisdiction to entertain it. And, in this regard, as already stated earlier, no less than Justice Conrado Sanchez, the writer of Chavez, supra., which is being relied upon by the main opinion, already laid down the precedent in Elizalde vs. Court, supra, which for its four-square applicability to the facts of this case, We have no choice but to follow, that is, that in view of reconsideration but even their argument supporting the same within the prescribed period, "the judgment (against them)has become final, beyond recall".
Indeed, when I consider that courts would be useless if the finality and enforceability of their judgments are made contingent on the correctness thereof from the constitutional standpoint, and that in truth, whether or not they are correct is something that is always dependent upon combined opinion of the members of the Supreme Court, which in turn is naturally as changeable as the members themselves are changed, I cannot conceive of anything more pernicious and destructive to a trustful administration of justice than the idea that, even without any showing of denial of due process or want of jurisdiction of the court, a final and executory judgment of such court may still be set aside or reopened in instances other than those expressly allowed by Rule 38 and that of extrinsic fraud under Article 1146(1) of the Civil Code.7And just to emphasize the policy of the law of respecting judgments once they have become final, even as this Court has ruled that final decisions are mute in the presence of fraud which the law abhors,8it is only when the fraud is extrinsic and not intrinsic that final and executory judgments may be set aside,9and this only when the remedy is sought within the prescriptive period.10
Apropos here is the following passage in Li Kim Those vs. Go Sin Kaw, 82 Phil. 776:
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.
Likewise the stern admonition of Justice George Malcolm in Dy Cay v. Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521, thus:
... Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts were instituted was to put an end to controversies. To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the slothful. 'If a vacillating, irresolute judge were allowed to thus keep causes ever within his power, to determine and redetermine them term after term, to bandy his judgments about from one party to the other, and to change his conclusions as freely and as capriciously as a chamelon may change its hues, then litigation might become more intolerable than the wrongs it is intended to redress.' (See Arnedo vs. Llorente and Liongson (1911), 18 Phil., 257.).
My disagreement with the dissenters in Republic vs. Judge de los Angeles, L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422, was not as to the unalterability and invulnerability of final judgments but rather on the correct interpretation of the contents of the judgment in question therein. Relevantly to this case at bar, I said then:
The point of res adjudicata discussed in the dissents has not escaped my attention. Neither am I overlooking the point of the Chief Justice regarding the dangerous and inimical implications of a ruling that would authorize the revision, amendment or alteration of a final and executory judgment. I want to emphasize that my position in this opinion does not detract a whit from the soundness, authority and binding force of existing doctrines enjoining any such modifications. The public policy of maintaining faith and respect in judicial decisions, which inform said doctrines, is admittedly of the highest order. I am not advocating any departure from them. Nor am I trying to put forth for execution a decision that I believe should have been rather than what it is. All I am doing is to view not the judgment of Judge Tengco but the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-20950, as it is and not as I believe it should have been, and, by opinion, I would like to guide the court a quo as to what, in my own view, is the true and correct meaning and implications of decision of this Court, not that of Judge Tengco's.
The main opinion calls attention to many instant precisely involving cases in the industrial court, wherein the Court refused to be constrained by technical rules of procedure in its determination to accord substantial justice to the parties I still believe in those decisions, some of which were penned by me. I am certain, however, that in none of those precedents did this Court disturb a judgment already final and executory. It too obvious to require extended elucidation or even reference any precedent or authority that the principle of immutability of final judgments is not a mere technicality, and if it may considered to be in a sense a procedural rule, it is one that is founded on public policy and cannot, therefore, yield to the ordinary plea that it must give priority to substantial justice.
Apparently vent on looking for a constitutional point of due process to hold on, the main opinion goes far as to maintain that the long existing and constantly applied rule governing the filing of motions for reconsideration in the Court of Industrial Relations, "as applied in this case does not implement on reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected, but instead constricts the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court on Industrial Relations Rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieve workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re-hearing or reconsideration (Sec. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial Relations Rule insofar as circumstances of the instant case are concerned."
I am afraid the zeal and passion of these arguments do not justify the conclusion suggested. Viewed objectively, it can readily be seen that there can hardly be any factual or logical basis for such a critical view of the rule in question. Said rule provides:
MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION
Sec. 15. The movant shall file the motion, in six copies, within five (5) days from the date on which he receives notice of the order or decision, object of the motion for reconsideration, the same to be verified under oath with respect to the correctness of the allegations of fact, and serving a copy thereof, personally or by registered mail, on the adverse party. The latter may file an answer, in six (6) copies, duly verified under oath.
Sec. 16. Both the motion and the answer shall be submitted with arguments supporting the same. If the arguments can not be submitted simultaneously with said motions, upon notice Court, the movant shall file same within ten (10) days from the date of the filing of his motion for reconsideration. The adverse party shall also file his answer within ten (10) days from the receipt by him of a copy of the arguments submitted by the movant.
Sec. 17. After an answer to the motion is registered, or after ten (10) days from the receipt of the arguments in support of said motion having been filed, the motion shall be deemed submitted for resolution of the Court in banc, unless it is considered necessary to bear oral arguments, in which case the Court shall issue the corresponding order or notice to that effect.
Failure to observe the above-specified periods shall be sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the supporting arguments, as the case may be. (As amended April 20, 1951, Court of Industrial Relations.).
As implemented and enforced in actual practice, this rule, as everyone acquainted with proceedings in the industrial court well knows, precisely permits the party aggrieved by a judgment to file no more than a pro-forma motion for reconsideration without any argument or lengthy discussion and with barely a brief statement of the fundamental ground or grounds therefor, without prejudice to supplementing the same by making the necessary exposition, with citations laws and authorities, in the written arguments the be filed (10) days later. In truth, such a pro-forma motion has to effect of just advising the court and the other party that the movant does not agree with the judgment due to fundamental defects stated in brief and general terms. Evidently, the purpose of this requirement is to apprise everyone concerned within the shortest possible time that a reconsideration is to sought, and thereby enable the parties concerned to make whatever adjustments may be warranted by the situation, in the meanwhile that the litigation is prolonged. It must borne in mind that cases in the industrial court may involve affect the operation of vital industries in which labor-management problems might require day-to-day solutions and it is to the best interests of justice and concerned that the attitude of each party at every imports juncture of the case be known to the other so that both avenues for earlier settlement may, if possible, be explored.
There can be no reason at all to complain that the time fixed by the rule is short or inadequate. In fact, the motion filed petitioners was no more than the following:
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
COME NOW movant respondents, through counsel, to this Honorable Court most respectfully moves for the RECONSIDERATION of the Order of this Honorable Court dated September 17, 1969 on the ground that the same is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during the hearing of the above entitled case.
Movant-respondents most respectfully move for leave to file their respective arguments within ten (10) days pursuant to Section 15, 16 & 17 as amended of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Motion for Reconsideration be admitted.
Manila, September 27, 1969.
To say that five (5) days is an unreasonable period for the filing of such a motion is to me simply incomprehensible. What worse in this case is that petitioners have not even taken the trouble of giving an explanation of their inability to comply with the rule. Not only that, petitioners were also late five (5) days in filing their written arguments in support of their motion, and, the only excuse offered for such delay is that both the President of the Union and the office clerk who took charge of the matter forgot to do what they were instructed to do by counsel, which, according to this Court, as I shall explain anon "is the most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe the procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court". (Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Arca, infra). And yet, very indignantly, the main opinion would want the Court to overlook such nonchalance and indifference.
In this connection, I might add that in my considered opinion, the rules fixing periods for the finality of judgments are in a sense more substantive than procedural in their real nature, for in their operation they have the effect of either creating or terminating rights pursuant to the terms of the particular judgment concerned. And the fact that the court that rendered such final judgment is deprived of jurisdiction or authority to alter or modify the same enhances such substantive character. Moreover, because they have the effect of terminating rights and the enforcement thereof, it may be said that said rules partake of the nature also of rules of prescription, which again are substantive. Now, the twin predicates of prescription are inaction or abandonment and the passage of time or a prescribed period. On the other hand, procrastination or failure to act on time is unquestionably a form of abandonment, particularly when it is not or cannot be sufficiently explained. The most valuable right of a party may be lost by prescription, and be has no reason to complain because public policy demands that rights must be asserted in time, as otherwise they can be deemed waived.
I see no justification whatsoever for not applying these self-evident principles to the case of petitioners. Hence, I feel disinclined to adopt the suggestion that the Court suspend, for the purposes of this case the rules aforequoted of the Court of Industrial Relations. Besides, I have grave doubts as to whether we can suspend rules of other courts, particularly that is not under our supervisory jurisdiction, being administrative agency under the Executive Department Withal, if, in order to hasten the administration of substance justice, this Court did exercise in some instances its re power to amend its rules, I am positively certain, it has done it for the purpose of reviving a case in which the judo has already become final and executory.
Before closing, it may be mentioned here, that as averred their petition, in a belated effort to salvage their Petitioners filed in the industrial court on October 31, 1969 a Petition for relief alleging that their failure to file "Arguments in Support of their Motion for Reconsideration within the reglementary period or five (5), if not seven (7), days late "was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the President of the respondent Union and on office clerk of the counsel for respondents as shown attested in their respective affidavits", (See Annexes K, and K-2) which in brief, consisted allegedly of the President's having forgotten his appointment with his lawyer "despite previous instructions and of the said office employee having also coincidentally forgotten "to do the work instructed (sic) to (him) by Atty. Osorio" because he "was busy with clerical jobs". No sympathy at all can be evoked these allegations, for, under probably more justification circumstances, this Court ruled out a similar explanation previous case this wise:
We find merit in PAL's petition. The excuse offered respondent Santos as reason for his failure to perfect in due time appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court, that counsel's clerk forgot to hand him the court notice, is the most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court. The uncritical acceptance of this kind of common place excuses, in the face of the Supreme Court's repeated rulings that they are neither credible nor constitutive of excusable negligence (Gaerlan vs. Bernal, L-4039, 29 January 1952; Mercado vs. Judge Domingo, L-19457, December 1966) is certainly such whimsical exercise of judgment to be a grave abuse of discretion. (Philippine Air Lines, Inc. Arca, 19 SCRA 300.)
For the reason, therefore, that the judgment of the industrial court sought to be reviewed in the present case has already become final and executory, nay, not without the fault of the petitioners, hence, no matter how erroneous from the constitutional viewpoint it may be, it is already beyond recall, I vote to dismiss this case, without pronouncement as to costs.
Footnotes
1 25 SCRA 58.
2 86 Phil. 525.
3 Daquis vs. Bustos, 94 Phil. 913, reiterated in Maramba vs. Lozano, 20 SCRA 474. See also Vicente vs. Lucas, 95 Phil. 716.
4 97 Phil. 806, at p. 816.
5 73 Phil. 408.
6 Under which this case was filed.
7 Mauricio vs. Villanueva, 106 Phil. 1159, cited by Moran in Vol. 11, p. 246 (1970 ed.).
8 Garchitorena vs. Sotelo, 74 Phil. 25.
9 Amuran vs. Aquino, 38 Phil. 29; Javier vs. Parades, 52 Phil. 910; Domingo vs. David, 68 Phil. 134.
10 Quion v. Claridad, 74 Phil. 100.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
For having carried out a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969 in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police department, upon two days' prior notice to respondent employer company, as against the latter's insistence that the first shift1should not participate but instead report for work, under pain of dismissal, the industrial court ordered the dismissal from employment of the eight individual petitioners as union officers and organizers of the mass demonstration.
Respondent court's order finding petitioner union guilty on respondent's complaint of bargaining in bad faith and unfair labor practice for having so carried out the mass demonstration, notwithstanding that it concededly was not a declaration of strike nor directed in any manner against respondent employer, and ordering the dismissal of the union office manifestly constituted grave abuse of discretion in fact and in law.
There could not be, in fact, bargaining in bad faith nor unfair labor practice since respondent firm conceded that "the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed' by the Constitution" and the union up to the day of the demonstration pleaded by cablegram to the company to excuse the first shift and allow it to join the demonstration in accordance with their previous requests.
Neither could there be, in law, a willful violation of the collective bargaining agreement's "no-strike" clause as would warrant the union leaders' dismissal, since as found by respondent court itself the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike, there being no industrial dispute between the protagonists, but merely the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work" to enable the workers to exercise their constitutional rights of free expression, peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievance against alleged police excesses.
Respondent court's en banc resolution dismissing petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having been filed two days late, after expiration of the reglementary five-day period fixed by its rules, due to the negligence of petitioners' counsel and/or the union president should likewise be set aside as a manifest act of grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners' petition for relief from the normal adverse consequences of the late filing of their motion for reconsideration due to such negligence — which was not acted upon by respondent court — should have been granted, considering the monstrous injustice that would otherwise be caused the petitioners through their summary dismissal from employment, simply because they sought in good faith to exercise basic human rights guaranteed them by the Constitution. It should be noted further that no proof of actual loss from the one-day stoppage of work was shown by respondent company, providing basis to the main opinion's premise that its insistence on dismissal of the union leaders for having included the first shift workers in the mass demonstration against its wishes was but an act of arbitrary vindictiveness.
Only thus could the basic constitutional rights of the individual petitioners and the constitutional injunction to afford protection to labor be given true substance and meaning. No person may be deprived of such basic rights without due process — which is but "responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided ... Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness."2
Accordingly, I vote for the setting aside of the appealed orders of the respondent court and concur in the judgment for petitioners as set forth in the main opinion.
Footnotes
1 The first shift comprised the workers from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. Respondent company had no objection to the two regular shifts workers (7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and 8 A.M. to 5 P.M.) being excused from work for the mass demonstration.
2 Ermita-Malate Hotel Operators Ass'n. vs. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849(1967), per Fernando, J.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
