EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23015 May 30, 1972
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
DOMINADOR DE LA CRUZ, FELIPE BILLEDO, SULPICIO GALICIA, JULIAN RAVAO, FLAVIANO SON, PABLO ALFORQUE, PEDRO OLEDEN, HONORIO DACLISON, FELIPE LLARENAS, EMILIO BUARON, LOPE MONTANO, LIMMEO MARCIAL, LUIS DE VERA and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito, Misa & Lozada for petitioner.
Ceferino E. Dulay for respondents.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur on the ground that since the unfair labor practice case was properly filed with the Court of Industrial Relations, it acted within its authority in directing that "justice and equity demand that complainants be paid the money equivalent of other rights and privileges ... like accrued vacation and sick leave, bonuses and the like," notwithstanding its dismissal of the unfair labor charge against petitioner-employer and its finding that respondents-complainants' dismissal was not on account of their union activities.
In Alhambra Industries, Inc. vs. C. I. R.,1 the Court dismissed a similar contention that under section 5(c) of the Industrial Peace Act, "it is mandatory upon respondent court to order the dismissal of the complaint, once it finds out that no unfair labor practice has been committed" and that any other relief sought should be by recourse to the ordinary courts.
The Court has long enunciated its stand against "split jurisdiction" that "(A) piecemeal resort to one court and another gives rise to multiplicity of suits.ℒαwρhi৷ To force the employees to shuttle from one court to another to secure redress is a situation gravely prejudicial. The time to be lost, effort wasted, anxiety augmented, additional expense incurred — these are considerations which weigh heavily against split jurisdiction. Indeed, it is more in keeping with orderly administration of justice that all the causes of action here 'be cognizable and heard by only one court;' ... ."2
Furthermore, as stated in the main opinion, even if petitioner could have earlier properly raised a question of jurisdiction against respondent court, it is now barred from raising the question under the doctrine of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy3 that "after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court."
While petitioner may be correct that as a matter of contract and usage, sick leave granted employees must be used and is non-commutable, the fact remains that the commutation and payment of such unenjoyed sick leave of respondents were ordered in respondent court's judgment which long became final in 1962 without petitioner having filed an appeal, and may no longer be questioned now.
I therefore vote for the dismissal of the petition.
Footnotes
1 35 SCRA 550 (Oct. 30, 1970).
2 Rheem of the Phil. Inc. vs. Ferrer, 19 SCRA 130 (Jan. 27, 1967) cited in Pacaña vs. Cebu Autobus Co., 32 SCRA 442 (April 30, 1970).
3 23 SCRA 29 (Apr. 15, 1968), as recently reaffirmed in Calderon vs. Public Service Commission, 38 SCRA 624 (Apr. 30, 1971).
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I concur wholeheartedly in the ruling that the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations once it takes cognizance of an unfair labor practice case is not limited by the apparently restrictive language of Section 5(c) of the Industrial Peace Act1 which provides:
(c) The testimony taken by the Court or such member of the Court or the Hearing Examiner shall be reduced to writing and filed with the Court. If, after investigation, the Court shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair labor practice, then the Court shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice and take such affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of this Act, including (but not limited to) reinstatement of employees with or without backpay and including rights of the employees prior to dismissal including seniority. Such order may further require such person to post the court's order and findings in a place available to all the employees and to make reports from time to time showing the extent to which the Court's order has been complied with. If after investigation the Court shall be of the opinion that no person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Court shall state its findings of fact and shall issue an order dismissing the said complaint. If the complaining party withdraws its complaint, the Court shall dismiss the case.
particularly when it is read in the light of paragraph (a) of the same section which reads thus:
(a) The court shall have jurisdiction over the prevention of unfair labor practice and is empowered to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice. This power shall be exclusive and shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by an agreement, code, law or otherwise.
It must be admitted that, inasmuch as under the provision just quoted, the jurisdiction conferred upon the Industrial Court in unfair labor practice cases is "over the prevention" thereof, and more specifically, the provision says that said court is "empowered to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice," the thought that in said cases the court can do no more and no less than issue an order, in case it finds the respondent guilty, "requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice and take (apparently, only in such eventuality but not in any other instance) such affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of this Act, including (but not limited to) reinstatement of employees with or without backpay and including rights2 of the employees prior to dismissal including seniority," while in the event it should "be of the opinion that no person named in the complaint is engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Court shall (only) state its findings of fact and shall issue an order (limited only to) dismissing the complaint" is not altogether implausible specially when the point is viewed exclusively from the standpoint of interpretation of the plain words employed by the legislature. On the other hand, however, I cannot perceive any sound reason of policy or otherwise why proven matters related directly to the charge of unfair labor practice as tried by the court, even if the charge itself is not substantiated to the degree required to prove an unfair labor practice, which, of course, must be proven convincingly and clearly, may not, by a process of statutory construction, be considered as something that is within the ambit of the court's power to utilize as basis for any relief that the court may deem justified to grant to any of the parties before it, provided naturally that all those legally interested have had full opportunity to be heard.
To start with, as I see it, the provisions of Section 5 (c), abovequoted, empowering the court, in the event it finds that an unfair labor practice has been committed, not only to issue a cease and desist order but also to "take such affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of this Act," including reinstatement, backpay and other rights, have the effect of constituting the particular unfair labor practice charged as a single cause of action justifying several reliefs. In other words, reinstatement, backpay, recognition of seniority, etc. are not distinct causes of action from each other but only separate and independent reliefs that can be demanded together with the main relief consisting of the order to cease and desist, and, consequently, they should not as a rule be made the subject of separate complaints, for that would be violative of the rule against splitting of a cause of action to make the different parts thereof the subject of separate complaints (sections 3 and 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court; 1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, pp. 117-118, 1970 ed.).
To sustain the theory of petitioner would in effect require the splitting of the cause of action of the laborers-respondents. Worse, it would be forcing the said respondents to go to different courts to obtain reliefs arising from a cause of action within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court. I hold, therefore, that the seeming restrictive import of the aforequoted provisions has to yield to the necessities of the situation in order to give way to the considerations of convenience and expeditiousness underlying the rule against splitting a single cause of action.
This reasoning is not new in the labor jurisprudence of this Court. Along the same lines as this is the ratiocination pursued in the cases cited in the main opinion penned by Mr. Justice Makasiar from Philippine Engineers' Syndicate vs. Bautista to Detective vs. Guevarra, under which the Court considered demands for the payment of differential night work and Sunday and holiday works as included in the contemplation of the provision conferring jurisdiction upon the Industrial Court in matters related to the law on hours of work and overtime pay, Commonwealth Act No. 444. The irresistible trend of these cases was most clearly expressed and formulated by Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez in Bay View Hotel vs. Manila Hotel Workers' Union, 18 SCRA 946, 952-953, in these words:
Two grievances remain.
One is that petitioner "has not been refunding in full" the waiters and roomboys the amounts collected from customer as extra "service charge" in lieu of "tips".
The other is that petitioner has failed to comply "with the grant of vacation leave of three (3) days a year in accordance with the Collective Bargaining Contract."
Whether the two causes just mentioned, standing alone, belong to the domain of the CIR, we need not now consider.ᇈWᑭHIL The industrial court has jurisdiction over the main causes of action with respect to minimum wage, overtime compensation and unfair labor practice. Which places the complaint herein in its entirety, including the two, within the jurisdiction of the industrial trial court. Because, all of said claims arose out of the same employment.
3. But, petitioner takes the position that jurisdiction over one is not jurisdiction over all.
This Court, however, already had occasion to rule in a case (Gomez vs. North Camarines Lumber Co., Inc., L-11945, August 18, 1958, which involves two claims: separation pay and overtime compensation. See also: Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers vs. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 938.) similar in factual context to the present, as follows:
... But considering that in this case, plaintiff- appellant's main claim is for the collection of overtime compensation, which comes within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court. We see no reason for dividing the 2 causes of action involved therein and for holding that one falls within the jurisdiction of one court and the remaining cause of action of another court. ....
We find reinforcement of this view in PRISCO, supra, where express pronouncement was made that as long as the employer-employee relationship exists or is sought to be re-established, the industrial court "has jurisdiction over all claims arising out of, or in connection with, employment."
citing, aside from Prisco, the ruling enunciated by Mr. Justice Alfonso Felix in Gomez vs. North Camarines Lumber Co., Inc., 104 Phil., 294, 300-302, which is along the same vein, in principle, as the earlier ponencia of Mr. Justice Felix in Isaac Peral Bowling Alleys vs. United Employees Welfare Association, 102 Phil., 219.
Stated differently, the law abhors the splitting of jurisdiction as it shuns splitting of a single cause of action. Understandably, why should parties be made to shuttle from one court to another, as emphasized by Mr. Justice Teehankee in his separate concurring opinion in this case? I do believe that in the Alhambra opinion rendered for the Court by Mr. Justice Teehankee, even if the Court had been convinced that the case did not involve in fact an unfair labor practice, still We would have ruled in favor of sustaining the integrated jurisdiction of the Industrial Court.
Indeed, another avenue of approach leads to the same conclusion. In Isaac Peral Bowling Alleys, supra, the basic consideration was stated thus:
IV. In view of the absence of express legislation granting employees of private firms or establishments the benefits of vacation and sick leaves with pay, said employees are not assured of such privileges, which are proper subject matters for collective bargaining between employers and employees. Although strictly speaking, therefore, there is no ground for the granting of said privileges, the Court of Industrial Relations in the exercise of its broad powers under Commonwealth Act No. 103 had on several occasions dealt with and granted claims for these benefits. With the enactment of Republic Act No. 875 and the abolition of the Court's general jurisdiction over labor disputes, this power seems to have been curtailed. It is believed, however, that whenever the Court of Industrial Relations may exercise its power of compulsory arbitration, as when a case is certified to it by the President of the Philippines, being again possessed of general powers, said Court may still grant these benefits. (See authorities cited in Francisco's Labor Laws, Vol. II, 3rd ed., p. 508 et seq).
More expansively, it may be said not without rational basis that the broad powers of the Court of Industrial Relations as the tribunal for the settlement of labor disputes not withdrawn from the pale of compulsory arbitration by the letter and spirit of the Industrial Peace Act may be availed of for the adjudication of controversies between laborers and employers, which is but logical, considering that, a stated by our Acting Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Jose B. L. Reyes in his concurring and dissenting opinion in PAFLU vs. Tan, 99 Phil. 854:
One need not range far search of cogent reasons in support of the exclusive jurisdiction herein advocated. The evolution of our labor and social legislation exhibits a decided and unmistakable tendency to entrust the solution of labor-management conflicts to specialized administrative organs: Court of Industrial Relations, Industrial Safety Bureau, National Employment Service, Labor Conciliation and Wage Administration Service, Workmen's Compensation Commission, Court of Agrarian Relations. Whether the tendency is due to the Legislative having believed that the regular Judges, trained in strict legal questions of property and contract, are ill prepared to cope with labor and tenancy disputes that demand a different perspective and a compromising temperament, aimed above all at minimizing friction and avoiding paralization of the processes of production; or because it was believed that the quick solution of social problems demanded more simplified and less protracted procedures; or because as it has been suggested, courts and lawyers are becoming obsolete, the policy of specialized offices for special problems clearly exists and should not be evaded.
With particular reference to labor injunctions, the all important issue is whether a given case involves or grows out of labor dispute. Our Judges of the Court of Industrial Relations are certainly much better qualified to determine such issue that the regular judges, experienced as the former are in the multifarious aspects that such dispute may assume. Why should we entrust this and other related questions to Judges who have not handled labor disputes on any previous occasion? The very case before us is proof that to do so would be to nullify the restrictions imposed by law on labor injunctions, because of the Judges' unfamiliarity with the policies and interests involved. It was not so long ago, either, that complaints were being aired that the regular courts are far too generous in granting ex parte preliminary injunctions, without due regard for the social aspect of the cases brought before them; and this Court has recently passed upon cases where squatters on public thoroughfares came to be protected by ex parte injunctions improvidently issued that took long years to correct.
In this connection, I maintain that in ascertaining the jurisdictional boundaries of the Industrial Court in unfair labor practice cases, it is not enough to confine our sight to the provisions quoted above. I believe that the legislature wisely added Paragraphs (d) and (e) to said provisions in order to enable the court to fully exercise the specific powers allocated to it and thereby settle, adjudicate and decide not only the main cases submitted to it but, in the language of Paragraph (d), also "all other matters relative to such disputes (unfair labor practice cases)."
I have chosen to express these thoughts as the specific bases for my concurrence in the judgment of the Court in this case because frankly, I have still to be convinced of the soundness of allowing conduct amounting to estoppel and laches, which are equity principles, to have the effect of conferring jurisdiction upon a court, when there is no specific legal provision granting it such authority whether expressly or impliedly. Much as I believe in the comprehensiveness of the authority of the Supreme Court to determine by construction the extent of allocations of jurisdiction defined by the legislature, I do not feel it is justified for the Court to enlarge the area clearly set down by law, as this would amount to judicial legislation which to me is as bad as any other offense against the rule of law. Briefly, I want to stick to the fundamental rule that jurisdiction is conferred by nothing else but statute, admittedly not only by specific metes and bounds in black and white but also by necessary implication, never by any act of the parties or even by the courts, including the Supreme Court. Submittal by a party to a court that has no power to act in the premises vests no whit of authority upon the court and the error of such party in going to it binds it in no way to its unauthorized pronouncements and orders. It is as simple as that.
I join in the judgment to affirm the resolutions appealed from.
Footnotes
1 The whole section 5 sets down the procedure for unfair labor practice cases in the Court of Industrial Relations.
2 Presumably meaning restoration of other rights of employees, etc.
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