EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26523 December 24, 1971
PELAGIO YUSINGCO ALFONSO YUSINGCO JR., CONSUELO YUSINGCO, PATRICK YUSINGCO, HENRY YUSINGCO and ASUNCION N. VDA. DE YUSINGCO plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ONG HING LIAN in his behalf and/or Administrator of the Estate of ONG BONPIN deceased, substituted by his legal heirs, namely: AZUCENA GOH ONG, ALICE, JAMES, DOLORES, ILDEFONSO, FLORENCIO, HERMAN, VICTORIA, JOSEPHINE and MARYLIN, all surnamed ONG; and ANICETO BONPIN in his capacity as newly appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of BONPIN defendants-appellees.
Calvin S. Arcilla Law Offices and Macario C. Ofilada Jr. for plaintiffs-appellants.
Oscar M. Herrera and Mojica Law Offices for defendant appellees.
Koh Law Office for administrator-appellee.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurirng:
I concur in the judgment rendered for the Court by Justice Makasiar insofar as it overrules the defenses of res adjudicata and laches with regard to the petitioners other than petitioner Pelagio Yusingco but I have grave doubts as to whether or not the holding that Pelagio's action is barred by said defenses is justified in the light of what appear in the records before Us, hence my reservation as to this part of the judgment.
Briefly stated, the first issue to be settled here is whether or not on the basis of the facts extant in the records, it is accurate to hold that the parties in the proceedings for the reconstitution of the title of Yusingco Hermanos under Republic Act No. 26 within Cadastral Case No. 12, Record No. 1364, namely, Pelagio Yusingco, on the one hand, and respondents herein, on the other, did actually join issues on the matter of ownership of the properties in question so as to make applicable here the exceptions jurisprudentially created in the cases relied upon by the main opinion. Aglipay and Franco.1 Since the only copy of the printed record on appeal now before Us and which was filed with the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 24964-R, the reconstitution case, begins with the order of the lower court denying the petition for reconstitution, and there is no showing whatsoever of the issues raised by the parties in the petition and written opposition, if any was filed by respondents, I do not feel morally justified to make any inference as to what were the issues which were submitted by the parties for resolution by the court in said proceeding. To be sure, if I were to infer from the order of denial alone what were the respective positions of the parties submitted to the court, I would say that all that herein petitioner Pelagio did was to insist that all that mattered was the fact that it was undisputed that the last existing title over the subject properties was in the name of Yusingco Hermanos and inasmuch as the same had been lost, it should be reconstituted pursuant to Republic Act 26, with the qualification that since the liens appearing thereon, before it was lost or destroyed, in favor of Carlos Palanca and Philippine Refining had already been settled and satisfied by the predecessor-in-interest of Yusingco Hermanos, the reconstituted title should not bear anymore the annotation of said liens or, at the most, their cancellation should be duly annotated, and, further, that after said reconstitution, forthwith, the court should order that said title be split among the herein petitioners since Yusingco Hermanos had ceased operations as such. On the other hand, the stand of herein respondents was that the mortgages in favor of Palanca and Philippine Refining were not paid by the Yusingcos but, on the contrary, were foreclosed extrajudicially and their predecessors-in-interest had acquired the same from the purchasers thereof at the foreclosure sales held on August 11, 1936 and November 11, 1936, and upon failure of any one to redeem the same they took actual possession of the subject properties and proceeded to make substantial permanent improvements thereon with nary a protest on the part of anybody, much less any of the Yusingcos up to the time the present controversy arose in 1952. No pretense is made that any title was ever issued in their names (respondents) or that they ever interested themselves in having any issued to them, albeit in relation to the support sale of August 11, 1936, there is a finding of the Court of Appeals that the same was duly annotated at the back of the copy of the title in the office of the Register of Deed which was being sought to be reconstituted, apparently before all the copies were lost. It is to be noted, in this connection, that no primary evidence of any kind is mentioned anywhere in the records tending to prove said entries. Only the testimony of the notary public Hernando J. C. Corvera appears to be the basis of the findings of the Court of appeals.
Under these circumstances, it seems to me that the parties joined issues only on one point, namely, as to whether or not the Yusingcos settled or paid the mortgages in favor of Palanca and the Philippine Refining.ℒαwρhi৷ And as to this pivotal issue, the finding of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the trial court is that the mentioned mortgage were fully paid and settled, which was precisely Pelagio's contention. There is nothing in the whole decision of the Court of Appeals indicating that the settlement of the said mortgages referred to by it was the result of the alleged foreclosure sale. In fact, there is no showing at all as to the details of the alleged foreclosure sale as regards, for instance, the price thereof and the deficiency, if there was any.
Worse, with respect to the alleged auction sale of November 11, 1936 involving the remaining half of lots 519, 520, 1014 and 1015 and the whole of lots 1016 and 1020, according to the Court of Appeals, "there is a dearth of evidence to show" it, and if somehow it sustained the respondents, it was on the basis of their long possession and the alleged inaction of the Yusingcos.
All in all, as I view this case, the evidence supporting the claim of ownership of the respondents is inconclusive and the findings of the Court of Appeals on this point is not free from contradiction and confusion. How can a party acquire ownership by prescription of lands registered under the Torrens System, particularly when the basis of their claim is nothing more than possession and the proof of the alleged foreclosure sale by which they claim to have acquired the property is inconclusive? Accordingly, I cannot see my way clear to considering the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 24964-R as a bar to the present action of all the Yusingcos including Pelagio. I believe that the fairest thing to do is to allow the parties to litigate their respective claims of ownership in the present case. I am afraid that the exception to the general rule that reconstitution proceedings do not involve questions of ownership which ought to be the subject of ordinary actions in the court of general jurisdiction, if such exceptions referred to in the main opinion do really exist, cannot be applied to the present case in which the record is not clear as to what issues were really joined in the reconstitution proceedings and what in concrete was the holding of the court as to the question of ownership. As I view it, the stand of Pelagio Yusingco is that the denial by the Land Court of his petition for reconstitution was precisely without prejudice to the resolution of the issue of ownership in the proper revindicatory action in the court of general jurisdiction. And that is precisely the present suit which the Court of Appeals has, erroneously, in my opinion, declared barred by res adjudicata and/or laches. I believe my conscience would rest easier only if the matter of ownership is properly tried in the court a quo.
Concepcion, C.J., concur.
Footnotes
1 See pp. 17-19, main opinion of Justice Makasiar.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the reservations stated in Mr. Justice Barredo's concurrence.
I vote, therefore, to set aside in toto the order of dismissal of the lower court and to remand the records of the lower court for all the Yusingcos, including Pelagio, to pursue their action therein for reivindicacion and to allow parties full opportunity to litigate therein and to present their evidence on their respective claims of ownership over the real properties in question.
Mr. Justice Barredo has raised the vital consideration that defendants-appellees should not summarily, through the lower court's order of dismissal, be held in effect have acquired ownership by prescription of the lands admittedly registered under the torrens system in the name of appellants' predecessor-in-interest, particularly when the basis of appellees' claim of ownership is nothing more than mere possession and the proof of the alleged foreclosure sale at which they allege to have acquired the property is at best inconclusive.
I would add that the first case which would now be held to be res judicata against Pelagio Yusingco was a reconstitution of title proceeding instituted by Pelagio himself. I do not believe that it is fair and equitable to now hold likewise summarily that Pelagio's claim of ownership over the disputed lots is also barred by the equitable principle of laches (main opinion, at page 19), when as things stand, it would appear that such principle of laches should well be invoked against defendants-appellees for not having done anything at all to transfer the title over the disputed properties to their names, if their claim be true that they had long acquired such title at the alleged foreclosure sale.
Concepcion, C.J., concur.
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