EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-32282-83 November 26, 1970
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, CAMILO PILOTIN, FRANCISCO PIANO, DELFIN PIANO PEDRO PATAO, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, CAMILO PIANO, CAMILO PATAO, PEDRING PIANO, ISIDRO PUGAL, ANTONIO TABULDO, LORENZO PERALTA, VENANCIO PACLEB ANTONIO PIANO, FERMIN PUGAL, CARLITO PUGAL, FLOR PIANO, ERNING ABANO and EIGHTY-TWO (82) JOHN DOES, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco, Solicitor Eduardo C. Abaya and Special Attorney Juan A. Sison for petitioners.
Adaza, Adaza and Adaza for respondent Erning Abano.
Crisologo Law Office and Pedro Quadra for respondent Camilo Pilotin.
Juan T. David for respondent Vincent Crisologo.
Augusto Kalaw as private prosecutor.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
The learned and scholarly opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes renders crystal-clear why the decision reached by this Court should be what it is. It is a manifestation of the jurist's art at its most exemplary.ℒαwρhi৷ It belies the belief not infrequently given utterance that hard cases make bad law. The problem before us is unique and unprecedented as far as our previous decisions go. It calls for a resolution far-reaching in its consequences and far-flung in its implications. Fortunately for the administration of justice according to law, there is the recognition of power vested in this Court, in the past perhaps only imperfectly discerned but nonetheless in existence, to be utilized whenever there is need to do so. This is one such occasion. Even without resort then to precedents coming from jurisdictions after which our judicial system was patterned, the same result would have been reached. For only thus, to paraphrase Cardozo, would the flexibility and the creativeness of the judicial process assert themselves.
The opinion of Justice J.B.L., Reyes therefore calls for assent, which I readily yield. Nor does it seem inappropriate if it be stressed that the conclusion reached by the Court is solidly buttressed not only in law as history but likewise in law as logic and as social control. Hence this brief concurring opinion, which likewise will afford me the opportunity to give expression to the view that the Constitution and the proceedings in the Constitutional Convention of 1934-1935 point unerringly to the conclusion that this Court as the sole body vested with judicial power by the fundamental law itself is not devoid of supervisory authority over inferior courts. Necessarily the prerogative to transfer the venue of criminal prosecutions whenever there is a persuasive showing that there would be a failure of justice is therein included. On such an assumption, I do not feel called upon to inquire into any asserted authority, even if denominated administrative, of an alter ego of the Executive, the Secretary of Justice, over the lower courts. For my belief gets stronger with the years that it would be difficult to assert that such a competence, even as thus limited, is warranted under a Constitution based on the doctrine of separation of powers and necessarily committed to the principle of judicial independence.
1. We start with the grant by the Constitution of Judicial power to this Court and to such inferior courts as may be established by law.1 Thus is conferred the authority to decide cases through the ascertainment of facts and the application of the law, involving many a time its interpretation.2 It connotes, in the language of the decision, "the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice. ...."3 Where, as this did develop in this case, there is more than a probability of an impasse with the witnesses for the prosecution displaying the utmost reluctance to testify if the trial would be held in Vigan, entailing the risk that there be, again in the language of the opinion, "a mockery of the judicial process."4 it would appear undeniable, and we have so held today, that this Court is not to be denied the necessary competence to set matters right. It is not to fold its hands as if in helpless submission to a binding decree of Providence but must meet the problem squarely, possessed of power adequate to cope with such an exigency. In the same way that the two other coordinate departments, the Executive and Congress, being constitutional organs, can rely on the fundamental law to justify the exercise of certain prerogatives,5 so may this Court, the only constitutional court, exercise supervision over all other judicial agencies thereafter legislatively created, appropriately termed by the Constitution as inferior courts.
There would be a void in the framework of government thus established if there is no official body of a higher rank that can take the necessary steps to avoid a frustration of the exercise of judicial power. It is my firm conviction that neither the Presidency nor Congress can rightfully be entrusted with such a task. If it were thus, then the doctrine of separation of powers becomes a myth. Such an approach necessarily and logically compel the conclusion that the so called administrative supervision exercised by the Secretary of Justice is, to put it at its mildest, infected with the gravest doubts as to its constitutionality.
There is no need to go that far to reach a decision in this case as is so aptly demonstrated in the opinion of the Court. What appears to me undisputed is that where the question partakes of a judicial character, only this Court can perform that function and trace its source to the Constitution itself. That is to free the Constitution from the reproach that a situation is left unprovided for. What is more, it assures the utmost respect for the principle that like the other two coordinate and co-equal branches, Court is likewise the recipient of power conferred by the Constitution itself.6
2. So much for law from the standpoint of analytical jurisprudence of law as logic. If the matter be viewed from the approach found congenial by sociological jurists, law as one of the most effective forms of social control, the same conclusion appears to be inescapable. This is to examine legal institutions in terms of how they function. It certainly would be a blot on the administration of justice if by the reluctance of witnesses to testify, based on what they consider to be a feeling that cannot be stigmatized under the circumstances as having no basis in reason, no trial could be had of a criminal case. It is a matter of great public interest that crime should not go unpunished. Of course, it is equally important that the rights of whoever is accused are duly safeguarded. Where as in this case an impasse is likely to occur, in itself an alarming symptom of a breakdown in the orderly legal processes, the loss of public confidence in the rule of law itself is incalculable. That is an eventuality which at all pains must be avoided. The only question is how. If the legal doctrine and principles, which under the system of legal norms followed must be grounded in the Constitution itself do not recognize such a competence in this Court, then for some all may well be lost.
It would be unthinkable, again given the assumption, not entirely without basis, that the two other branches of the government cannot escape political considerations, to assume that either Congress or the Executive can be trusted to take care of such a situation. Nor would it do to leave such matters in the hands of the lower courts, unless whatever is decided by them is subject to correction and review by the only constitutional court, certainly vested with the needed supervisory authority. It would thus appear, if a breakdown in the legal system is to be averted, that the power of this Court is undeniable. There would seem to be no other way to avoid a serious disruption in the legal order.
The above considerations necessarily lead me to yield a full concurrence with what has been so persuasively and ably put forth in the masterly opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes.ℒαwρhi৷
December 5, 1970
Footnotes
1 According to the Constitution: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law." Art. VIII, Sec. 1.
2 Cf. City of Baguio v. de Leon, L-24756, Oct. 31, 1968, 25 SCRA 938; Vera v. Arca, L-25721, May 26, 1969, 28 SCRA 351; Pecson Jose v. Santos, L-25510, Oct. 30, 1970.
3 Opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, p. 5, Editor's Note: p. 180 this volume).
4 Ibid.
5 Cf. Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62 (1939); Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451 (1939); Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950).
6 Cf. Debates in the Constitutional Convention with Delegate Jose P. Laurel explaining his draft proposal as found in V Laurel, ed., Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention pp. 724-731; 911-928.
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