EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23714 June 30, 1970
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA ALAK (NAFLU), petitioner,
vs.
HAMILTON DISTILLERY COMPANY and THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Gregorio E. Fajardo for petitioner.
Delia L. Hermoso for respondent Hamilton Distillery Company.
Mariano B. Tuazon for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the extensive main opinion penned by Mr. Justice Barredo, which expressly finds that "a careful review of the records does not bear out the accuracy of the premises of petitioners' grievances," whereby through a new set of officers and new counsel, a minority of twenty-one out of forty-nine members who all authorized the settlement of their case for reinstatement with back wages (as decreed by this Court's final decision of October 30, 1962 in G.R. No. L-18112, entitled "Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa ng Alak (NAFLU) vs. Hamilton Distillery Co., et al.) and who each acknowledged in writing receipt in full of his respective share of the P20,000.00-settlement paid by respondent company under the compromise agreement of December 24, 1963 duly approved by the industrial court, sought to overthrow the very same settlement.
As the industrial court en banc duly heard the parties and "without any dissenting vote, was convinced that petitioners have not been deceived and that the petitioners constituted a minority who could not speak for the union that had entered into the agreement as such" (main opinion, at page 24) the Court's decision affirming the industrial court's en banc resolutions refusing to set aside the settlement and to reopen the case, is fully grounded on the facts and on the applicable law and settled principles, as ably expounded by Mr. Justice Barredo in the main opinion.
Since the present case properly applied the precedents of Dionela vs. C.I.R.,1 Jesalva vs. Bautista2 and Betting Ushers Union (PLUM) vs. Jai Alai Corporation,3 applying the doctrine in labor cases that the will of the majority should prevail over that of the minority, it might be well to point out that the doctrine has been qualified by the Court in two recent decisions, viz., La Campana Food Products, Inc. etc. Employees Ass'n. vs. C.I.R.,4 where the Court disregarded the petitioner union's motion to dismiss a pending appeal on the ground that it was formulating a collective bargaining agreement with the employer in the interest of industrial peace and instead ruled upon the merits of the union's appeal on behalf of twenty-one members who were the parties directly and personally affected by the employer's unfair labor practice and who stood to take tremendous losses and suffer injustice from a dismissal of the appeal, as sought by the union, and Heirs of T. Cruz, et al. vs. C.I.R., et al.5
In the latter case of Cruz, the Court reaffirmed the rationale for the majority rule doctrine that: "the will of the majority must prevail over that of the minority in the process, for 'under the philosophy of collective responsibility, an employer who bargains in good faith should be entitled to rely upon the promises and agreements of the union representatives with whom he must deal under the compulsion of law and contract. The collective bargaining process should be carried on between parties who call mutually respect and rely upon the authority of each other." We however expressly qualified the doctrine, pointing out that: "(W)here however, collective bargaining process is not involved, and what is at stake are back wages already earned by the individual workers by way of overtime, premium and differential pay, and final judgment has been rendered in their favor, as in the present case, the real parties in interest with direct material interest, as against the union which has only served as a vehicle for collective action to enforce their just are the individual workers themselves. Authority of the union to waive or quitclaim all or part of the judgment award in favor of the individual workers cannot be lightly presumed but must be expressly granted and the employer, as judgment debtor, must deal in all good faith with the union as the agent of the individual workers. The court in turn should certainly verify and assure itself of the fact and extent of the authority of the union leadership to execute any compromise or settlement of the judgment on behalf of the individual workers who are the real judgment creditors."
As indicated hereinabove, and fully discussed in the main opinion, the factual setting of the case at bar rules out the applicability of these latest decisions of the Court.ℒαwρhi৷
Footnotes
1 L-18334, Aug. 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 832.
2 105 Phil. 348 (1959).
3 101 Phil. 822 (1957).
4 28 SCRA 314 (May 22, 1969).
5 Jointly decided with Lydia Bulos, et al. vs. C.I.R., et al., 30 SCRA 917 (Dec. 27, 1969).
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