G.R. No. L-30773, February 19, 1970,
♦ Decision, Sanchez, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Castro, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Fernando, [J]
♦ Concurring Opinion, Barredo, [J]

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30773 February 18, 1970

FELIXBERTO C. STA. MARIA, petitioner,
vs.
SALVADOR P. LOPEZ, THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, and NEMESIO CERALDE, respondents.

V.E. del Rosario and Associates and Atienza, Tabora & del Rosario for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo and Special Counsel Perfecto V. Fernandez for respondents Salvador Lopez, et al.

Crispin D. Baizas for respondent Nemesio Ceralde.


Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

There is much in the exhaustive opinion of Justice Sanchez, impressive for its grasp of the law and breadth of scholarship, that commends itself for acceptance. Nonetheless, I feel called upon to express my concurrence separately as for me the question at issue could be viewed from a narrower perspective. It could also be said, and this is not intended by way of criticism, that the opinion of the Court could have accorded a more explicit recognition of the complexity of the problems that sorely beset the President of the University of the Philippines and thus result in greater understanding and sympathy for his efforts to arrive at a correct and just solution. As the question before us is one of power, however, even the best of motive cannot be a substitute. Not only must the objective sought to be attained be within the law, but the means employed must not suffer from a legal infirmity. To be more specific, in the case before us, I am unable to reach a conclusion other than that procedural due process had not been observed in the removal of petitioner.

The view I take of the matter is thus in conformity with that expressed in the opinion of the Court. Considering all the circumstances discussed with the fullness of detail by Justice Sanchez, the steps taken by the University administration, even if susceptible to the interpretation that they were equivocal at most, had not been purged of the taint of unfairness thus calling into operation the protection afforded by the due process guaranty. There should be by this time no need to stress the obvious that insofar as security of tenure and the right to the perquisites are concerned, a public office is indeed property of which the occupant cannot be deprived save in accordance with its dictates.1 Nonetheless, to erase any lingering doubts on the matter, there is nothing inappropriate in reaffirming such a principle. Nor is there anything incompatible with the principle thus reiterated with the fundamental postulate that a public office is preeminently a public trust,the exercise of the authority thus conferred being conditioned on the official having uppermost in mind what is best for public welfare.

Necessarily then in accordance with the security of tenure guarranty2 of the Constitution and its statutory implementation under the Civil Service Act,3 this Court has been committed to the principle that a public official may secure judicial redress for any suspension or removal contrary to such mandateso explicitly announced, irrespective of the motives that may have inspired such a move, if thereby the ground for such disciplinary action is untenable or the procedure followed is irregular. A host of decisions attests to such a long, unbroken, impressive course of adjudication.4 The decision reached by us in this case is therefore solidly buttressed in authoritative pronouncements. It is well that it is so. Whatever inconvenience may thus be visited on attempts concededly taken in the utmost good faith to resolve a critical impasse is more than offset by adherence to the rule of law.

The Constitution, being the supreme law, its supremacy must be upheld, its mandates deemed controlling.ᇈWᑭHIL There is no justification for any of its commands being disregarded Or set at naught. As so eloquently put in Ex parte Milligan:5 "The Constitution ... is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government." Petitioner, if he could show that no deference was paid to his constitutional right to due process, could thus seek judicial relief, the courts being duty bound to maintain inviolate the provisions of the fundamental law.

Nor is such a remedy precluded by petitioner pursuing a course of conduct which apparently had given cause for grave dissatisfaction on the part of the student body. Much less could the expression of discontent on the part of the student body, immoderate in character, giving rise to what could plausibly be looked upon from the standpoint of the University administration as an emergency call for the application of a different principle. It is precisely under such circumstances that the paramount character of the Constitution must be accorded due recognition. As so forcefully stressed by former Chief Hughes: "Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not increase granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved. The Constitution was adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its grants of power to the Federal Government and its limitations of the power of the States were determined in the light of emergency and they are not altered by emergency."6

It is to the credit of the opinion of Justice Sanchez that while being fully cognizant of the amplitude of the constitutional right on the part of the students to assembly and petition, it reminds them of the limits thereof. The beneficial results that could be expected of student activism, expressed at times with more vehemence than the occasion would call for, might not come to pass if the boundaries of legally permissible conduct are overstepped. It would seem to me that the sense of maturity and the spirit of calm deliberation that should permeate an academic atmosphere should be antidotes to what at times may be the impatience and exuberance of the young carried to excess. The words of Justice Frankfurter come to mind: "It must never be forgotten, however, that the Bill of Rights was the child of the Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. It was in order to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope. But utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution ."7

To the possible objection that there is an air of unreality to the preceding observation as the University administration was confronted not by what ought to have been but what in fact was, it suffices to answer that even then deference to the rule of law was not thereby rendered impossible. It is to be admitted that it was much more difficult under the circumstances, but that of itself certainly could not justify its disregard. This is not to say that there was such an intent. Far from it. It must be conceded that on the facts as shown, there was no thought on the part of the University authorities to trample on the rights of petitioner. Their motive, as had been noted, was to solve the impasse with the best interests of the entire University constituency uppermost. Nonetheless, the purest of motives, to repeat, does not warrant a deviation from what the law prescribes.7!ᕼdMᗄ7

Nor could reliance be had on the clause that did confer on the University administration the power to put an end to petitioner's continuance in his position as Dean. While the term was fixed at five years, it could be "sooner terminated." In entire good faith then, it could be interpreted as permitting what was done. If that were all, then no due process question would have arisen. Such was not the case though. Charges, not trivial in character, were in fact lodged against petitioner. To put an end to his term then without giving him a hearing was to condemn him, considering that apparently t ere was no indication that such a thing was previously contemplated, until the attitude of the students did assume such belligerent posture. It is one thing to inform an official that for the best interest of the service, and without reflection on his actuations, a new man should be placed at the helm. It is an entirely different matter, if subjected as he was to accusations reflecting on his performance as such official, he is summarily relieved without the formal hearing to which due process entitles him. It is on this precise ground that I vote for the granting of the petition and concur in the result reached by the Court.


Footnotes

1 Cf. Morfe v. Mutuc, L-20387, 22 SCRA 424 (1968) citing Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil. 740 (1949) ; Lacson v. Roque, 92 Phil. 456 (1953); Meneses v. Lacson, 97 Phil. 857 (1955); Tabora v. Montelibano, 98 Phil. 800 (1956); Unabia v. City Mayor, 99 Phil. 253 (1956); Cammayo v. Viña 101 Phil. 1149 (1957); Pinero v. Hechanova, L-22562, 18 SCRA 417 (1966); Abaya v. Subido, L-25641, 18 SCRA 1034 (1966)..

2 Art. XII, Sec. 4, Constitution of the Philippines.

3 Republic Act No. 2260 as amended (1959).

4 Cf. Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil. 740 (1949) ; De los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 (1950) ; Lacson v. Roque, 92 Phil. 456 (1953); Batung-Bakal v. National Dev. Co., 93 Phil. 182 (1953); Rodriguez v. Del Rosario, 93 Phil. 1070 (1953); Mission v. Del Rosario, 94 Phil. 483 (1954); Palamine v. Zagado, 94 Phil. 494 (1954); Inocente v. Ribo, 94 Phil. 652 (1954); Abella v. Rodriguez, 95 Phil. 289 (1954); Uy v. Rodriguez, 95 Phil. 493 (1954); Gorospe v. De Veyra, 96 Phil. 545 (1955);Olegario v. Lacson, 97 Phil. 75 (1955); Quintos v. Lacson, 97 Phil. 290 (1955); Meneses v. Lacson, 97 Phil. 857 (1955); Tabora V. Montelibano, 98 Phil. 800 (1956); Pulutan v. Dizon, 99 Phil.168 (1956); Unabia v. City Mayor, 99 Phil. 253 (1956); Faunillan v. Del Rosario, 99 Phil. 758 (1956) ; Claravall v. Paroan 100 Phil. 476 (1956); Senarillos v. Hermosisima 100 Phil. 501 (1956); Jose v. Lacson, L-10477, May 12, 1957; Cuyo v. City Mayor, 101 Phil. 558 (1957); Cammayo v. Vina 101 Phil.1149 (1957); Cabo Kho v. Rodriguez, L-9032, Sept. 28, 1957; Briones v. Osmena 104 Phil. 588 (1958); Diaz v. Amante, 104 Phil. 968 (1958); Mangubat v. Osmena L-12837, April 30, 1959; Baguio v. Rodriguez, L-11078, May 27, 1959; Tan v. Gimenez, 107 Phil. 17 (1960); Subido v. Sarmiento, L-14981, May 23, 1960- Fernandez v. Cuneta, L-14392, May 30, 1960; Board of Directors v. Alandy L-15391, Oct. 31, 1980; Vito v. Lacson, L-16173, 3 SCRA 666 (1961); Gonzales v. Osmena L-15901, 3 SCRA 841 (1961); Dichoso v. Valdepenas L-17448, 5 SCRA 1069 (1962); Corpus v. Cuaderno, L-17860, 4 SCRA 749 (1962); Garcia v. Salcedo, L-19748, 6 SCRA 1 (1962) ; Fernandez v. Ledesma, L-18878, 7 SCRA 620 (1963); Libarnes v. Executive Secretary, L-21505, 9 SCRA 261 (1963); Jorge v. Mayor, L-21776, 10 SCRA 331 (1964); Diaz v. Raquid, L-19158, 13 SCRA 339 (1965); Tañala v. Legaspi L-22537, 13 SCRA 566 (1965); Corpus v. Cuaderno, L-23721, 13 SCRA 591 (1965); City of Manila v. Subido, L-25835, 17 SCRA 231 (1966); Carino v. ACCFA, L-19808, 18 SCRA 183 (1966); Piñero v. Hechanova, 22562, 18 SCRA 417 (1966); Abaya v. Villegas, L-25641, 18 SCRA 1034 (1966); Ferrer v. Hechanova, L-24418, 19 SCRA 105 (1967); Abellera v. City of Baguio, L-23957, 19 SCRA 600 (1967); Cruz v. Primicias, L-28573, 23 SCRA 998 (1968); Pere v. Subido, L-26791, 23 SCRA 1074 (1968).

5 4 Wall. 2 (1866).

6 Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 US 398, 425 (1934).

7 Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 US 287, 293 (1941).
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